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1   
Chapter One
Introduction
I did not begin this study of post- war international statebuilding interven-
tions expecting to find failure. I was in fact looking for success. Mozambique 
seemed worthy of study because of its relative neglect in the scholarly 
literature, except that it had been held up as a success story for peacebuild-
ing and development. This was particularly in terms of the sequencing of 
its elections and demobilisation under UN auspices after the war ended in 
1992. It had experienced high GDP growth, had held regular elections, had 
undertaken a series of economic and political restructuring measures with 
the support of international financial institutions, had a former president win 
the Mo Ibrahim Prize for African Leadership and recorded a marked drop in 
its level of absolute poverty between 1996– 7 and 2003– 4.1 I read up on the 
theory and practice of peacebuilding and statebuilding, went through books 
on Mozambican history, processed the policy reports, looked at the profile 
of bilateral donors, multilateral agencies and NGOs in the country, learned 
Portuguese and set off.
Within three days of landing in the capital Maputo on a research visit in 
2009, I went to a health sector capacity- building workshop in an upmarket 
hotel downtown to which I was warmly invited by the organiser. Community 
leaders from around the country were gathered by an international NGO to 
receive leadership training that would help them fight malaria. The American 
consultant running the workshop explained that one of the main problems 
with health systems in the developing world was not a lack of resources but 
the lack of leadership and management skills. However, the consultant was 
here to train attendees in ‘The Challenge Model’, which could then be used to 
help fight malaria. She promised that this would be one of the most practical 
classes they would ever take.
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As the consultant did not speak Portuguese, the national administrative 
language in Mozambique, she spoke loudly and slowly in English, with a 
translator of variable quality summarising what she said. I looked around 
the room. The attendees were well dressed and authoritative looking, mostly 
men of varied ages between about thirty- five and sixty- five, and most were 
carrying multiple phones to attend to their various responsibilities. Some 
were paying attention, others looked somewhat disengaged, and one or two 
were texting. One of the more engaged attendees attempted to correct errors 
of translation a few times. The trainer laid down explicit ‘ground rules’ for 
attendance, such as no lateness and no texting. One attendee asked for the 
programme of activity and made a request to ‘follow the programme’, but this 
was not provided at this stage. Instead, videos were shown showcasing this 
particular leadership training package as it had been rolled out in an Egyptian 
hospital and a Nepali health centre (narrated in English). In both cases, the 
nurses and doctors were depicted as demotivated, disorganised and disinter-
ested, but according to the narrative of the video, following the roll- out of 
‘The Challenge Model’ ‘EVERYTHING changed!’.
After a substantial buffet lunch in the hotel restaurant, the workshop pro-
ceeded with another video, which was a clip from an Oprah Winfrey show, 
again in English – the story of Faith the dog. Faith the dog had been born 
with only two legs, but amazingly had learned to walk on those two legs, to 
the delight of Oprah and the crowd. This amazing story of perseverance and 
courage was a lesson for the beginning of the training: that we do not have 
problems, but challenges, and challenges can be overcome. Problems are 
outside, but challenges are something you own. The trainer went on to show 
the next video, which explained ‘The Challenge Model’, which entailed the 
leadership skill of writing down ‘challenges’ on a sheet of flip chart paper 
and listing ways of addressing them, in line with one’s mission. This was the 
basic management model that these leaders would study for the next five days 
and then roll out to others in their communities around the country to help the 
fight against malaria.
I did not attend the following days of the workshop but followed up with 
a number of the attendees in their hometowns across the country. One of the 
attendees had a master’s degree in business from a South African university 
and ran various business enterprises alongside attending to his religious 
congregation, being engaged in informal community policing and running a 
regular meal service for poor children in the city. I asked him what he had 
got out of ‘The Challenge Model’. He thought for a while and said that he 
had seen such things many times in management textbooks but that it was 
nice to have practical training on it. As for some of the other participants, 
he said, they didn’t understand so well. He laughed as he described the dif-
ficulties in explaining what ‘vision’ meant in management speak to the local 
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committee. Some argued saying that a vision meant seeing the Prophet. 
Others argued that vision meant ‘seeing’, so how could it mean something 
you think? He acknowledged that for many of them, nothing really had been 
understood and it was quite superficial. But he would continue and see what 
happened.
Another attendee, who had asked for the programme at the start of the 
proceedings, was a priest managing six congregations in a peri- urban area in 
a northern province. When asked about the usefulness of the programme, he 
said that there was an issue with the programmes on the ground. He said that 
people had had big expectations when they saw the NGO cars arrive, and the 
NGO was giving everything for the leadership training, but not enough was 
provided to make it work. They needed motorbikes to travel between com-
munities to spread messages about malaria but didn’t have them. They had 
been given US$100 at the district level for stationery and materials – on my 
calculation, this was about half the cost of a single night’s stay in the capital 
for the international NGO project intern. The lack of resources at the district 
level to execute plans was a common complaint amongst the members, which 
went into reports but never seemed to reach the national level. He explained 
that the transport was needed because usually priests did an exchange – the 
congregation didn’t find it strange that it was another priest from another 
church talking about malaria. They needed a new face, so they would listen 
and believe, but they had to trust the face as well. Wryly, he joked that using 
‘The Challenge Model’ they would redirect some of the funding towards 
transport costs or where they needed to spend it.
***
Very little that I had read in the literature on intervention thus far had primed me 
to understand what was going on here, which was nonetheless part of a flagship 
programme in international development and capacity- building. Why would 
the interveners spend so much money on a programme which was unevenly 
translated to its intended beneficiaries, who then did not have the resources or 
infrastructure at the ground level to make it work? Why would the interveners 
argue – and then say to the experienced, often qualified, assembled community 
leaders – that their problem was a lack of leadership capacity? How could they 
liken such leaders to a two- legged dog? And why would such leaders attend this 
kind of programme? What did this contribute to the strengthening of public ser-
vices and institutions? Why did complaints about the lack of resource at the local 
level go nowhere? Were these aspects only a technical problem of programme 
design and implementation? Or was there something else going on here?
As the research continued, I heard similar stories and issues raised all over 
the country. This suggested the answers to the questions were likely structural 
in nature, and these and other problems were widely understood by both 
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interveners and targets of intervention. Moreover, the problems also seemed 
deeply political, in the sense of turning on highly uneven sets of identities, 
entitlements and power relations between interveners and their targets. They 
articulated a particular kind of world view about who and what was to blame 
for poverty and the nature of state incapacity in the global South, which 
incidentally seemed at odds with the realities on the ground. Finally, this 
political structure clearly also resulted in significant patterns of both material 
accumulation and dispossession – whilst some were doing well materially out 
of these systems of intervention, it was always clear that this money might 
have been spent differently, and perhaps with better effects.
***
Working through these problems, this book concludes that interventions fail – 
and keep failing – because they are constituted through structural relations of 
colonial difference which intimately shape their conception, operation and 
effects. This interpretation emerges from an examination of the underlying 
dynamics of hierarchical presence,2 disposability, entitlement and depend-
ency which characterise intervention. Such tendencies continuously under-
mine the attempts to centralise capacity within the state and promote wider 
forms of development and good governance.
Addressing ‘failure’ is then not a question of Western interveners and 
scholars finding another technique for ‘fixing failed states’ through better 
sequencing, more cultural appropriateness, more hybridity, more partici-
patory planning mechanisms and so on. Nor can it be smoothed by more 
empathy or better social relations between interveners and targets. When all 
of these measures are constitutively structured by unacknowledged relations 
of colonial difference, they will simply produce small variations in this fail-
ure, rather than confronting the underlying dynamic itself. This underlying 
dynamic is a set of constitutive assumptions regarding who is entitled to 
what in the world (and who is to blame for failure), rooted in forms of com-
mon sense which naturalise such inequalities of wealth and power.
The book reaches these conclusions through taking seriously the interpret-
ations and experiences of the targets of intervention – those people whose 
political systems and livelihoods are supposed to be transformed by the 
expertise and assistance of international assistance. In Mozambique, whilst 
there have been ‘internationals’ of various kinds for centuries, the period after 
the end of the war in 1990 has seen a particularly large cohort active in the 
country promoting peace, development, democracy, good governance and so 
on. Whilst interveners tend to come and go after a few months or years, how-
ever, the targets of intervention remain to welcome the next batch and repeat 
the cycles of co- operation. What does the politics of intervention look like 
after two or three decades to them?
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EXPLORING THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION
This book uses the term ‘intervention’ as a shorthand for what are sometimes 
called ‘international statebuilding interventions’ which incorporate aspects 
of development, peacebuilding, good governance promotion and general 
capacity- building in ‘fragile states’ and conflict situations in the global South. 
Whilst there are literatures in different scholarly disciplines, from public 
administration to peace studies to agricultural sciences, that contribute to dis-
cussions about what should be done in such situations, this book contributes 
to an ongoing conversation which seeks to explain and interpret the political 
form and significance of intervention.
Within International Relations (IR), and conflict and peace studies, this 
debate has taken the form of debates on the ‘liberal peace’, peacebuild-
ing, post- war reconstruction, international statebuilding and international 
trusteeship.3 Unsurprisingly, many of the contributions to the IR debates 
have zeroed in on questions of sovereignty – in some senses, the ‘master’ 
concept of IR. Many contextualise the sovereignty question in terms of 
the moral and political legitimacy of intervention, its role in maintain-
ing international order and the promotion of specifically liberal norms. 
Some of the research particularly focuses on the imperial ‘paradox’ of 
international governance in a territory which is designed to lead to sover-
eignty and state strengthening, but which has to undermine sovereignty to 
do so; whilst some see this as in principle feasible and necessary, others 
do not.4
A specific and important strand of this debate examines the intersection of 
intervention and globalisation – in particular, the emergence of a global neo-
liberal economic and political orthodoxy, driven by the West, which has been 
reformatting all states but particularly those in the global South. In these argu-
ments, sovereignty no longer marks a state boundary but is now articulated as 
a frontier, in which there is a blurring of regulatory and administrative spaces 
and responsibilities. In these approaches intervention is fundamentally about 
the production of global liberal governance, centred around international 
institutions such as the World Bank.5
Another strand of the literature, often ethnographic and practitioner- 
 oriented in terms of its methods, to some extent influenced by critical 
development studies, has sought to analyse and deconstruct the spaces and 
practices of international intervention, with a view to talking about how these 
condition the outcomes of intervention on the ground.6 In focusing on the 
gaps between policy and practices, they have not always focused on develop-
ing a wider argument about the broader political significance of interventions. 
However, these works have contributed to the debate by refocusing the gaze 
of the analyst on the lived experiences of interventions, particularly through 
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the multiple ways in which interveners and targets negotiate the space of 
intervention, through forms of accommodation, resistance, avoidance, per-
formance and simulation. This has had the consequence of opening up the 
gaps between policy and practice for scrutiny, shedding light on the imaginar-
ies of interveners, the bureaucratic and physical worlds in which they live and 
opening up the political logics therein. It has also offered a sensibility which 
is more attuned to the ways in which power and legitimacy are expressed and 
mediated in intervention contexts.
The contribution of this book to the debates on the politics of intervention 
is twofold. First, it seeks to articulate and address the reductive treatment in 
much of the analysis of the intended beneficiaries, or whom I call the ‘targets’ 
of intervention.7 I argue this is not a methodological accident but emblem-
atic of diverse forms of intellectual Eurocentrism within scholarly research. 
Counteracting these involves specific strategies for decolonising research, 
focused on recovering the targets of intervention as political beings. I explain 
the choice of the term ‘target’ later in this chapter.8
Second, this book builds an alternative explanation of the international 
phenomenon of intervention upwards from the experiences, interpretations 
and historical conditions of these targets. Whilst this explanation has sig-
nificant points of congruence with the existing studies, it suggests a number 
of other dynamics which embed questions of sovereignty, imperialism and 
governance within deeper hierarchical historic structures of coloniality which 
nonetheless strongly condition the present order and regimes of intervention. 
By taking these constitutive structures into account, the apparent failures and 
limitations of intervention, as well as the experiences of it on the ground, 
become more intelligible as political phenomena. This then also reframes 
some of the possible responses in terms of political action. Specifically, it 
elicits the need for a political ethics of international assistance focused on 
questions of responsibility, justice and reparation, which can counteract the 
relations of disposability and dependency embedded in contemporary inter-
vention regimes.
DECOLONISING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
How do you ‘decolonise’ a discipline once characterised by one of its found-
ers as the study of ‘the best way to run the world from positions of strength’?9 
Indeed, the primary assumption of contemporary IR – that we live in a world 
of more or less independent states – in one sense fundamentally presupposes 
the already- existing success of decolonisation. What does it mean to say this 
assumption is wrong? And how would one proceed with the study of world 
politics after that?
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For the last twenty years or so, a number of contributions have been 
made in the field which unearth the past and present of its colonial origins, 
objects of study, methodological approaches, ethics and zones of exclusion 
or silence.10 In this sense, a clear case has been made for IR as a colonial dis-
cipline in its constitution, even when we look at its traditional concerns such 
sovereignty, war, nationalism, international law, international institutions, 
trade, human rights, democracy and so on.
Within these debates, the organising principles of race and empire and their 
ongoing significance in the present are being excavated, demonstrated and 
engaged as political issues. Such work expresses a wider engagement with the 
histories and politics of decolonisation, the contributions of anti- colonial and 
postcolonial thought in the twentieth century and a political context in which 
questions of empire – this time for the United States – were reintroduced 
into public discussion. In short, this productive line of thinking has brought a 
number of forgotten histories back into view.
However, the ‘decolonising’ element of this question calls for more. 
Specifically, it calls for scholars to engage, examine, retrieve and cultivate 
other ways of thinking about and being in the world that can form alter-
native points of departure to the hegemonic knowledges of empire. The 
central aim must be to reject the assumed ways in which global humanity 
is intellectually ordered into a hierarchy of ‘advanced’ and ‘backward’ 
groups, along lines produced by historic systems of colonial exploitation 
and dispossession. This means rethinking world politics in terms of its 
histories, geographies, economies, ecologies, conceptions of the human, 
the social, the sacred and the mundane and so on. This requires thinking 
about the kinds of research methods and models to be used and the kinds 
of constituencies for and with whom the research might be produced 
(Sabaratnam 2011).
Whilst this is difficult, luckily we as scholars do not have to start from 
scratch. Once we accept the need to think otherwise, the world is full of 
already- existing possibilities. Whilst many of these ways of thinking were 
forged in and through the historical experiences and connections of empire, 
others have survived them over a longer period.11 These different ways of 
dealing with the human condition, often but not always cultivated through 
experiences of suffering and de- personification, reframe questions of the 
political, power, justice and ethics in ways which do not take the current state 
of the world for granted.
Neither do we have to abandon the terrain of substantive explanation 
and analysis in the search for different points of departure. One widespread 
characterisation of postcolonial thought – in my view erroneous – has been 
that its embrace implies a dialogue- inhibiting form of philosophical relativ-
ism that precludes convincing analysis. On the contrary, an embrace of the 
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postcolonial question can considerably strengthen and enrich understand-
ings of the world we live in, in terms intelligible to existing philosophies of 
social science but which challenge its exclusionary starting points (Go 2016). 
Articulating what Go calls a ‘perspectival realism’ in the pursuit of global 
social theory, ‘decolonising’ our study of the international holds out a sub-
stantive promise for more widely enriching our understanding of the causes 
and dynamics of international order, if those are the questions of common 
interest.
This book makes a contribution to the project of decolonising IR in three 
ways. The first is demonstrating, through the extended treatment of a contempo-
rary ‘real- world’ phenomenon – international statebuilding interventions – that 
the need and possibilities for decolonising the study of world politics does not 
need to be, principally, an exercise in history. Finding out that the progenitors 
of the discipline in the twentieth century were racist colonisers is important, but 
finding out that the contemporary aid regime operates on racialised hierarchies 
of entitlement presents a more timely opportunity for demanding change.
The second contribution is its excavation of a theoretical debate informed 
by specific traditions of critical thinking in IR – broadly put, liberal, 
Marxist, Foucauldian and constructivist – which maps and interrogates their 
Eurocentric tendencies. Such an exercise, whilst focused on the specific topic 
of intervention, has been demonstrated as useful for opening up lines of think-
ing within other topics characterised by similar debates. Whilst these traditions 
can all contribute to projects of global justice, without serious attention to the 
people in whose name justice is being pursued as political subjects and not 
mute objects, they are likely to remain constrained in their vision and analysis.
The third contribution made by the book to decolonising IR is through the 
suggestion, development and implementation of particular decolonising strate-
gies appropriate to the task, informed by anti- colonial thinkers, on the one 
hand, and feminist standpoint theory, on the other.12 In this sense it does the 
work of putting together a toolbox to reframe the politics of intervention, but 
which might also be used in other contexts and situations where the analytic 
problems are similar. More than simply ‘good social science’ – which might be 
one way of ensuring the inclusion of histories, political interpretations, material 
conditions in a particular space – the argument makes its strategic choices in the 
light of specific and asymmetric forms of analytic erasure within the research.
By bringing a decolonising approach to the study of international interven-
tion, this book works through an ostensibly colonial relation of international 
power – intervention – with analytic methods which are explicitly designed 
to unpack this dynamic at the level of theory and practice. The interaction 
of topic and method in this regard is particularly productive, generating an 
understanding of dynamics which are highly visible and important from the 
ground but receive less analytic attention amongst scholars than they should.
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RESEARCHING INTERVENTION IN MOZAMBIQUE
As previously mentioned, to study international intervention in Mozambique 
is to study a site where intervention is perceived to have been both relatively 
successful and pervasive in terms of its reform of the state institutions. It has 
not received the same level of research coverage in the international state-
building literature as more high profile and expensive post- war interventions 
in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Lacking any high- profile post- war 
justice mechanisms, or dramatic incidents following its elections, this rela-
tively impoverished, Lusophone country on the southern tip of Africa has 
been nonetheless tagged as a ‘donor darling’, receiving over 80 per cent of 
its public budget in aid in the immediate post- war years. Graham Harrison 
(2004) has also designated it a ‘governance state’, one in which the World 
Bank and other institutions have constitutively permeated the state infrastruc-
ture and its financial management systems. In this sense it is a ‘hard case’ 
of sorts for the contemplation of international intervention as having been 
unsuccessful.
Research within Mozambique for this project took place in 2008, 2009 
and 2014, amounting to about six months’ stay in the country in total. 
I interviewed over 150 people, of whom 22 were not Mozambican, princi-
pally in Portuguese, some in English and others in Makua with translation. 
Interviewees were selected from across the hierarchy of international 
co- operation, from a minister and senior civil servants to health workers 
and farmers’ associations, as well as those less directly involved such 
as journalists, civil society organisers, academics and students. I was 
also invited to directly observe intervention ‘events’ by various parties. 
The research covered the sectors of health, governance and agriculture 
and was carried out in three different provinces in different zones of 
the country (Maputo, Sofala and Nampula). Interview data was supple-
mented through access to the national and local press, TV and radio, elite 
commentaries published in the media, books bought in Mozambique or 
academic journals, online historical archives, government documents, 
donor policy and evaluation documents. It is also more widely supported 
by extended secondary academic sources on African political economy 
and history, ethnographies of social power and international aid, and stud-
ies on the nature and effect of aid.13
The research on Mozambique here is used as a basis for engagement 
with both individual and shared understandings of international intervention 
since the end of the war in 1990, rooted in a historical appreciation of ideas 
of political order, identity and conceptions of justice within the space. This 
necessarily also involves an engagement with a wide range of questions from 
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agricultural economics to the history of the liberation struggle, to cosmolo-
gies of sorcery and witchcraft. The claim of this book is not to have rendered 
such things authoritatively or completely on their own terms. However, it 
does aim to provide an account of international intervention as seen through 
and with these factors.14 To this extent, the empirical material forms an impor-
tant part of the argument, even if not in any sense surprising to those familiar 
with Mozambique or other aid settings. Its contribution is in the disclosure 
of alternative bases for interpreting the political significance of intervention.
Throughout the book I refer to people in Mozambique as the ‘targets’ of 
international intervention. On the one hand, I wish to avoid the language of 
‘beneficiaries’, widely used in policy and implementation documents, as it 
presupposes positive effects of intervention analytically, which often turn out 
not to be the case. It also implies a direction of agency from intervener to 
beneficiary which renders the latter as passive. Other possible formulations, 
such as ‘the local’, can also presuppose a particular significance about the 
political dynamics which to some extent pre- empts the analytic case, as I 
explain further in  chapter 2.
On the other hand, in using the language of ‘targets’, I also avoid the 
language of the ‘subaltern’, popularised in postcolonial thought and in some 
spaces used to characterise the native subject under colonial rule (Shilliam 
2016). One reason is that the term is now (infamously) bound up with a set 
of debates about interpretive closure and access to languages of power in 
which this work does not directly intervene. Under the conditions in which 
this work took place, my interlocutors would not always fit the description of 
‘subaltern’ in relation to our discussions of intervention. However, the use of 
the term ‘targets’ is also a positive choice as a descriptor fitting the structural 
relations of intervention that I am trying to depict. Practices of intervention 
need to be guided by an idea of the objects of intervention – those people 
or institutions that are to be transformed. However, to name these people as 
‘targets’ is to leave open the significance and effects of their being targeted. It 
allows them to be positioned within the political relationship without prejudg-
ing a particular analytic outcome.
STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK
The book is structured into two sections. Part I makes a theoretical and 
methodological argument about how and why ‘decolonising’ the study of 
intervention is necessary. It begins in  chapter 2 with an account of the recent 
history of policy and debates on statebuilding, which had to contend with the 
accusation that such projects were ‘imperial’ in character. The chapter then 
expands into a discussion of how even ‘critical’ accounts of these relations 
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have been excessively Eurocentric in their analyses. By this, I mean that they 
have consistently focused on the ‘West’ and interveners as the central object 
and subject of politics, whilst erasing, avoiding or objectifying any engage-
ment with the targets of intervention as subjects in their own right.
Chapter 3 then seeks to remedy this exclusion by developing ‘decolonis-
ing strategies’ for research, based on the anti- colonial thought of Du Bois, 
Césaire, Fanon and Cabral. It identifies three useful methods for overcoming 
the forms of erasure identified in the literature – a recovery of historical pres-
ence, an engagement of political consciousness and an investigation of the 
material conditions of the targets of intervention. It reinforces the analytic 
prospects of these strategies through a discussion of feminist standpoint the-
ory and its claims for greater scientific objectivity when researching political 
phenomena ‘from below’.
In Part II, these strategies are put into practice, in three extended illustra-
tive discussions of intervention in Mozambique on the state, the peasantry 
and the politics of anti- corruption. Chapter 4 looks at the effects of interna-
tional intervention on the functioning of the state – the ostensible object of 
statebuilding. It does this through an account of what has happened to the 
health sector, as seen, narrated and experienced by those on the ground. The 
chapter argues that although public services have visibly improved since the 
end of the war due to international support, in key respects the state has been 
‘unbuilt’ and fragmented by aid, which targets link to structural problems of 
impoverishment, aid dependency and donor protagonismo.
Chapter 5 narrates the effects of international intervention on the peasantry 
and agricultural sector, focusing on Nampula Province. Building on the nar-
ratives of farmers and agricultural workers, it argues that intervention has 
refrained from supporting policies that would provide crucial material sup-
port to peasant farmers, particularly through the state, meaning that for many 
farmers engaging with the activities they and the state promote is a risky 
business. It situates this tendency as a manifestation of the historic structural 
indifference to the conditions of smallholder farmers since colonial times, 
rooted in a sense of their political and economic disposability.
Our final illustration looks at the politics of anti- corruption in Mozambique 
as a means of exploring the limits and blind spots of intervention. Chapter 
6 argues that there are multiple ways of thinking about and explaining the 
problems of corruption in the country, of which technocratic ‘good govern-
ance’ approaches are a small and relatively contained part. More popular and 
powerful are ways of thinking about contemporary corruption through the 
icon of Samora Machel, first president of independent Mozambique, famed 
for his zero- tolerance attitude to corruption, and ideas which link corrup-
tion fundamentally to questions of greed, appetite and social equity. In this 
wider intellectual framework, although international intervention supports 
 
 
 
 
12 Chapter One
   
anti- corruption activities, its own expensive, wasteful and pro- wealth charac-
ter is understood to be a contributor to the cultures of corruption which have 
emerged over the last thirty years.
The concluding discussion in  chapter 7 brings together the key findings 
of the book to ask what they disclose about the politics of international 
intervention. This chapter argues that it is difficult to make sense of interna-
tional intervention as a ‘bad fit’ for ‘local’ contexts, a grand project of global 
neoliberal governance or a set of faulty bureaucratic and social practices. 
Instead, we need to make sense of and explain the asymmetric tendencies 
which persistently cause it to fail, despite widespread knowledge of its prob-
lems. The concepts of the ‘coloniality of power’ and ‘relations of colonial 
difference’ are used to provide useful interpretive and explanatory purchase 
regarding the constitutive structures of contemporary statebuilding interven-
tions, through developing a connection between the epistemic and material 
impacts of Western- centrism at the global level and the concrete practices 
of intervention. Whilst most discussions of these concepts are relatively 
abstract, they appropriately illuminate and explain the dynamics of protago-
nismo, dependency and disposability identified within the case. With this 
framework in mind, the conclusion discusses the difference a decolonising 
political ethics of intervention might make. It offers three suggestions for 
how interveners could make their policies and practices less immediately 
destructive, whilst acknowledging that a more fundamental, decolonising 
change in attitudes, practices and structures is necessary to realise any long- 
term emancipatory potential.
NOTES
 1. This figure is taken from IMF (2007: 10).
 2. What will be discussed and characterised as protagonismo in  chapter 4.
 3. An introduction to this debate is available in Campbell et al. (2011). Significant 
monographs on this topic include Chandler (1999, 2004, 2010b), Duffield (2001, 
2007), Paris (2004), Chesterman (2004), Richmond (2005, 2011, 2014), Zaum (2007), 
Pouligny (2006), Heathershaw (2009), Autesserre (2010, 2014), Hameiri (2010), Mac 
Ginty (2011). Important edited volumes include Chesterman et al. (2005), Pugh et al. 
(2008), Lémay- Hebert (2009), Richmond et al. (2009), Call et al. (2009), Campbell 
et al. (2011), Tadjbakhsh (2011), Richmond et al. (2011) Turner et al. (2014) and 
Turner et al. (2015).
 4. See, for example, Paris (2010) in defence of liberal peacebuilding, against the 
critical approaches.
 5. Governance arguments are most strongly associated with Harrison (2004), 
Duffield (2007), Hameiri (2010, 2014), Williams (2008, 2013), Zanotti (2011).
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 6. The most significant of the ethnographic approaches to peacebuilding, state-
building and aid within IR are Pouligny (2006), Heathershaw (2009), Lémay- Hebert 
(2011), Iñiguez- de- Heredia (2012, 2017), Autesserre (2014) and Smirl (2015). These 
draw some influence from a longer tradition of this work within anthropology and 
development studies, particularly Ferguson (1990), Chambers (1997), Mosse (2004), 
Mosse et al. (2011).
 7. I would largely exclude Pouligny’s excellent account of Peace Operations 
Seen from Below (2006) from this comment. Her work articulates a sociological 
grounding for reading the operation of power from below and contains striking 
commentary on the significance of how the UN functions in post- war contexts. Her 
conclusions on how they are perceived and why strongly resonate with my findings 
of interveners in the longer term. However, her account of the political stakes does 
not fully elaborate some of the key issues articulated in this book.
 8. With this in mind, I deliberately avoid the language of ‘beneficiaries’, widely 
used in policy and implementation documents, as it presupposes positive effects of 
intervention analytically (and also often turns out not to be the case). Other formu-
lations, such as ‘the local’ can also presuppose a particular significance about the 
political dynamics which also, to some extent, pre- empts the analytic case. For these 
reasons, I have settled on the language of ‘targets’ of intervention as suitable for the 
analysis of this book.
 9. E.H. Carr, in his 1977 correspondence to Stanley Hoffman, quoted in Haslam 
(2000: 252– 253).
 10. Significant contributions include Doty (1993), Krishna (1993), Darby et al. 
(1994), Grovogui (1996), Barkawi and Laffey (1999, 2002, 2006), Vitalis (2000, 
2015), Inayatullah and Blaney (2003, 2010), Long and Schmidt (2005), Jones (2006), 
Shilliam (2006, 2009, 2011, 2015), Bilgin (2008), Agathangelou et al. (2009), 
Muppidi (2012), Hobson (2013), Anievas et al. (2014).
 11. Examples include Rao (2010), Shilliam (2015), and Pham et al. (2016).
 12. See also Julian Go’s chapter on the subaltern standpoint (2016:  chapter 4).
 13. Important sources include Batley (2005), Bozzoli and Brück (2009), Cabrita 
(2000), de Bragança and Wallerstein (1982), Egerö (1987), Geffray (1990), Gengenbach 
(2005), Gray (1982), Hall and Young (1997), Hanlon (1984), Henriksen (1978), Honwana 
and Isaacman (1988), Jone (2005), Marshall (1993), Moreira (1947), Mosca (1999), 
Newitt (1995), Pitcher (1996, 2006), Vail and White (1980), and Weinstein (2002).
 14. The publication of this book is accompanied by a translated summary of its 
findings in Portuguese, which will be shared and discussed with interviewees and 
others on a return trip presenting the findings. An online discussion space will be 
developed at http:// meerasabaratnam.com in 2017.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
Part I
DECOLONISING CRITIQUE
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Chapter Two
Intervention, Statebuilding 
and Eurocentrism
International interventions in post- war or post- crisis environments are par-
ticularly interesting spaces for studying global politics – that is, questions of 
power, authority, legitimacy, representation, distribution, sovereignty and so 
on, as enacted between different countries and peoples. To explain why we 
need to decolonise the study of intervention, however, we need to identify 
its existing ‘colonial’ parameters. This chapter argues that existing studies 
of intervention and statebuilding have tended to locate and understand its 
politics primarily with respect to the power, activities, presence, intentions 
and policies of Western interveners. Although it has successfully ques-
tioned their role, even in ‘critical’ accounts there are many manifestations 
of Eurocentrism in how ‘politics’ is defined and located. This generates an 
impasse within critique. Despite the recent ‘local turn’ and ‘everyday turn’ 
in the research on intervention, the targets of intervention remain located as 
mute objects or data points rather than serious interlocutors with an alterna-
tive standpoint or traditions of knowledge. In this sense, most scholars and 
analysts have not yet seriously attempted to ‘study up’ from the experiences 
and perspectives of target societies.1
I begin the chapter with a brief overview of the now extensive scholarly 
debates on post- war intervention and statebuilding (which I now simply 
refer to as ‘intervention’ for simplicity). Already burgeoning towards the 
end of the 1990s in peacebuilding circles, the invasions of Afghanistan and 
Iraq by Western armies prompted a much wider interest in the problem in 
the Western academy, as well as a much larger response which drew on and 
developed various critical theoretical resources in IR. In the main part of the 
chapter I argue that various exemplars of critical accounts of international 
intervention are constrained by various forms of Eurocentric thinking about 
Western and non- Western subjects. Such forms of thinking constitutively 
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ignore, bypass or depoliticise the targets of intervention. In the final part of 
the chapter, I look at how attempts to correct for some of these problems 
have nonetheless revealed a depth of alignment with intervention as a politi-
cal practice that strongly permeates the analysis. These arguments pave the 
way for decolonising strategies informed by standpoint approaches, which 
are explained in  chapter 3.
THE BEGINNER’S GUIDE TO NATION- BUILDING2
It seems a commonplace now amongst Western policymakers and many 
intellectuals that the most obvious answer to war, crisis, famine, disaster, 
terrorism and poverty in the global South is more and better governance via 
international statebuilding, but this was not always the case.3 This specific 
way of labelling interventions emerged over the last twenty- five years, in 
which certain circumstances, abilities and ideologies converged, enabling 
the coalescing of contemporary intervention practices around this idea.4 
Scholarly literature became not only a part of this emerging common sense 
but also a site in which it was contested.
The field of peace studies had been suppressed during the Cold War in 
much of the West as politically suspect, as much of it was connected to or 
informed by an opposition to Western and global militarism. With the end 
of the Cold War, the immediate upswing in international peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding missions (see Boutros- Ghali 1992) allowed peace studies 
scholars into the limelight, particularly to lead discussions on how reconcilia-
tion, rehabilitation and reconstruction should be conducted in ‘war- shattered’ 
societies (Crocker et al. 1996; Kumar 1997; Lederach 1997; Pugh 2000).
At the same time, there was a growing interest in the problem of failed 
states (Helman and Ratner 1992), ‘good governance’ for economic policy 
(Williams and Young 1994) and the idea of human security through develop-
ment (UNDP 1994). The neat silos in which security, development, peace, 
economics, human rights and so on had been contained began to break 
down via a common focus on governance and the role of the state in deliv-
ering goods and services (Duffield 2001). This was informed by a grow-
ing academic discourse on state failure and state collapse (Zartman 1995). 
Emblematically, in 1995 UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros- Ghali issued 
a Supplement to the Agenda for Peace, which underscored the need to radi-
cally reimagine intervention beyond its limited peacemaking mandate:
It means that international intervention must extend beyond military and human-
itarian tasks and must include the promotion of national reconciliation and the 
re- establishment of effective government. (1995: §13; emphasis added)
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This was a significant moment in which the UN’s apparent Cold War reluc-
tance to intervene in political affairs was openly jettisoned, in favour of an 
embrace of all kinds of reforms and transformations to defeat the scourge of 
state failure and war.
In much of the policy- oriented academic literature, this led to discussion 
about intervention technique and sequencing. One of the most influential 
thinkers of this period, Roland Paris, argued that liberalisation reforms should 
occur only after institution- building had taken place (1997, 2004). This was 
an argument not only for statebuilding but also for protracted, carefully con-
trolled statebuilding. It corresponded historically with the kinds of extended 
international transitional administration taking place in Bosnia, Kosovo and 
East Timor, as well as the unfolding chaos in Iraq and Afghanistan, follow-
ing the US- led invasions in 2001 and 2003, respectively. Others contributed 
reflections on how and why interventions could work to promote not only 
internal stability but also wider global order, including in the fight against 
terrorism (Rotberg 2003; Fukuyama 2004; Call and Wyeth 2008; Ghani and 
Lockhart 2009).
The founding of the Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding in 2006– 7 
thus coincided with the high point of political and academic activity around 
the questions of how what was now called intervention and statebuilding 
would work. However, it also responded to a thread of scholarly literature 
which had been critical of the politics of international statebuilding from a 
variety of angles, particularly its resonances with imperial trusteeship. This 
resonance was picked up by Chandler (1999), Duffield (2001, 2007), Bain 
(2003), Caplan (2005), Hill (2005), Richmond (2005), Zaum (2007), Mac 
Ginty (2010) and many others in the ensuing debates. Not all of these think-
ers thought this was inherently problematic for the project; some concluded 
that it was a necessary structure that needed to be embraced for the good of 
post- war populations in the absence of proper government (Caplan 2004; 
Zaum 2007).
Others, however, took this critique more seriously and argued that it implied 
serious ethical and political challenges for the project of intervention. It is to 
these ‘anti- imperial’ critical readings that the rest of this chapter now turns. 
They are interesting not only in terms of their own content but also as repre-
sentatives of critical- theoretic approaches to the study of IR. Such approaches 
are mindful of two well- known principles in the critical study of IR: First, 
that all theories are attached to some particular purpose (Cox 1981) and that 
their ontologies selectively tell a story about what politics is and where to 
look for it (Walker 1993). Second, as a consequence, they also – however 
provisionally – close down possibilities, telling us what is not possible.
If it is true that the critical literature is systematically Eurocentric in 
various ways, it is also true that it must close down some ways of thinking 
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about the world.5 It is of course perfectly possible to mount a thoroughly 
Eurocentric attack on imperialism, and there are long legacies of this kind 
of thinking in IR (Hobson 2012: 234– 284). However, as Gruffydd Jones 
(2006) has argued, fully comprehending the ways in which imperialism may 
be a constitutive feature of the international requires a reckoning with the 
habituated Eurocentric patterns of disciplinary knowledge, including preva-
lent critical theories, methods and arguments. To this end, this book seeks to 
‘decolonise’ critique by reversing some of its key assumptions.
WHAT IS EUROCENTRISM AND HOW 
DOES IT LOCATE THE POLITICAL?
Although Eurocentrism has multiple incarnations, overall, it can be described 
as the sensibility that Europe is historically, economically, culturally and 
politically distinctive in ways which significantly determine the overall char-
acter of world politics. As a starting point, we might regard it as a conceptual 
and philosophical framework that informs the construction of knowledge 
about the social world – a foundational epistemology of Western distinc-
tiveness. Overall, within Eurocentric sensibilities, ‘Europe’ is a  cultural- 
geographic sphere (Bhambra 2009: 5), which can be understood as the 
genealogical  foundation of ‘the West’. Ascione and Chambers (2016: 303) 
argue that over time, this has morphed from a view of Europe as the supreme 
force in world history to a view of Europe as prima inter pares while retain-
ing its ontological claim as the generative centre of modernity.
In his piece ‘Eurocentrism and Its Avatars’, Immanuel Wallerstein (1997) 
argues that many critical literatures in world history nonetheless reproduce 
tropes of Eurocentrism in their analyses. Here I suggest these avatars be 
grouped under three broad headings: culturalist, historical and epistemic. For 
thinking about where the politics of intervention is ‘located’, it is necessary 
to unpack these forms of Eurocentric thinking and reflect on how they shape 
contemporary scholarly debates.
Some of Eurocentrism’s culturalist avatars, as identified by Wallerstein 
(1997), are now relatively well recognised by scholars across various disci-
plines. The most famous is probably Orientalism, which is a framing of the 
East through negative and/ or feminised stereotypes of its culture, political 
character, social norms and economic agency. This framing casts it as a 
space of tradition and opportunity to be governed and explored, or alter-
natively feared, by the rational and enlightened West (Said 2003 [1973]). 
This is closely allied to the avatar of civilisational thinking, which assigns 
to the West as a whole a package of secular- rational, Judeo- Christian, 
liberal democratic tolerant social values, in contrast to other civilisations 
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such as the ‘Indic’ (Wallerstein 1997: 97– 98). However, this cultural-
ist avatar seems to have taken new forms since the apparent decline of 
public Orientalism. As Balibar (1991) has suggested, there are important 
functional continuities between old and new frameworks based on ‘civili-
sation’, ‘race’ and ‘cultural difference’ in reproducing an idea of Western 
distinctiveness. Although now rarely supremacist, this culturalist form 
of Eurocentrism is generative: It posits the core ontological difference 
between the West and its Others as arising from their distinctive cultures 
or civilisations, with major political issues emerging from the question of 
cultural difference and how to manage this. On this reading, a mismatch 
of ‘cultures’ is the location of the political, which is about a negotiation of 
incompatible value systems.
Eurocentrism also manifests through historical avatars. The first of these 
is the assumption that Europe is the principal subject of world history, as dis-
cussed by the Subaltern Studies research group, and especially Chakrabarty 
(2000). This is the tendency of historians (Hobsbawm is offered as the exem-
plar) to see the emergence of capitalism and industrialisation in the West as 
the real driver of history and non- Western societies as either ‘outside history’ 
or lagging behind Western historical development. A closely related historical 
avatar includes the notion of Historical Progress (Wallerstein 1997: 96), as 
elaborated in much post- Hegelian theory, which understands human history 
as not just linear but also self- consciously improving the human condition 
through the trying out of different political ideas. Again, these particular 
forms are understood as somewhat outmoded in scholarship, although they 
seem to reappear in new guises.
This tendency is evident not only in proclamations of the ‘End of History’ 
(Fukuyama 1989) but also in forms of Marxist thought that endow the West 
with historical ‘hyper- agency’ in terms of world- historical development 
(Anievas et al. 2013; Hobson 2004, 2007, 2012). For Bhambra (2010), the 
emphasis is on the assumption of ‘endogeneity’ in the story of the rise of 
Europe: the idea that European development was self- generating – driven by 
war, competition, the Enlightenment and technological advances – and then 
diffused out to the rest of the world via imperial expansion. This thus rein-
states Europe as the implicit subject of world history and historical sociology 
and occludes the contemporaneous and necessary involvement of the wider 
world in this rise (Barkawi and Laffey 2006). Both old and new historical 
versions of Eurocentrism understand different parts of the world as more and 
less ‘developed’, or more and less ‘modern’, indicating a strong connection 
between geographic- cultural space and temporal/ scalar positioning (Hindess 
2007; Hutchings 2008). What this means is that politics proper, thought of as 
the evolution of social relations, is focused in global terms on the West as its 
primary site and agent.
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Finally, we can identify Eurocentrism’s epistemic avatar, which is the 
purported atemporal universalism of modern social scientific knowledge 
(Wallerstein 1997: 100). In this tendency, social scientific modes of knowl-
edge which emerged in Europe from the nineteenth century onwards are rep-
resented as supremely privileged in their understanding of social phenomena 
above other modes of knowing, as demonstrated through their powers of 
abstraction, reasoning and objectivity. This also establishes a hierarchy of 
knowers with the authority to speak about the world, which tracks their posi-
tions in relation to the Western academy (Smith 1999). Put bluntly, it is an 
assumption that ‘the West knows best’, particularly when it comes to critical 
thinking. Thus, even apparently ‘anti- imperial’ or ‘postmodern’ critiques of 
social science often do not disrupt the overall claims to hegemony of social- 
scientific or legal knowledge (Mignolo 2002: 86– 90) where there is no reck-
oning with the question of epistemic location or a refusal of anything other 
than its own universalist claims. This is because such knowledge presents 
itself as a logically bounded totality.
Yet, there is a tension that emerges from what Shilliam calls the ‘double 
hermeneutic’; this is the tension inherent in the claim that, on the one hand, 
all social beings interpret reality, but, on the other hand, scholastic interpreta-
tions are better than others (2014: 355). As a consequence, one of the ways 
in which this manifests itself is through the asymmetric casting of doubt on 
some claims – purported to be ‘biased’ or ‘suspect’ – more than others. In an 
analytic sense, then, these knowledges are often ignored, downgraded and 
circumscribed – included as ‘data points’ rather than having any interpretive 
validity in and of themselves. This habit is particularly pronounced where 
the other knowers are understood as distant from and culturally ‘Other’ to 
Western academic knowledge.
Overall, Eurocentric tendencies in scholarship limit thinking about the 
world in three identifiable ways: first, where politics is located; second, who 
knows about it; and third, what kinds of responses are thinkable. To repeat, 
a general belief in Western historical/ epistemic primacy does not necessarily 
lead to support for an imperialist politics – indeed, as will be discussed, what 
is interesting is the manifestations of these tendencies in anti- imperial work. 
And none of these accounts are ‘crudely’ Eurocentric in the sense of being 
anachronistically Orientalist, racist or triumphalist. Rather, their analyses are 
often informed by ‘cutting’ edge critical theory. My argument is that they 
lead to a limited understanding and explanation of the politics of interven-
tion, a circumscribed sense of the possibilities for connections and solidarities 
between the West and non- West, as well as a limited articulation of what an 
anti- imperial politics can look like. Without a substantive alternative to the 
Eurocentric philosophical terrain upon which the debates have taken place, 
the critiques themselves may become ‘apologia’ (Chandler 2010: 137) for 
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what exists rather than grounds for alternative political practices. Thus, whilst 
much of the work that has emerged is ‘indispensable’, it is also often ‘inad-
equate’, to borrow Chakrabarty’s terms (2000).
CRITIQUES OF INTERVENTION AND  
THE PROBLEM OF EUROCENTRISM
The critical debate on intervention is haunted by five particular avatars 
of Eurocentrism, which extend from the categories above: a bypassing of 
target subjects in empirical research; the analytic bypassing of subjects in 
frameworks of governmentality; an ontology of cultural Otherness distin-
guishing the ‘liberal’ from the ‘local’; the analytic constraints of ‘everyday’ 
approaches; and nostalgia for the liberal social contract, the liberal subject 
and European social democracy. These collectively generate an impasse in 
which Western liberalism is not only seen as a source of oppression but also 
implicitly rehabilitated as the only true source of emancipation. As such, the 
critical approaches developed hitherto cannot imagine a world in which the 
targets of intervention can generate their own meaningful terms of engage-
ment with interveners, nor critically evaluate the problems of modernity and 
development, rooted in their own experiences and knowledges. In unpacking 
the manifestations of Eurocentrism in the debate, this section draws attention 
to the constitutive absence and depoliticisation of the targets of intervention 
as political subjects.
Bypassing the Targets of Intervention: Research Design
Whilst this is not the trend in much of the more recent critical literature on 
intervention, in the earlier work which set the research agenda, and in later 
formulations, there was a tendency to exclude or marginalise consideration of 
the people targeted by its interventions from the analysis. This methodologi-
cal exclusion manifested itself in different ways.
In a seemingly banal sense, it manifested often in work which sought to focus 
principally on the conceptualisation of intervention rather than its specific effects. 
Thus, some major works in the debate such as Richmond’s Transformation of 
Peace (2005) and Chandler’s International Statebuilding: The Rise of Post- 
Liberal Governance (2010) did not represent or engage with the activities or 
behaviour of particular peoples targeted by interventions since these were not 
considered relevant to the overall framing of this part of the research. Rather, 
such projects focused on making sense of the genealogies, contradictions 
and trajectories of intellectual traditions associated with the ‘West’ as the key 
object of intellectual concern. In the context of these deliberations, the peoples 
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targeted by intervention were implicitly irrelevant to the conclusions that 
the research wanted to draw about the West’s relationship with post- conflict 
environments. Whilst this is a methodological ‘exclusion’, then, it does not on 
the surface appear a problematic one – rather, it seems a natural artefact of a 
research design focused on Western ideology.
Contributing to the theoretical framing, methodological exclusion of 
targeted peoples also characterised some of the empirical work on particu-
lar interventions. This often focused very largely on the policies, beliefs 
and practices of interveners. Exemplary of this were Chandler’s Faking 
Democracy after Dayton (1999) and Empire in Denial (2006), which almost 
exclusively looked at the international administrative structures and their 
illiberal and hypocritical exercise of power. Where Bosnians did appear it was 
briefly and through a short explanation of their nationalist voting patterns in 
the context of anti- corruption policies (2006: 154– 157).
This same methodological exclusion is, however, also manifested in other 
influential writings. For example, in the cases covered in Richmond and 
Franks’ Liberal Peace Transitions (2009), the focus is almost exclusively 
on the trajectory of the interventions. References to Kosovans, Cambodians 
and Timorese people are relatively brief, generally about recalcitrant politi-
cians and offered in service of a critique that demonstrates the failure of 
intervention to transform societies. Chesterman (2008) argues that the same 
applies to Zaum’s (2007) treatment of target societies. Even in Duffield’s 
work, which has included substantial efforts to ground the global theoreti-
cal critique in particular cases, the overarching tendency is to focus on the 
interveners and their practices in those environments rather than the peoples 
targeted by intervention. We see this particularly accentuated in the handling 
of the Zambezia Road Feeder Project in Mozambique (2007: 82– 110) and 
continuities in Western attitudes towards Afghanistan (133– 158). Similarly, 
Hameiri’s excellent analysis (2010) of the production of regulatory state-
hood through statebuilding in the Asia- Pacific uses several cases but sys-
tematically ignores the targets of intervention in the analysis. Again, there 
is a seemingly solid rationale for this – that this is the right methodological 
choice to make because these interventions are themselves the object of 
inquiry.
Yet, it is a fundamental of most philosophies of social science that method-
ological choices reflect underlying ontological premises (Jackson 2010). As 
noted, our ontological premises determine our basic understanding of what 
the political is (Walker 1993). In these cases, to look only at interveners, and 
to imply by design that this is an adequate account of the politics of interven-
tion, helps to reproduce, however unintentionally, the background assumption 
that what is exterior to the interveners does not matter for an appreciation of 
the politics of intervention. The fact that no explicit methodological rationale 
 
 
 
 
 
 Intervention, Statebuilding and Eurocentrism 25
   
is usually offered for this absence suggests further that this is a matter of 
scholarly common sense.
Thus defining and framing inquiry in this way supports habits of intel-
lectual Eurocentrism by emphasising ‘Western’ agency as the terrain – or 
ontology – of the political. What is under question then is not whether the 
methods used were adequate to the research question, but why research ques-
tions about the politics of intervention are continuously framed in this way. 
On my reading, this methodological habit precisely reproduces tenets of ‘old’ 
Eurocentrism here – the implied passivity, irrelevance or mysteriousness of 
the non- West – even as it tries to avoid them. It is argued that in combination 
with other avatars of Eurocentrism, it has played an important role in generat-
ing a critical impasse within the debate.
Bypassing the Targets of Intervention:  
Governmentality Approaches
Allied to the methodological exclusion of peoples targeted by interven-
tions is a deeper analytic bypassing of such peoples as substantive political 
subjects, via critical accounts of global governance. Specifically, the recent 
critical debate on intervention has also been strongly influenced by the idea 
that it is a form of liberal governmentality (Dillon and Reid 2000). This is 
the idea, derived from Foucault, that it is a productive technology of power 
which seeks to regulate life through its freedom – through the production 
of self- governing liberal subjects. Global governmentality is understood 
to operate through a system of biopolitics (Duffield 2005; Richmond 
2006), which articulates sovereign power as shifting from a management 
of territories to a management of bodies. The debate has been unfolding 
alongside the broader rise of Foucaultian analytics of the international and, 
particularly, in analyses of war, peace and global governance (Jabri 2007; 
Joseph 2010).
This analytic framework, particularly as developed by Duffield in the two 
books cited here (2001, 2007), has been incredibly powerful as a critical 
imaginary for understanding the structure and practices of the development- 
security nexus and intervention in the global South. This is a nexus that is 
seen to have emerged following the realignment of global economic pro-
cesses, which increasingly exclude the South from relations of production 
and investment. In doing so, however, they re- include it via relations of lib-
eral governance. Whilst the first book details the emerging strategic complex 
of actors – humanitarian, military, developmental – who intervene widely 
in the global South in new configurations, the second rearticulates these 
practices via a reading of liberal power as the expanding frontier of Western 
biopolitical governance.
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Duffield offers his reading of what he calls ‘liberal peace’ (2001: 9), 
through Foucault, as a contrast to theses suggesting that interventions are a 
‘new imperialism’ (2001: 31– 34). Rather, liberal power is ‘based on the regu-
lation and management of economic, political and social processes’ (34). One 
of the most important themes emerging from the later work (2005, 2007) is 
the unevenness of life- chances and developmental expectations accorded to 
the liberal West and the rest of the world. For Duffield this is a continuation of 
colonial strategies of rule (2005) and liberal racism (2007: 185– 214) designed 
to contain populations globally. Duffield roots this analysis in Harvey’s cri-
tique of capitalism’s need to manage ‘surplus populations’ to avoid systemic 
crises (2007: 10– 11).
However, the central problem with this analytic framework is its tendency 
to ignore the exteriority of power through the discounting of Southern sub-
jecthood. This turns on the way in which political power and political subject-
hood are implicitly understood to interact and produce consent:
People in the South are no longer ordered what to do – they are now expected 
to do it willingly themselves. Compared to imperial peace, power in this form, 
while just as real and disruptive, is more nuanced, opaque and complex. 
Partnership and participation imply the mutual acceptance of shared norma-
tive standards and frameworks. Degrees of agreement, or apparent agreement, 
within such normative frameworks establish lines of inclusion and exclusion. 
(Duffield 2001: 34)
Here it is strongly implied that liberal governmentality in the international 
sphere operates in the way liberal governmentality operates within ‘advanced 
liberal societies’ (Joseph 2010: 224) – that is, specifically through the effec-
tive and productive power of liberal discourse to produce self- regulating and 
self- governing subjects. If it is the case that intervention consists of a strategic 
complexes of governance consisting of different actors (Duffield 2001: 12), 
then the implication is that they are governing the global South through the 
production of liberal subjectivity.
Nonetheless, the way Duffield frames it here actually hedges the bet 
over Southern subjectivity whilst simultaneously endorsing the overall 
framework. That is, he does not want to say outright that Southern political 
subjecthood is produced by intervention. Yet, this is the point of the ‘govern-
mentality’ framework insofar as it has any analytic traction, that is that it is a 
specific modality of power which works through the production of volition 
rather than coercion or loyalty. Throughout the work then, we have a fairly 
strong narrative of intervention and development- security network as a web 
or network of Western liberal power, the logic of which works through its 
attempted production of liberal subjects.
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There are long- standing debates as to whether a Foucaultian account of 
power is applicable at a global level (Joseph 2010), adequate for understand-
ing either the development of governmental structures themselves or the 
nature and character of resistance. As Jabri (2007: 74) notes, postcolonial 
critiques have argued that Foucault’s own focus on the European expression 
of power ignores the differentiated character of imperial power. In particular, 
they have problematised Foucault’s ignoring of the specific historical angle 
or positionality that informs his account of power (Jabri 2007: 74) and, subse-
quently, his account of resistance that is itself ideologically somewhat empty, 
as noted by Spivak (Jabri 2007: 75).
These concerns can be applied to the use of his work in the interven-
tion debate and are specifically connected to the account of the subject that 
is implicit in the governmentality framework. Chandler has made similar 
claims, arguing that there is an emptiness to Duffield’s call for a ‘solidarity 
of the governed’ as a response to global liberal governmentality (Chandler 
2009: 67), because it lacks a political subject as the basis for critical theoris-
ing (2010: 153).
Chandler is right, to an extent; there is a lack of political subjecthood 
in Duffield’s account of intervention. However, what he does not clearly 
specify is that the principal lack is of the subjecthood of those targeted by 
intervention, not those seen to be enacting it. The latter are given plenty of 
strategic agency, intentionality, ideology and purpose in this framework. In 
this sense, Duffield’s account of intervention is not dissimilar to Chandler’s, 
in that they both focus on the agency and subjecthood of interveners, even if 
under the analytic of governmentality this becomes more diffuse. Yet, they 
both exclude and avoid considerations of the exteriority of this power, and 
particularly the peoples targeted by interventions as political subjects. The 
habit of methodological exclusion noted in the previous section becomes 
then cognate with the analytic exclusions which underpin the framework 
of governmentality. Both exhibit avatars of Eurocentrism, which emphasise 
the distinctiveness and importance of Western behaviour and primacy whilst 
occluding the space outside it.
Ontologies of Otherness: Liberal- Local Relations,  
Hybridity and Resistance
Sensitive to the problem of such occlusion, a major strand of recent literature 
has emphasised the need to rethink the relations between the ‘liberal’ and 
the ‘local’ in intervention settings (Mac Ginty 2011; Richmond 2009, 2010, 
2011), in what has been labelled a ‘fourth- generation’ approach (Richmond 
2011), or ‘the local turn’ (Mac Ginty et al. 2013). This writing has taken a 
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much more proactive approach to research with and about the peoples tar-
geted by intervention, aiming to correct the impression of smooth liberal 
transformation and the ‘romanticisation’ of the local (Mac Ginty 2011: 2– 4). 
Yet the paths it has taken have, inadvertently, reinforced a Eurocentric under-
standing of intervention, through using an ontology of ‘Otherness’ to frame 
the issues. This is despite attempts to acknowledge or engage with the ‘colo-
nial’ resonances of peacebuilding and ‘postcolonial’ ideas.
Prominent amongst these accounts is Richmond’s recent work on the ‘lib-
eral peace’ (2005, 2006) and ‘post- liberal peace’ (2009, 2010, 2011), which 
frames the key problems of intervention through an ontological distinction 
between the ‘liberal’ and the ‘local’. In earlier writing, intervention is elabo-
rated as foundationally liberal and genealogically endogenous to ‘Western’ 
traditions of thought, reflecting Enlightenment, modern and post- Christian 
liberal values (Richmond 2005). In post- conflict settings, however, the liberal 
peace is critiqued for exercising forms of hegemony that suppress pluralism, 
depoliticise peace, undermine the liberal social contract and exercise a colo-
nial gaze in its treatment of local ‘recipients’ of intervention. In view of these 
various aspects of failure, liberal intervention is characterised as ‘ethically 
bankrupt’ (2009a: 558) and requiring re- evaluation.
The ‘local’, on the other hand, is a space characterised by ‘context, cus-
tom, tradition and difference in its everyday setting’ (2010: 669), which is 
suppressed by interventions. The very conception of the ‘post- liberal peace’ 
is thus about the ways in which two ontologically distinct and separate 
 elements – the ‘liberal’ and ‘local’ are ‘rescued and reunited’ via forms of 
hybridity and empathy, in which ‘everyday local agencies, rights, needs, cus-
tom and kinship are recognised as discursive “webs of meaning” ’ (2010: 668).
Mitchell has recently argued that Richmond’s conception of the ‘local’ 
is not ‘a reference to parochial, spatially, culturally or politically bounded 
places’ but ‘the potentialities of local agents to contest, reshape or resist 
within a local “space” ’ (Mitchell, 2011: 1628). Richmond himself has also 
been concerned not to be understood as ‘essentialising’ the ‘local’, empha-
sising that it contains a diversity of forms of political society (2011: 1628), 
including that which is called the ‘local- local’. Indeed, this more recent work 
elaborates a more complex conception of the ‘everyday’ as a space of action, 
thought and potential resistance.
Despite these qualifications, however, there is much conflation, inter-
changeability and slippage between these conceptions of the ‘local’. 
Accordingly, the ontology of Otherness, understood as cultural distinctive-
ness and alterity, continuously surfaces throughout the narratives of liberal 
and post- liberal peace. Not only is intervention closely linked to the intellec-
tual trajectory of the ‘West’, but a conception of the ‘local’ as non- modern 
and non- Western often reappears:
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This requires that local academies and policymakers beyond the already lib-
eral international community are enabled to develop theoretical approaches 
to understanding their own predicaments and situations, without these being 
tainted by Western, liberal, and developed world orthodoxies and interests. In 
other words, to gain an understanding of the ‘indigenous’ and everyday fac-
tors for the overall project of building peace, liberal or otherwise, a via media 
needs to be developed between emergent local knowledge and the orthodoxy of 
international prescriptions and assumptions about peace. (Richmond 2009: 571; 
emphasis added)
There is a clear emphasis here on the need to engage with the ‘indigenous’ or 
‘authentic’ traditions of non- Western life, which seems to reflects an underly-
ing assumption of cultural difference as the primary division between these 
two parties. This reproduces the division between the liberal, rational, modern 
West and a culturally distinct space of the ‘local’.
Indeed, the call for a post- liberal peace is often a call for peace-
building to reflect a more ‘culturally appropriate form of politics’ 
(2011: 102) which is more hybrid, empathetic and emancipatory. This 
emphasis on tradition and cultural norms as constitutive of the ‘local’ is 
carried through in recent research on interventions in Timor Leste and the 
Solomon Islands. These focus largely on the reinvigoration of ‘custom-
ary’ houses and institutions as a form of ‘critical agency’ in distinction 
to liberal institutions and the state (2011: 159– 182). The point here is not 
simply that there is an account of alterity or cultural difference within 
the politics of intervention, but that the liberal/ local distinction appears 
to be the central ontological fulcrum upon which the rest of the political 
and ethical problems sit (see also Chandler 2010: 153). Therefore ‘local’ 
or ‘everyday’ ‘agency’ is seen to be best expressed to the extent that it 
reclaims ‘the customary’ and is not ‘co- opted’ by the internationals. It is 
understood as enhanced where codes of ‘customary law’ become part of 
the new constitutional settlement.
A similar division can be seen in Mac Ginty’s framework, which sees the 
hybridities in peacebuilding as emerging at the intersection of the ‘inter-
national’ and ‘local’ agents and institutions (2011). Again, this framework is 
built on an ontological distinction between the two which repeatedly splits the 
‘Western’/ ‘international’ from the ‘non- Western’/ ‘local’. Even though this is 
well qualified, overall Mac Ginty defends this distinction, arguing that if one 
were to abandon such potentially problematic labels, then this would lead to 
an abandonment of research altogether (2011: 94). This can quite straightfor-
wardly be read as a defence of the basic ontology of the project of the ‘local 
turn’, which is an ontology of the distinction between the West and its Others, 
which meet through various forms of hybridisation. Whilst Mac Ginty does 
not pursue the ethics of the post- liberal peace in the same way as Richmond, 
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the underlying intellectual framework also uses this distinction as the analytic 
pivot of the research.
We earlier defined Eurocentrism as the belief in Western distinctiveness, 
and I have argued that this is philosophically fundamental to ‘the local 
turn’ in the literature. This point is also picked up by Paffenholz (2015) and 
Randazzo (2016). This strand has put substantial analytic weight on fun-
damental cultural differences between these two entities, even whilst disa-
vowing any essentialism and making some substantive conceptual efforts 
to move away from this. Such difficulties are indicative of the deep hold 
that this particular avatar of Eurocentrism has on the critical imaginary. By 
contrast, the point made by a wide variety of other ‘postcolonial’ writers has 
precisely been against such an ontology of the international, pointing instead 
to the historically blurred, intertwined and mutually constituted character of 
global historical space and ‘culture’ (Bhambra 2009; Nadarajah et al. 2016). 
Whilst this is occasionally acknowledged, it does not interrupt the direction 
of argument as such.
The ‘Everyday’ and Hermeneutic Containment
That said, the turn to the ‘everyday’ in the literature on intervention is not all 
reliant on a culturalist or binary ontology of the ‘local’. Arguably the most 
significant recent work in the field of intervention scholarship is Severine 
Autesserre’s Peaceland (2014), which is a rich, close ethnographic study 
of various sites of international intervention. Autesserre draws on the recent 
‘practice turn’ in IR advanced by Pouliot, Adler and others (Bueger et al. 
2015), to develop an explanation of the failures of intervention rooted in the 
everyday practices of interveners including their knowledge practices and 
daily work routines. Unlike other scholars in the ‘local turn’, she does not root 
the term ‘local’ in terms of culture, agency or resistance, but uses it to describe 
in a positional sense to talk about people targeted by interventions (2014: 64). 
That is the approach also suggested in this book. Also unlike many of the 
studies already cited, she does not methodologically bypass those subjects but 
engages with them and presents their voices in the course of the study, relat-
ing them to the wider ‘structures of inequality’ which characterise Peaceland 
(2014: 194– 214). She also declines to characterise intervention as necessarily 
‘liberal’ by design, pointing to the disconnect between the seemingly ‘liberal’ 
ideals and its practical dimensions (2014: 52– 53). In this sense, Autesserre’s 
research design already shows some potential to work against the Eurocentric 
habits and tendencies in thinking about intervention that we have already 
identified. In addition, there is much which focuses in on the political tensions 
between interveners and targets, following in the footsteps of Pouligny (2006).
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Autesserre’s analysis, however, comes across also as an exercise in the 
hermeneutic containment of her ‘local’ interlocutors when it comes to their 
own analysis, even as she recognises the realities to which they point. In a 
number of places throughout the analysis, she quotes at length from amongst 
her interviewees, and these interviewees are explicitly referencing colonial-
ism, imperialism and racism (2014: 74, 100, 216). Yet, she herself system-
atically declines to take these as serious interpretations, often leaving them 
unremarked- upon or choosing to interpret them as part of more generic 
everyday structures of inequality or ineffective daily work practices. In the 
text there is occasional passing reference to ‘postcolonial theory’ or scholars, 
but these questions are never seriously elaborated. Indeed, the presence of 
African- origin international civilians in peacekeeping missions is implied to 
disqualify intervention as a setting in which colonial or racist relations might 
obtain (60– 61) – as if any institution of colonial governance was established 
only by whites.
The subsequent analysis conforms to what Debra Thompson characterises 
as ‘racial aphasia’ (2013: 44– 45) – an inability to speak about race, but in 
this case also colonialism and imperialism. Subsequently, the nature of the 
structural ‘inequality’ between ‘internationals’ and ‘locals’ is never fully 
theorised – it simply ‘is’ the grounds on which the ‘practices’ of interveners 
take place. Rather the ‘practices’ of interveners become not just a methodo-
logical entry point but the primary conclusion of her study into intervention. 
Autesserre’s conclusions and policy recommendations in this sense look and 
feel a bit strange as she exhorts interveners to try harder to be more reflex-
ive and less exclusionary or estranged in their social practices, but in ways 
which resonate with their existing priorities for intervention such as security 
(2014: Conclusion).6
For Autesserre, Eurocentric thinking is thus manifest in an ongoing and 
final epistemic alignment with the international interveners, whose good 
faith, technical expertise and policy objectives are taken as true, even in the 
face of the multiple alternative plausible interpretations that are available 
from her own empirical research as she has herself presented it. That said, 
one has the sense that throughout the text Autesserre is wrestling with the 
double hermeneutic discussed by Shilliam – the balance between a fidelity 
to her interpretive method and findings and the specific need to emerge with 
a story that aligns with the stories interveners tell about themselves and their 
motivations. This epistemic alignment, however, ultimately acts as a form 
of hermeneutic closure in favour of intervention, bypassing these alternative 
and less flattering interpretations and their significance. Rather, Autesserre’s 
conclusions offer yet another possibility for the deferred redemption of inter-
national intervention.
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Nostalgia for Social Contract Politics, Welfare Democracy  
and the Liberal Political Subject
The manifestations of Eurocentrism just discussed are prominent features of 
critiques which shape the basic starting points of research. This last avatar 
can, however, be characterised as more ‘recessive’ in critical scripts, occu-
pying a more muted but important place in the overall thinking. This is an 
implicit nostalgia for the social contract, the liberal subject and the welfare 
state, which are understood to provide the substance of many of the alterna-
tives to intervention. However, as will be further elaborated, these end up 
reinforcing the rationale for interventions rather than disrupting them.
The ‘social contract’ or even ‘liberal social contract’ is sometimes invoked 
in the critiques not only as a means of restoring balance between powerful 
and less powerful actors, but also as a way of shoring up intervention itself 
through moving away from neoliberalism. For Richmond, a ‘new social con-
tract’ offers a means of balancing the international with the indigenous, which 
provides the basis for a post- liberal peace with more ‘everyday legitimacy’ 
(2009: 567– 568). For Divjak and Pugh, writing in the context of corruption 
in post- conflict Bosnia, the main cause of corruption is understood as the 
‘absence of a liberal social contract’ (2008: 373). This resonates with other 
literature that has pointed to the ‘external’ rather than ‘internal’ contract 
engendered by peacebuilding (Barnett and Zürcher 2009).
This line of argument is interesting precisely because of the strong sug-
gestion that what is required is not a rejection of intervention, but the need 
to control it by bringing it into a classical liberal framework of account-
ability through contract. If only such contractarian relations were available 
to guide international- local relations, or indeed the relations between elites 
and masses, then intervention could, in Richmond’s words, be ‘salvaged’. 
Practitioners might of course point out that in a formal sense there are plenty 
of ‘contracts’ and agreements that govern intervention in all peacebuilding 
missions – governments necessarily consent to them, and constitutions are 
also forged through political processes which are designed to be ‘inclusive’. 
For critics who know this, however, the implication must be that these are not 
genuine or authentic forms of contracting.
Complementary to the call for a (better) social contract is also a call for 
more welfare provision and state intervention in post- conflict economies 
within a critique of neoliberal economic policy (Pugh 2005, 2009; Richmond 
2008). This resonates with Duffield’s observation that the provision of ‘social 
insurance’ for ‘surplus populations’ in the global North is not replicated in 
the South (2007: 217). In particular, Pugh emphasises the need for employ-
ment creation and labour rights (2008), and Richmond emphasises the meet-
ing of basic needs and rights through better state provision (2008). These 
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stipulations are both, however, combined with an emphasis on the need to 
uphold ‘culture’ or ‘heterogeneity’ (Pugh et al. 2008) in the context of a 
developmental political economy and with a consciousness of the problems 
of some of these objectives (Richmond 2011: 39).
Whilst the critique of the effects of neoliberal economic policy in these 
writings is very insightful and important, it is nonetheless interesting that 
the alternative vision is clearly based on a particular conception of state- 
led social democracy akin to that practised in post- war western Europe, but 
one which is able to accommodate culturally appropriate modifications and 
development. Again, however, practitioners might well point to this as actu-
ally reflecting the current centre of gravity in intervention policy (‘we are all 
Keynesian now’, quoted in Richmond 2011: 169). Moreover, they may note 
that it is Western donors themselves that have enabled any kind of social 
provision via health and education services to take place. Whilst critics might 
argue soundly that such provisions are everywhere inadequate, this does 
not seem to reflect any kind of real gap in thinking between interveners and 
critics.
In a slightly different vein, other critiques have shown a nostalgia for the 
liberal political subject as a basis of political action. Earlier, for example, we 
noted that Chandler (2010) critiqued Duffield for the thinness of the idea of 
the ‘solidarity of the governed’. In the same piece, Richmond is also criticised 
for a fear of doing epistemic violence to ‘the Other’. These concerns reflect 
Chandler’s criticisms of post- structuralist and cosmopolitan approaches, 
which mourn the loss of the ‘liberal right- bearing subject’ (2009: 56) and 
the ‘transformative dynamic ontology of the universal rational subject’ 
(2010: 155).
This is because, for Chandler, intervention does not represent so much the 
contradictions of divergent strands of liberalism but a degraded ‘neoliberal’ 
form which critiques autonomy (2010). Whilst it is never made totally expli-
cit what kind of politics of engagement Chandler would advocate, it is clear 
that his preoccupations with autonomy, sovereignty and the virtual death of 
political ideologies in the West indicate a kind of refounded pluralist liber-
alism in which ‘politics’ and ‘autonomy’ are themselves more highly valued 
as the foundation of a properly political project. Yet, as Jones has recently 
argued, this seems to depend upon an implicit defence of the ‘mythology’ 
(Chandler’s word) of unproblematic autonomy as the basis for political soci-
ety (Jones 2011: 237). Indeed, the focus on the unaccountability of interven-
tion and the critique of autonomy suggests that he, too, might be in favour of 
a classical liberal social contract as the alternative to neoliberalism.
Thus the critiques of intervention often remain tied to alternatives which 
reflect political imaginaries grounded in the vision of a ‘better’ European 
past, either in terms of ideas about the social contract or welfare state or 
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about the autonomous liberal political subject. These imaginaries may all 
be improvements in many respects on the present situation; however, it is 
perhaps disconcerting that these alternatives are framed in terms of and with 
references to such a past and that there is little real difference between these 
visions and those that practitioners of intervention themselves hold. These 
are an important limit to the potentiality of critique through confining the 
 intellectual spaces from which critique can emerge.
CONCLUSION
In a recent piece defending liberal peacebuilding, Roland Paris accuses its 
critics of failing to come up with alternatives to it, arguing that mostly they 
endorse variants of liberalism, or just nothing at all (2010: 354– 357; see also 
Begby and Burgess 2009). Indeed, in terms of the defence he offers, this 
is one of the most biting counter- critiques: There Is No Alternative. He is 
partially right, but for the wrong reasons. The problems emerge not because 
there is nothing ultimately better than liberalism but because the deeper 
framework of philosophical Eurocentrism denies the possibility of any real 
political exteriority to this broad category of ideas. So, even where interven-
tion is understood as a project of global governmentality, the only subjects 
and agents who appear in the picture are the interveners themselves. Thus for 
Paris it becomes relatively easy to claim that anything short of self- declared 
and non- consensual totalitarian colonialism enforced through naked violence 
is actually some form of – implicitly acceptable – ‘liberalism’, because there 
is an intellectual conflation of ‘Western’ activity with liberal action, and 
indeed the politics of intervention itself. This converges with Autesserre’s 
sense that whereas colonialism is characterised principally by prejudice and 
violence (2014: 56), contemporary intervention is not.
This leaves critiques trapped in an impasse, which may be characterised as 
a ‘paradox of liberalism’. On the one hand, the critiques problematise inter-
vention’s liberal biopolitics, cultural inappropriateness, neoliberal economic 
policies and unaccountability, but, on the other, they try to respond to these 
problems through some kind of middle ground, better practices or some kind 
of ‘proper’ liberalism of the past. This is the circle in which interventions and 
its critics find themselves enclosed, with interventions themselves apparently 
softening their edges and filling the space through emphases on ‘local own-
ership’, ‘participatory governance’, multidimensional approaches to poverty 
reduction and political ‘partnership’ with aid- recipient countries.
These reforms in intervention practice accordingly often overlap with 
critiques to such an extent that it is unclear whether critiques themselves 
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have only become descriptive, rather than critical, of the present directions 
in intervention policy (see Millar 2014). Overall, Duffield is consistently 
more conscious and sceptical of these colonial dimensions of the present 
security- development nexus (2005) and of the longer entanglements of ‘lib-
eral’ intervention practices with racism, imperialism and attempts to control 
the colonial frontier (2007). Others seem to recognise these continuities; yet 
Richmond cites the creation of the Tribal Liaison Council in Afghanistan as 
an indication of a hybrid interface between the international and local and the 
emergence of the ‘post- liberal peace’ (2009: 337). But is this really something 
to be celebrated as more ‘culturally appropriate’, or does it instead represent 
a more efficient instrument of neocolonial governance?
The critical literature on intervention thus far is characterised in various 
dimensions by forms of Eurocentric theory, method and conclusion and as 
such gives us only limited scope for understanding it, or reimagining the 
nature of intervention and its alternatives. This is so even as this literature 
produces multiple important insights about its significance, nature and 
functioning, particularly as it draws empirically closer to how intervention 
operates in more detail. In the next chapter, I show how our conceptual and 
methodological grounding can be rethought through strategies for decolonis-
ing our understandings.
NOTES
 1. Exceptions include Pouligny (2006), Heathershaw (2009), Autesserre (2010, 
2014).
 2. The title of a book released by the RAND Corporation (Dobbins et al. 2007). 
Much of this section draws directly on Sabaratnam (2011a) and Heathershaw (2008). 
See also Cunliffe (2012).
 3. A contrary, and important, reading of the place of statebuilding operations is put 
forward by Shahar Hameiri, who locates it not in the changes in peacebuilding prac-
tice but as part of a wider schema of global governance via the regulation of statehood 
(Hameiri 2013; Hameiri et al. 2015).
 4. This is, of course, not to deny the historical resonances and continuities in terms 
of content with broader projects of colonial and postcolonial development, which 
privileged the standing of external experts and models, and to which my argument 
will return; rather, it is to locate the contemporary idea of ‘international statebuilding’ 
as a specific discourse of recent heritage, with a particular rationale.
 5. This argument draws directly on Sabaratnam (2013) and extends it with regard 
to the most recent literature.
 6. See also review by Carayannis (2015).
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Chapter Three
Strategies for Decolonising 
Intervention
So, what is to be done? The Eurocentric tendencies in much of the present 
literature place limits on how we understand international intervention. As 
noted in the previous chapter, these tendencies work in different ways, and 
many of them are ‘anti- imperial’ in their sensibilities. However, they have the 
collective effect of heavily circumscribing the ontological and epistemologi-
cal bases of critique. This is because they depoliticise the ‘local’ targets of 
intervention and their significance and reinscribe interventions and interven-
ers themselves as the ‘true subjects’ of international politics. This not only 
creates a tension between their objectives and their methods, in some cases, 
but more fundamentally impoverishes the wider scholarly and public debates 
on intervention.
This chapter develops strategies for researching intervention from a ‘decol-
onising’ orientation, grounded both in the historical project of decolonisation 
and in scholarly debates about knowledge production. This chapter articu-
lates a set of principles on which to base research, as well as a philosophical 
grounding for the kind of approach advanced. The effect of these strategies 
is, first, to reconstruct the presence of target societies within the analysis 
and, second, to provide a rationale for how and why these might support an 
alternative explanation for the politics of intervention. This approach forms 
the basis for the analysis across the three subsequent chapters, each of which 
deals with an aspect of intervention in post- war Mozambique.
This chapter begins with a look at the historical project of decolonisation 
in the twentieth century through the work of W. E. B. Du Bois, Aimé Césaire, 
Frantz Fanon and Amílcar Cabral. These thinkers all contributed actively to 
the politics as well as the intellectual basis for decolonisation in/ of Africa, 
and all developed intellectual strategies to counteract discourses of colonial 
rule. Whilst contemporary manifestations of Eurocentrism in research on 
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intervention are in a number of ways distinct from early twentieth century 
justifications for colonialism, there is a common structure to the intellectual 
framing of hierarchy, exclusion and presence which means that mapping tech-
niques for dealing with colonialism onto Eurocentrism should be a productive 
way forward. The three strategies for the reconstruction of target societies 
which I borrow from these thinkers are a recovery of historical presence, an 
engagement with the political consciousness of subordinate actors and an 
appreciation of the material conditions in which they operate.1
The second part of the chapter engages with the debate around feminist 
standpoint approaches to the analysis of society. I argue that this provides 
a set of important rationales for why research on society is improved and 
made more ‘objective’ by engaging with the experiences and consciousness 
of those in subordinate positions, as also recommended by decolonising 
strategies. In this section, questions of representation, positionality, objectiv-
ity and epistemic privilege are discussed and clarified in relation to common 
critiques. This move is important in terms of underscoring the significance of 
the methodological challenge posed by these approaches to all research, even 
for those who are sceptical about the associated projects of anti- sexism and 
anti- racism to which feminist and decolonising strategies are often attached.
STRATEGIES FOR RECONSTRUCTING SUBJECTHOOD
In the previous chapter it was argued that intervention scholarship was char-
acterised by varied manifestations of Eurocentrism – the tendency to mark 
the West as the proper subject of political analysis, with ‘other’ people and 
societies (i.e. the targets of intervention) as analytically subordinate. To think 
against Eurocentrism, we need strategies to counteract this subordination. 
This is not to say that the reconstruction of subaltern subjects in and of itself 
delivers an adequate response, but it is a necessary starting point (Laffey and 
Weldes 2008: 560). Moreover, as Shilliam has shown (2016), the use of the 
concept of the ‘subaltern’ does not imply a being whose mind and being is 
completely dominated by colonial power – indeed, the project of ‘decolonis-
ing’ must in part articulate a ‘decolonise- able’ subject.
Of course, this is not a new problem. The modern global colonial project 
in which Western hegemony was historically forged has always had its crit-
ics, who, out of necessity, needed to make the intellectual space for moral 
and political challenges to it through decolonisation. As such, it makes sense 
to turn to some of the key thinkers involved in this project for inspiration. In 
doing so I bring together some common preoccupations of a quartet of think-
ers involved in the twentieth-century project for African decolonisation in dif-
ferent corners of the globe – Du Bois, Césaire, Fanon and Cabral. Whilst their 
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origins, training and approaches to analysis are diverse, encompassing sociol-
ogy, literature, psychoanalysis and agrarian political economy, respectively, 
they nonetheless converged intellectually and politically on the problem of 
the denial of African subjecthood within European thinking and advocated 
overlapping responses to the conditions of colonialism.2
These overlapping responses contribute to what I call the reconstruction 
of subjecthood in political analysis. By ‘subjecthood’ in this context, I mean 
the property of having one’s presence, consciousness and realities engaged 
in the analysis of the political space. This does not entail in and of itself spe-
cific conclusions but is a necessary precursor for analysis of political orders 
and – more broadly – ‘dialogue’ about such orders (Sabaratnam 2011: 782). 
As noted in the previous chapter, whilst the ‘local turn’ and other arguments 
have incorporated elements of this, they have often done so in ways which 
ultimately complement rather than challenge the Eurocentric set- up of the 
problem. By contrast, articulating the exclusion of target societies as a prob-
lem of ‘subjecthood’ in research gives us a platform for a more systematic 
rethinking. Whilst the three strategies below overlap philosophically, heuristi-
cally separating them helps to map out a pathway for analysis.
Recovering Historical Presence
In anti- colonial thought, it was argued that erasing a society’s historical 
presence was an important part of both colonial strategies of rule and of the 
Eurocentric political imaginary. Whilst Césaire (2000 [1955]) directs this cri-
tique against French colonialism, Cabral (1966) directs it against the Leninist 
orthodoxies of the European Left, both of which regarded the histories of 
colonised societies as largely irrelevant both to the political questions of the 
day and to the history of the world in general. Without a sense of ‘African 
Presence’, of past cultures, processes, events and practices, the existential 
crisis which colonialism had produced could not be discussed, challenged 
or rejected.3 Although the histories of Africa presented often took a celebra-
tory form in the context of decolonisation, many thinkers also resisted the 
temptation to glorify uncritically a precolonial African agency or presence. 
For example, Césaire wrote about the problem of coming to terms with the 
painful historical miseries of slavery as an integral part of African history in 
which Africans participated, even as he articulated the need for a celebration 
of Négritude. The broader point, common to these different orientations, was 
nonetheless to say that colonised subjects had histories in order to challenge 
the idea that they were blank slates or barbarians waiting to be civilised.
Du Bois, however, also makes the argument that Africa has not only 
histories but historical significance, that is, a significance with regard to 
its contributions to things perceived to be major achievements of human 
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civilisation. In his writings on The World and Africa: An Inquiry into the Part 
Which Africa Has Played in World History (2014 [1947]), he brings together 
a reading of Africa’s contribution to ‘antiquity’ with his global historical soci-
ological analysis of its place in modernity. This argument is framed this way 
in order to challenge the racist assumptions common at the time that Africa 
had no meaningful history or culture and certainly nothing transnational in 
character. Fanon’s analytic of African historicity made more assertive claims 
about the status of the African masses as an engine of historical change and 
the redemptive capacity therein for the future of humanity (Fanon 2008 
[1954], 1965), although he was more pessimistic about the effects of colonial 
rule on its contemporary historical presence. Either way, to say that colonised 
peoples had not only history (i.e. a past of significance) but also historical 
significance was – and in some sense remains – a radical departure from the 
common assumptions of modern scholarship.
By contrast, it is noteworthy that the majority of scholarly literature on 
intervention is fundamentally ahistorical when it comes to target societies, 
and this is symptomatic of their Eurocentric historiography.4 This is either 
because they do not attend to historical dimensions at all in their analysis, 
such as in the rationalist analysis of Barnett and Zürcher (2009) or the nar-
rative accounts of Chandler (2000, 2006) and Pugh (2005), or because they 
are principally focused on the lineages and presence of Western interven-
ers (Duffield 2001, 2007) and/ or their ideas (Richmond 2011). In a third 
variation, historical detail is mentioned simply in passing en route to dis-
cussing a generic typology of international- local ‘friction’ (Björkdahl and 
Höglund 2013).
Therefore, these spaces are analytically framed simply as being inter-
changeably non- liberal sites of post- war transformations, upon which pro-
jects of liberal governance are visited. Due to these sites lacking a historical 
presence, the analytic effect produced is that of these societies as a ‘blank 
slate’. In this sense, scholars treat the interveners themselves as the primary 
actors of interest for analysis, with target societies becoming strangely 
anonymised – in Björkdahl and Höglund’s words, cases are the ‘diagnostic 
sites’ (2013: 295) for the analysis of political relations.
There are at least two ways in which the failure to articulate target societies 
as historical entities in their own right has had implications for the analysis 
of intervention in the scholarship, beyond the general denial of presence. In 
the first instance, it is largely implied that liberal peacebuilding represents a 
novel form of governance- based liberal social transformation in post- conflict 
settings. Indeed, in particular cases, such as that of Richmond, it is made to 
sound as if engagement with the liberal peace represents a novel encounter 
not only with liberalism but somehow also with modernity in general as 
opposed to the world of local custom and tradition. This resonates with the 
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colonial projection that African societies were empty spaces historically and 
politically speaking.
Second is the corollary insinuation that the engagement with liberal inter-
vention is by default therefore an alien and inauthentic form of politics, in 
which those who adhere to it are understood as either co- opted into its ideol-
ogy via false consciousness, or engaged in elaborate game playing. Whilst 
this may be demonstrated to be a useful interpretation in specific instances, to 
assume it in advance of an engagement with political or social history of the 
actors seems to assume some sort of ahistorical and fundamental ontology of 
liberal- local difference. We have no sense of the ways in which many socie-
ties have been long- inserted into global connections and conditions associ-
ated with liberal modernity (Nadarajah and Rampton 2016), which is itself 
anyway constitutively hybrid (Laffey and Nadarajah 2012). This means we 
can neither understand the differences between places, nor the contemporary 
political terms on which they might engage with intervention. Whilst it is a 
problem across the formerly colonised world, the relative historical length of 
Portuguese and Spanish colonial rule means that such entanglements are cen-
turies older and in many cases carry their own forms of violence and erasure.
Decolonising the analysis of intervention thus means cultivating an appre-
ciation of the historical presence of target societies and contemplating its 
significance for the politics of intervention. Histories are of course always 
contested, and postcolonial historiography has questioned the construction 
of elite and nationalist accounts of historical presence in the postcolony 
(Prakash 1994). That said, David Scott (2004) argues that particular kinds 
of negation demand particular kinds of response. On my specific research 
question regarding international intervention, an appreciation of historical 
presence that allows us to evaluate the politics of engagement between inter-
national actors and the targets of their reform is appropriate.
For my study of Mozambique in the following chapters, I assume and 
engage with the historical presence of the state, the peasantry and the poli-
tics of anti- corruption, viewing the politics of intervention from this vantage 
point. This narrative locates and substantiates the territory of present- day 
Mozambique as being the subject of a series of different projects of modern 
rule and social organisation, of which the post- war international statebuilding 
era is a recent iteration. This historical sensibility draws directly on the nar-
ratives and context provided by project interviewees, as well as those given 
by scholarly sources and public histories. This allows an appreciation of 
questions of continuity and change, of interpretive and practical significance 
which reframe many of the issues surrounding the politics of intervention. 
Moreover, an understanding of Mozambique as having a historical presence 
is necessary to inform a critique which can engage with its peoples as proper 
‘subjects’ of politics.
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Engaging Political Consciousness
If the critiques of statebuilding interventions have been content to more or 
less ignore the historical presence of target societies, they have been equally 
willing to marginalise the political consciousness of their inhabitants, regard-
ing it as either irrelevant to the question of intervention’s legitimacy, or 
largely tainted or co- opted and thus unable to make authentic or relevant 
comment upon it. Yet, this also denies subjecthood to target societies; in a 
meaningful sense one cannot have subjecthood without the implicit assump-
tion of consciousness. In moral philosophy, it is the presence of the capacity 
for self- reflection – conscience – that renders it possible to discuss action as 
having moral significance: without this it is difficult to ascribe moral agency 
as generally understood. Similarly, being able to appreciate a self as a politi-
cal subject and imputing political meaning to his/ her actions must assume a 
form of political consciousness.
Echoing Fanon’s critique of colonial mentality (2008: 3), this overdeter-
mination within the analytic gaze means that the political consciousness of 
target societies can end up being understood as a form of empty mimicry 
without its own significance. This construction mirrors the ahistoricism of the 
analysis, in terms of denying presence and significance to people as proper 
subjects of politics. For some recent analyses this is the result of a focus on 
the productive character of liberal discourses of governance, which are thus 
understood as determining political consciousness (which then does not need 
to be looked at on its own terms). For others it seems to mark the key politi-
cal difference between interveners, who are unproblematically ‘authentic’ 
bearers of liberal consciousness and people in target societies who are not. 
Another tendency more broadly avoids interpretive analysis altogether when 
it comes to target societies, reading politics off manifest behaviour alone.5
These habits of ignoring political consciousness in analysis set off several 
alarms in the context of anti- colonial thought and decolonising struggles. At 
a general level, the denial of historical presence for colonised societies was 
interwoven with the idea that the natives’ heads were empty and lacking in 
the proper capacity for politics. This provided a key political rationale for the 
denial of sovereignty to ‘uncivilised’ peoples (Gong 1984; McCarthy 2009). 
This rationale was mirrored in academic terms as well; politics in the colonies 
was only a matter of if and how these spaces could and should be brought 
up to levels of European civilisation – matters on which natives could not 
possibly have as informed views as Europeans. To this extent colonial admin-
istration was its own branch of political science (Vitalis 2000), implying its 
separateness from politics proper.
The decolonising strategies of anti- colonial thinkers addressed this denial 
of political consciousness directly, but did so from different perspectives 
 
 
 
 
 
 Strategies for Decolonising Intervention 43
   
and with different objectives. I summarise here two relevant to this study 
of international intervention. First, engagement with political consciousness 
was understood to be a necessary decolonising act in its own right; it was a 
dialectical form of recognition and humanisation to counter the derecognition 
and dehumanisation effected by colonialism (Césaire 2000). In the context of 
expressing human and racial equality, a recognition of political consciousness 
amongst colonised populations established political grounds for rejecting the 
colonial relationship. Particularly for those forms of scholarship engaged with 
emancipatory or critical approaches, this should be a reason to think carefully 
about the implications of systematically excluding the political consciousness 
of the oppressed in studies of hegemony. This is not to reduce critical schol-
arship to the politics of recognition (Coulthard 2014), or what is sometimes 
pejoratively called ‘identity politics’, but to recognise that questions of voice 
remain an issue when dealing with Eurocentrism in scholarship.
The second purpose – in some senses more important for our analysis – 
of engaging the political consciousness of the colonised was intellectual 
and analytic. In this sense it is a clear departure from the politics of recog-
nition. At a general level, one could understand the nature of colonialism 
 differently – and often better – through the ways in which colonised peoples 
understood and experienced it. We see various versions of this claim worked 
out in the writings of anti- colonial thinkers. Particularly resonant and influen-
tial is Du Bois’ conception of ‘the veil’ (1994 [1902]: 3) which characterised 
the experience of living as a black subject in the United States: the situation of 
being simultaneously conscious of the white racist gaze as well as conscious 
of the power of black subjectivity to see through this. Sometimes referred 
to as ‘double- consciousness’, Gilroy (1993: 130) argues that this situation 
produces a particular and novel kind of political understanding, creativity and 
prospective space for self- realisation.
Césaire and Fanon had their own accounts of the colonised political subject 
as politically conscious, and each corresponded to the idea that there was 
something productive about the colonial condition which gave rise to impor-
tant differences in the perspectives of coloniser and colonised. For Césaire, 
this sensibility manifested in his eventual fallout with the French Communist 
Party (2010 [1956]), which explicitly rejected the possibility of the European 
Left ‘thinking for’ the colonised, particularly along lines which did not focus 
on the specificities of racism. His wider involvement in the Négritude move-
ment celebrating African culture, history and presence proceeded from his 
belief that they represented a space in which an alternative set of human 
political attitudes could be cultivated.
For Fanon, colonialism and racism produced specific forms of conflicting 
and alienating political consciousness (2008 [1954]) which nonetheless also 
contained within them the dynamic potential for overcoming via struggle and 
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resistance (1965, 1994). Yet, this required, particularly of colonised elites, 
the relocating of understanding, identification and political consciousness 
in the experiences, needs and ideas of the colonised masses. It also required 
a vigilance and reflexivity with regard to the new dispensations of national 
consciousness. Despite the various difficulties colonised societies would face 
in seeking it, political subjecthood per se was both necessary and achievable 
in the struggle against colonialism.
Looking at these brief examples together, three pointers emerge for 
engaging political consciousness as a decolonising strategy. The first is 
that the roots of political consciousness, and indeed political subjecthood, 
are multiple and themselves political – they derive from the antagonistic 
social relations of colonialism, the use of culture as a political resource 
and a conception of the humanity of the colonised. Each of these sources 
is used as a source for political consciousness, and each gives insight into 
how colonialism functions. The second is that these are relational and not 
essentialised conceptions of the political subject – coloniser/ native and 
white/ black relations are seen as constructed, provisional and there to be 
overcome by an emancipatory decolonisation. Even in their most ‘cultural-
ist’ form via Négritude, they represent a possibility for a cosmopolitan and 
humanist future (Wilder 2015). The third is that the ‘mundane’ or ‘everyday’ 
is political in its full sense, including individual and group experiences of 
discrimination, humiliation and frustration.
We have seen in the previous chapter that the study of interventions to 
date has tended to ignore the political consciousness (and content thereof) 
of target societies, with a few exceptions. It therefore reproduces a particular 
hierarchy of knowers and excludes various insights available to it regarding 
intervention, as well as the possibility of more deeply rethinking the nature 
of its politics. In this study of Mozambique, I have endeavoured to engage 
the political consciousness of those targeted by intervention, often by asking 
interviewees what and how they think about it and looking at this along with 
other sources of political discourse. Although I am not naïve about the poli-
tics of the interview setting, across the wide range of people that I spoke to, 
there was a very high degree of overlap in their understandings of the nature 
and functions of intervention which corresponded to both a sense of their own 
historical presence and of the material conditions produced by the interven-
tion setting. I treat these comments as expressions of political consciousness 
because they are comments and questions on the nature and distribution of 
power and the values that underpin it, questions of accountability and the 
distributive effects of policy. In the substantive analyses of the state, the 
rural economy and the politics of anti- corruption in this project, my analysis 
proceeds by taking these views seriously and asking what we learn about the 
politics of intervention.
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Investigating Material Realities
The final decolonising strategy proposed is about engaging the ‘material 
conditions’ of societies under intervention. Put simply, this is a ‘real-
ity check’ on the nature of the problem (Hameiri 2011), which does not 
assume a correspondence between the stated aims and representations of 
interveners, and the experience of intervention itself. It is also a counter- 
narrative to thinking about the political economy of intervention primarily 
as a function of a specific ideology (e.g. neoliberalism) rather than a con-
crete system lived by humans in time and space. This element is already 
present to some extent within the intervention literature and more widely 
in the literature on the anthropology of aid.6 But it often stands alone or 
is bracketed as part of the standard operational failures (inefficiencies, 
ineffectiveness) of development assistance. Put into interaction with an 
awareness of historical presence and political consciousness, however, 
it becomes a powerful basis for critical thinking – an alternative reality 
to map and explain.7 This resonates with Césaire’s method for thinking 
about colonialism:
In other words, the essential thing here is to see clearly, to think clearly – that 
is, dangerously – and to answer clearly the innocent first question: what, funda-
mentally, is colonization? (2000 [1954]: 32)
They throw facts at my head, statistics, mileages of roads, canals, and railroad 
tracks.
I am talking about thousands of men sacrificed to the Congo- Océan. I am 
talking about those who, as I write this, are digging the harbor of Abidjan by 
hand...
They dazzle me with the tonnage of cotton or cocoa that has been exported, 
the acreage that has been planted with olive trees or grapevines.
I am talking about natural economies that have been disrupted, harmonious 
and viable economies adapted to the indigenous population – about food crops 
destroyed, malnutrition permanently introduced, agricultural development ori-
ented solely toward the benefit of the metropolitan countries; about the looting 
of products, the looting of raw materials. (2000 [1954]: 43)
Here, Césaire’s polemic gestures towards a concrete political economy of 
colonialism, rooted in situated questions of dispossession and suffering. He 
is of course well versed in more orthodox Marxist political economy regard-
ing capitalism and imperialism as well, as were most anti- colonial thinkers 
of the time. However, there was a sense in which simply reading a critique 
of capitalism off historical materialist categories would not be adequate to 
the political and intellectual task of decolonisation. Like Cabral and Fanon, 
he was very clear that a theory and practice of decolonisation was needed 
which would deal with what we might call the ‘phenomenological excess’ 
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of colonialism – the ways in which it produced specific patterns of living in 
the colony and how this translated into ways in which social and political 
hierarchies were sustained.
Cabral’s political economy thinking is also very much of this type, 
rooted in the concrete effects of colonialism on the peoples of Guinea 
and the kinds of practice this was built on. His indictments in Portuguese 
Colonial Domination, one of the early liberation struggle pamphlets 
published in 1960, lists a number of specific complaints against colonial-
ism rooted in dispossession, including the non- ownership of cultivated 
property, the forced acceptance of low prices, the driving of Africans off 
more profitable land and crop holdings, the high profits of the colonial 
companies, the ‘native tax’ on Africans and the spending of these revenues 
on Europeans. His comparisons are visually and politically arresting: ‘The 
setting up of each European family costs Angola one million escudos. 
For an African peasant family to earn that much money, it would have to 
live for a thousand years and work every year without stopping’ (Cabral 
1979: 20– 21).
This strategy contributes to decolonising analysis in three ways. First, and 
straightforwardly, it indicates the ways in which colonial discourse misrep-
resents itself and its developmental or civilising effects. This is significant 
if colonialism desires to be understood as a substantive project of human 
betterment and not a hypocritical project of domination and/ or exploitation. 
Second, it exposes the specific ways in which the hierarchy of colonial dif-
ference impoverishes and inflicts material suffering on the colonised, again 
pushing against the idea that colonialism improves and uplifts rather than 
oppresses. Third, it asks for analysis to problematise the idea that African 
lives are worth less than those of the European settlers and to begin thinking 
about political economy on this basis.
With this sensibility in mind, in this study I pursue a specific decolonising 
analysis of the political economies of intervention as understood and experi-
enced by different groups of people, including public sector workers, media 
commentators, government officials, donor representatives and farmers, and 
corroborated with wider studies that attend to these conditions. Within these 
analyses emerge narratives of its material conditions that are too distinctive 
to be contained under the more general framework of a global neoliberalism; 
instead they are evidence of structures emerging from more specific asym-
metric relations of hierarchy, income and production within and alongside 
intervention. These include the political economy of the aid ‘industry’ as an 
important productive and relational context for how intervention is practiced 
and reproduced. However, it is just as important to see this as embedded 
within wider social relations which pre- exist the post- war interventions and 
which have not necessarily been transformed by it. It is these patterns which 
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are read through the concept of the coloniality of power in the concluding 
chapter to the book.
***
To summarise, in order to pursue a decolonising analysis, I argue that we 
need to begin by assuming and engaging the historical presence, political 
consciousness and material realities of the targets of intervention. These strate-
gies work against the kinds of erasure that allow political analysis to become 
largely Eurocentric in its logic and focus, and in doing so they open up intel-
lectual space for an alternative interpretation of the politics of intervention. In 
the following chapters, I bring together these three decolonising strategies to 
evaluate the politics of intervention in three contexts in Mozambique – within 
the central state apparatus, within the rural economy and within the politics of 
anti- corruption. The final chapter of the book contemplates how intervention 
can be understood with reference to the findings of these strategies and the 
question of the coloniality of power in contemporary world order.
However, before this, it is useful to substantiate more clearly the philosophical 
rationale for how and why decolonising strategies are an appropriate response 
to the problems of Eurocentrism in research – that is, not only in the service of a 
specific political project but also in the service of a more philosophi cally robust 
platform for thinking about global order. In the next section, I do this through 
working with feminist standpoint theory and its claims for how and why ‘situ-
ated knowledges’ improve our understanding of structures of power – and why 
this is not just the substitution of one set of biases for another. I address some 
of the questions it raises through the thinking of black and Third World feminist 
scholars on the relationship between science and political action. There are sig-
nificant overlaps between the reconstruction of subjecthood advocated by anti- 
colonial thinkers and the adoption of situated knowledges by feminist thinkers, 
and this lineage is noted already in the literature (Laffey and Weldes 2008: 559; 
Go 2016). Both confront a situation in which political institutions together with 
standard scholarly approaches normalise the exclusion of specific questions, 
actors and positions from discussions about politics, even when they form part 
of these structures in a material sense. Thinking about this as simultaneously a 
‘scientific’ problem as well as a political problem is a necessary step towards 
better starting points for studying how politics functions.
FEMINIST STANDPOINT, ‘OBJECTIVITY’ 
AND EPISTEMIC PRIVILEGE
A basic premise at the centre of standpoint theories is that the knowing sub-
ject can never be fully separate from the object of knowledge, thus refusing 
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the idea that most scientific knowledge is naturally ‘objective’ (i.e. subject- 
independent) in nature. In this sense, they sit amongst a wide set of critiques 
of the modern episteme. Rather, scientific knowledge is socially constructed, 
partial and contains within it a number of biases and blind spots. Thus, claims 
for the ability of scientific knowledge production practices to transcend par-
ticular interests or values by virtue of uniquely superior rational methods 
should be regarded with suspicion. This generic premise – that knowledge 
is always ‘situated’ – is important but not unique to standpoint approaches. 
What is distinctive – and most controversial – in standpoint theories is the 
way that this purported problem in the nature of modern scientific knowledge 
is reconstructed as a resource for thinking about how to reconstruct sciences 
‘from below’ in the service of subjugated people and groups.
Early feminist standpoint thinkers critiqued the monopolisation of sci-
entific communities by ‘masculinist’ world views, methods and analytic 
priorities, which led to the exclusion of women’s lives, knowledges and expe-
riences from the purview of scientific knowledge. Dorothy Smith made this 
argument for the discipline of sociology, which at that point tended to end its 
analysis of society at the front door of the household in which most women 
were predominantly embedded. For Smith, this exclusion was emblematic of 
the institutional complicity of sociology as a discipline with the maintenance 
of the existing patriarchal social order: ‘objective sociology as an authorita-
tive version of how things are [is] done from a position and as part of the 
practices of ruling in our kind of society’ (2004 [1974]: 30).
A key point on which the critique developed was the way in which the 
notion of scientific ‘objectivity’ was specifically wielded to reinforce the 
authority of men and masculine science over the means of knowledge pro-
duction (Harding et al. 1983, 1991; Haraway 1988). In this sense, it was 
‘pseudo- objectivity’ (Harding 1998) – it had pretensions to be value- free but 
was in fact presumptively embedded in white, male, bourgeois projects of 
hegemony. For standpoint theorists, a ‘successor science’ to this would have 
to embrace the partial, limited, embodied and situated nature of knowledge 
practices but radically expand whose perspectives and experiences were 
considered useful, worthy of attention and so on. ‘Strong objectivity’ as for-
mulated in standpoint theory thus creates a form of political triangulation for 
claims about the world and requires knowers to think about overlaps, reso-
nances and tensions between positions. Science must therefore understand 
itself as polyphonic, politicised and plural. In this sense, ‘strong objectivity’ 
requires reflexivity, humility and openness to multiple accounts of the world 
(Haraway 1988; Mills 1998 [1988]).
Standpoint theorists, however, also contended that knowledges produced 
from a position of relative subjugation would be distinctive from hegemonic 
knowledge in various ways. Moreover, many argued that subjugated or 
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subaltern knowledges are not only distinctive but also analytically privileged 
perspectives on how power relations operate in society. Hartsock (2004 
[1983]) develops this argument primarily as a feminist reformulation of 
Marx’s method for contemplating the standpoint of the proletariat; others 
have developed this thought in relation to Hegel’s argument about slave con-
sciousness (Harding 2004: 53– 54).
The basic argument runs as follows. Under conditions of structured ine-
quality, people occupying dominant and subordinate positions will tend to 
have different kinds of awareness about their social positions, role and condi-
tions. Although, on the one hand, dominant groups have a greater control over 
collective narratives and ideologies than subordinated groups, subordinated 
groups, on the other hand, are nonetheless aware of the limits of these narra-
tives by virtue of their own materially different conditions. In fact, because of 
the ways in which they are incorporated into hierarchical relations (i.e. of pro-
duction/ reproduction), subordinated groups have an epistemically privileged 
vantage point when it comes to analysing the nature of social order. Those 
occupying privileged or ideologically ‘unmarked’ positions, however, often 
lack – or indeed suppress – awareness of the various structures and practices 
which uphold their privileges.
In feminist writing on standpoint theory, the possible sources of feminine 
epistemic privilege are not singular but multiple. Whilst there is a ‘biologi-
cal’ argument made in some feminist writing about the superiority of female 
cognitive patterns (Mills 1998: 394), most writers make a materialist case for 
epistemic privilege derived from women’s involvement in both productive 
and reproductive labour. In some cases it is argued that this requires a deeper 
and more immediate tangible connection with the totality of effort required 
for human existence (Hartsock 2004 [1983]: 42–4 3; Ruddick 1980). For oth-
ers, it derives from occupying a marginal ‘outsider- within’ position which 
involves occupying a social space (e.g. as Black women domestic workers 
and carers) but being invisible or marginalised within it (Collins 1986). Part 
of the experience of feminine subordination – particularly when racialised 
for particular kinds of labour – thus involves a great deal of intimacy with 
privileges that cannot be accessed by women normally. Moreover, it demands 
expertise in how to survive particular systems of subordination.
In each version, there is a case not just for the distinctiveness of women’s 
knowledge based on concrete material difference, but the privilege of the sub-
ordinate position as a place from which to perceive or try to apprehend more 
of the ‘totality’ of social order in some sense. Hartsock’s argument is thus that 
the sexual division of labour between men and women across time can even 
be understood as analytically prior to class divisions as the major organising 
principle for society. However, in articulating an intersectional standpoint 
framing, Mohanty argues that ‘within a tightly integrated capitalist system, 
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the particular standpoint of poor indigenous and Third World/ South women 
provides the most inclusive viewing of systemic power’ (2003: 232). Thus 
the case for epistemic privilege is also based on the relationship between the 
system as a whole and the degree to which specific subjects are marginalised 
within it.
Returning to our discussion on Eurocentrism in the literature on interven-
tion and the need for decolonising strategies, there are important points to 
bring in from the discussion on standpoint theory. In the language of Haraway 
and Harding, the persistence of a Eurocentric framing within the literatures on 
intervention can be seen as a form of ‘pseudo- objectivity’ within the present 
scholarship on intervention. This is because Eurocentric assumptions place 
limits on how the researcher can think about and engage with the politics of 
intervention and systematically excludes much of the story and the relevant 
actors. Interveners themselves are likely to be oblivious to, or indeed sup-
press, knowledge and understanding which directly challenges their power 
and privileges. Moving towards ‘strong objectivity’, however, would require 
a practice of expanding the pool of knowledges on which a more public, 
democratic, liberation- oriented science could proceed. In Shilliam’s words, 
an engagement with what he calls the ‘non- West’ is necessary for ‘a more 
adequate appreciation of the global context of modernity’ (2010: 24). The 
decolonising strategies advanced in this chapter offer a way of engaging and 
recovering such positions, which would be a way of articulating ‘situated 
knowledges’ about intervention and building up a wider account of the phe-
nomenon from there.
Furthermore, when putting decolonising strategies together with standpoint 
theory, there is a clearer rationale for the argument that these strategies can 
deliver a ‘better’ account of social structures than those aligned with the 
perspectives of interveners (Go 2016). This comes from the argument that 
the knowledges of subordinated groups can claim epistemic distinctiveness 
and advantages when it comes to understanding the totality of the system in 
question. This is intimated by Du Bois in his idea of ‘the veil’ as a space of 
‘second sight’ for the Negro (1994 [1902]: 3) and in Césaire’s emphasis on 
‘thinking clearly’ about colonialism. This is because subordinated groups 
experience social structures and institutions differently and have a particu-
lar familiarity with them, because of under- labouring within them, thinking 
about how to survive them or struggling against them.
For this research on intervention, my argument is that states or societies 
targeted by intervention experience them differently than the interveners. 
Because they have to ‘service’ the interventions in various ways, they need 
to think about how to survive them and may also struggle against them. The 
point is then that the material position of being politically subordinated is 
epistemically generative – that is, gives rise to a different and more holistic 
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way of seeing that particular structure. People on the receiving end of inter-
national intervention and statebuilding projects are therefore likely, for the 
reasons just described, to have a different and more holistic way of seeing the 
system as a whole. This contrasts, for example, with Autesserre’s treatment of 
the situated knowledges of the targets of intervention, which are included but 
the substance of which (in terms of complaints about colonial or racist forms 
of behaviour) is quietly ignored.
***
Perhaps unsurprisingly, these alternative approaches to the practice of science 
have faced objections from different quarters, to which considered and robust 
responses have been made (Mills 1998 [1998]; Harding 1991). In this section, 
I summarise some of these challenges relevant to my proposed application of 
decolonising strategies as well as some responses to them. Given the kinds 
of scepticism with which such alternative epistemologies are often received 
in social- scientific communities, it is useful to be clear about the intellectual 
basis for this way forward.
These challenges come from two different directions. A ‘rationalist’/ 
positivist critique within Marxism suggests that false consciousness oper-
ates across the board, including amongst subordinated groups; it thus rejects 
the possibility of the epistemic privilege within standpoint theory (Mills 
1998: 399– 402). For the purposes of our study, this resonates somewhat with 
the argument that ‘local’ actors are ‘co- opted’ into the interventionary frame-
work, which might lead us to be sceptical of rooting analysis in the perspec-
tives of subordinate groups. Developing this line of argument, we might argue 
that the very nature of political hegemony requires it to generate consent and 
acceptance amongst the subjects over whom it wishes to rule, meaning those 
subjects are likely to internalise many of the perspectives of dominant groups.
As a wholesale rejection of standpoint analysis, however, this does not seem 
plausible. When one examines the concrete histories of self- awareness and lib-
eration struggles by oppressed groups, they often do demonstrate empirically 
these capacities for distinctive analysis and action. The uprisings of the enslaved 
and the Maroons in the Haitian Revolution are an increasingly well- understood 
example of this capacity (Shilliam 2008, 2017; Buck- Morss 2009). One should of 
course be interested in the specific historical conditions under which, for exam-
ple, the conditions of enslavement gave rise to the Haitian revolution, or women 
around the world were granted voting rights. One might also offer criticisms 
of the limited ideologies or world views under which forms of liberation were 
achieved (white imperialist feminisms or patriarchal nationalisms, for example).
However, it is difficult to sustain seriously, in the face of the historical 
record, a thorough- going rejection of all of these kinds of self- awareness 
as equivalent forms of false consciousness to their historical opponents in 
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analytic terms. It is not the case that both the slavers and the enslaved had 
opposing, but equally valid and equally misguided, views of slavery as a 
system. Similarly, I would not expect targets of international intervention 
to labour under grand illusions that were significantly disparate from their 
experiences of it over a long period of time, particularly with public and 
private spaces in which critical discussion can take place. As will be seen in 
Mozambique, although there is a desire for more such spaces and less party- 
politicisation of them, they exist in many settings and have been used to gen-
erate critical awareness of multiple kinds.
From the other direction, post- structuralist critiques have questioned the 
utility of holding to broad unifying labels such as ‘woman’ in feminist meth-
ods, because this does not foreground the fluidity of gendered categories, the 
multiplicity of positions and experiences held by different women and risks 
reductionism or even biological essentialism.8 Moreover, claiming epistemic 
privilege and a progressive normative framework is seen to attempt to resur-
rect the old Enlightenment violences of Truth and Reason as a means to dis-
cipline dialogue. It may also reinforce hegemonic patterns of binary thinking 
and cement the control of particular kinds of women or feminists (usually 
cisgendered, straight, white, able- bodied, middle-class) over the political 
agenda. For many years, and perhaps especially in the present, this question 
has been at the heart of feminist discussions about the nature of political 
thought, analysis and action.
Thinking through this critique in the context of this study, this would mean 
problematising the labelled position of ‘Mozambique’ as a place from which 
to speak, because (i) it does not foreground the fluidity of positions within the 
country, (ii) it essentialises ‘national consciousness’ in a binaristic way and 
(iii) it may well privilege official/ elite/ masculine actors relative to non- state/ 
non- elite/ feminine voices and positions in discussing intervention because of 
their relative ability to appropriate the label. It may also seek to discipline 
narratives through their correspondence or not to a particular set of ‘truth 
claims’. Given the general investment of decolonising strategies in combating 
exclusionary tendencies, these are important issues to address.
In response, standpoint theory emphasises a kind of perspectival realism 
(Mohanty 1993; Go 2016: 162– 166) which is compatible with the post- 
positivist claim that knowledge is theory- dependent. On the first point, 
Collins’ (1997) response to Hekman (1997) is that structured oppression is 
not experienced by individuals incommensurably but by groups, and these 
structures are durable over time and space, even though there is fluidity 
within them. As such, for standpoint theory one cannot simply substitute the 
‘individual’ for the ‘group’ as a locus of analysis; indeed, denying an epis-
temological basis for talking about group experiences works to deny the pos-
sibility of talking about structured oppression at all (1997: 377). In fact, the 
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concerns of the second and third critiques of representation require that other 
structured oppressions have their own group- based realities which can be 
identified, albeit not under a singular mode or voice of analysis. In terms of 
thinking about our ‘decolonising strategies’, the purpose is precisely to affirm 
a collective subject that has been previously negated, denied or ignored but 
which can share truths about the nature of oppression.
Relatedly, the purposive, pragmatic defences of ‘science’ and ‘truth’ put 
forth by Haraway (1988) and Harding (1991, 2008) suggest that oppositional 
logics can generate understandings of oppression, even if they are also sub-
ject to reasoned disagreements about the nature of that oppression. Looking 
at the strategies of Third World feminists, Chela Sandoval (2004 [1991]) 
argues that the retention of an oppositional logic has been necessary in order 
to preserve political space for their critique. Yet, this is only one amongst 
many methods of political organisation and ‘tactical subjectivity’ (2004: 
203) available to Third World feminists, who engage with it as one mode 
of struggle and survival. In this vein, many are sanguine about the possibil-
ity of using ‘the master’s tools to dismantle the master’s house’ (Hutchings 
2003: 148).
In thinking about the implications of studying intervention, the point is then 
that in this particular context of inquiry (i.e. the construction of Eurocentric 
knowledge about intervention), it is useful and legitimate to contemplate a 
framing which engages tactically and practically with a political context in 
which the ‘beneficiaries’ of intervention as ‘states’/ ‘countries’/‘societies’ 
are recognised groups with experienced realities and claims to make, even 
if analysis is not limited to those frames. There is thus a warrant for talk-
ing about ‘Mozambique’s’ experience of intervention in analysis – being 
‘Mozambican’ has a specific meaning in this context. It does not imply, as 
was well understood by anti- colonial thinkers, that nationalism and national 
identity is an end in itself, but rather a space of experience and intellectual 
tool to achieve a degree of liberation.
This clarification also speaks to the third critique of representation men-
tioned above – namely, the overtaking of a broad collective identity by nar-
rower and sectional articulations thereof within the feminist movement. This 
is a well- known area of discussion amongst black and Third World feminists 
(Mohanty 1988; Sandoval 2004), as well as queer theorists (Butler 1990), 
many of whom have argued that there is a tendency amongst white and 
liberal feminists to over- homogenise women’s experiences, assume a repre-
sentational role for all ‘women’ and call for ‘unity’ in order to enforce homo-
geneity within the feminist movement. In this sense, the position of white 
and liberal feminists may be analogous to the role of national, metropolitan 
elites in talking about ‘Mozambique’s’ experience of aid in discussions on 
intervention.
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On this point, humility, reflexivity and accountability are important but 
only partial responses. The spirit of triangulating perspectives to generate 
‘strong objectivity’ infuses the research design of this study, and to this extent 
I have endeavoured to seek out engagement outside and beyond metropolitan- 
based elites in Mozambique, with the various caveats about my own positions 
and how access to non- elite respondents can be pursued. These involve the 
use of new labels and positions, for example ‘camponeses / peasant farm-
ers’, which themselves are infused with hierarchies of privilege, access and 
representation which are also classed, politicised, gendered and – to a lesser 
extent – racialised. It is nonetheless a limitation of this study that proportion-
ately, within the material studied for this project, much of it is drawn from 
‘elite’ sources.
Yet, in the context of this inquiry, even a limited study such as this has 
the potential to generate new questions, categories and analyses for our 
understanding of the world. To return to Collins’ point, however, the accept-
ance of shared realities is a necessary starting point for any discussion of 
structured oppression, even if such structures themselves contain other forms 
of structured oppressions or erasure. This project focuses on the relations of 
intervener and targets as a strategic response to situations in which the latter 
has been made absent from the analysis.
CONCLUSION TO PART I
The traditions of critical thinking now present in IR offer much promise as 
resources for thinking about world politics differently. However, they have 
their blind spots, inherited and reproduced in specific ways of thinking 
about the world. The previous chapter demonstrated the general absence of 
the subjecthood of target societies in much research on intervention as part 
of this intellectual terrain and located this tendency within the philosoph-
ical co- ordinates of Eurocentrism. In this chapter I have elaborated some 
decolonising strategies for challenging that in a methodologically reasoned 
and sustained way. The strategies identify and challenge particular absences – 
historical, political and material – and elaborate these strategies as consonant 
with feminist philosophical arguments for standpoint approaches.
IR as a discipline would benefit greatly from the much wider application of 
these strategies if it wants to take forward its aim of understanding how world 
politics works. In this sense, these decolonising strategies open up spaces 
for challenging the habituated provincialism of IR and its narration of world 
affairs. The following three chapters use these strategies for thinking about 
different aspects of the politics of intervention and statebuilding as they have 
evolved over the last two decades – the nature of the state, the rural political 
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economy and the politics of anti- corruption. These different approaches 
generate different interpretive frameworks for intervention and explanations 
for why it fails, rooted in experiences of the social and political hierarchy 
between interveners and targets. The final chapter asks how we can think dif-
ferently about intervention when we use these decolonising strategies and a 
critical mindset to analyse the problem.
NOTES
 1. These principles are also described in Sabaratnam (2011).
 2. They are nonetheless distinctive thinkers in their own right and each has 
inspired a rich scholarly literature. For a selection of key works see Reed (1997), 
Wilder (2015), Wynter (2001), Gordon (1995), Chabal (1983) and McCulloch (1983).
 3. This refers to the journal set up by Alouine Diop in 1947, Présence Africaine, 
with which Léopold Senghor was also associated.
 4. Notable exceptions here are Heathershaw (2009, 2010), Goodhand (2005), 
Autesserre (2010); Rutazibwa (2014).
 5. Mac Ginty’s (2010) qualifier is that scholars may lack the ‘antennae’ for such 
analysis.
 6. For example, in Pouligny (2006), Autesserre (2010) and Smirl (2015), as well 
as Mosse (2005).
 7. An important exception to this lacuna is Turner and Shweiki’s volume on 
de- development in Palestinian political economy (2014), which explores the con-
crete effects of aid within the context of colonial relations with Israel in the vein 
proposed here.
 8. See Hekman (1997) and responses.
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Chapter Four
The State Under Intervention
When you are poor, you have to accept the game.
— Civil servant, Nampula Province
Help which does not help is not help.
— Provincial official, Nampula Province
On my first visit to Mozambique, I found myself in the office of the country 
director of one of the largest international NGOs, which had projects across 
various sectors. He had been in post for a few months and had very little 
Portuguese. On the walls of the office was a large map of the country. ‘So’, he 
said, ‘can you tell me a bit about what the war was about? And who exactly 
are Renamo?’
Stories of this kind – where interveners know very little about their host 
countries – are not uncommon in Aidland.1 Put differently, in the interven-
tion relationship, the weight of history and memory sits heavily on one 
party but often hardly at all on the other. Interveners tend to rotate through 
posts quickly, particularly when working for national development agencies. 
Furthermore, as Autesserre (2014) demonstrates, their roles do not depend 
on having knowledge of the national context. By contrast, for nationals of 
the country – plus some of those from abroad who have chosen and suc-
ceeded in making their homes there – the intervention relationship is one 
which is soaked in historical experiences and common reference points, 
struggles, upsets, failed reforms, scandals, triumphs, lost energies and slow, 
ground- out time.
This chapter works through an account of the state under intervention in 
Mozambique, through deploying the decolonising strategies developed in 
the previous chapter. That is to say that the account of the state is rooted in a 
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sense of its historical presence, the political consciousness of the people who 
inhabit it and an account of their material realities. Thinking about the state 
in this way highlights a number of particular dynamics within international 
intervention that are often occluded by other accounts. Specifically, explained 
by the targets of intervention, these elements are the consequence of structures 
of aid dependency, on the one hand, and what is called donor protagonismo, on 
the other. These two heuristics of intervention are key elements to how the tar-
gets of intervention explain its ongoing dynamics. These dynamics include the 
unbuilding of the state through fragmentation of its infrastructures, the draining 
of its human resources, the waste of efforts on capacity- building activities and 
the experiences of public services as better but fundamentally unreliable. Whilst 
these dynamics are well known and well understood by many of those involved 
in intervention, they are understood by its targets as persisting because of the 
structures of dependency and protagonismo in which they are embedded. The 
chapter first locates the post- war statebuilding project historically and describes 
the context of intervention, before examining its key dynamics in terms of the 
functioning of the state. It finally turns to the question of how the targets of 
intervention make sense of its effects on the state and its functionaries.
BUILDING THE POSTCOLONIAL STATE
To make sense of intervention after the war, it is important to locate our 
understanding in the postcolonial statebuilding project launched after inde-
pendence. Mozambique achieved independence from Portugal in 1975, 
following a long guerrilla campaign in the north of the country, interna-
tional pressure and a coup inside Portugal from an army tired of fighting 
colonial wars. Frelimo – the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, 
and the leading organised political force – assumed power and embarked 
upon an energetic programme of African socialist statebuilding. In part, it 
had little choice – many of the productive industries, farms and various 
offices held by Portuguese settlers had been abruptly abandoned, meaning 
that nationalisation was the only way to get them going again. Yet, it also 
cohered with the ideological vision for a modernising, egalitarian, state- led 
society inherent in the Marxist- Leninist commitments of the vanguardist 
party leadership.
To give a sense of the public services and statebuilding challenges, at 
independence, it is estimated that there were only eighty trained doctors in 
a country of ten million people, and the population was more than 95 per 
cent illiterate. In this context, the first international assistance for statebuild-
ing in independent Mozambique came from other states in the Eastern bloc 
that were willing to supply medical staff, teachers, equipment and advisers 
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to the new government and included cooperantes – volunteers, often young 
Westerners attracted by the promise of creating a socialist society – who 
were also used to fill administrative and technical roles, particularly in the 
 ministries. Young Mozambicans with any education at all – often from  middle- 
class and/ or white settler families – found themselves with senior roles in 
government and industry very quickly. In addition, those who demonstrated 
their worth through participation in the independence struggle for Frelimo 
were entrusted with major offices. Collectively they oversaw attempts to 
exponentially expand education and health services, agricultural production, 
infrastructure development and other public goods. This statebuilding project 
was underpinned by Frelimo’s commitment to the cultivation of a ‘New Man’ 
in the wake of colonialism – a scientifically minded, egalitarian, collectivist 
citizen who cast off both imperialism and sorcery in building the future.
This fragile and ambitious experiment in African revolutionary statebuild-
ing was almost immediately put under severe internal and external pressure 
through the 1980s. The inexperienced new order found it difficult to make 
things work, and various enterprises collapsed under their own weight. This 
was in spite of – and sometimes because of – international assistance, from 
both Eastern and Western bloc donors, in some productive sectors such as 
sugar and public services such as health. Affairs were also severely disrupted 
by the beginning of a long and bloody war. Funded by white regimes in 
Rhodesia and South Africa, Renamo (Mozambique National Resistance) 
began a campaign of violent destabilisation and sabotage, targeting schools, 
hospitals and roads, drawing in part on resentment created by Frelimo’s state-
building and collectivisation programme. Up to a million people are thought 
to have died as a result of the war, with around three million internally and 
externally displaced. This conflict absorbed huge amounts of government 
attention and funds on its own terms. Coupled with tied loans, the drying up 
of Soviet support, the losses from the state industries and expansion of public 
services through the country, Mozambique found itself in a major debt crisis 
by the mid- 1980s. Moreover, these crises had severely disrupted even the 
most basic systems of food production and people were starving – many to 
death – all over the country.
A large Structural Adjustment Programme (PRE in Portuguese) was agreed 
to with the Bretton Woods institutions and implemented in 1987, in which 
debt relief and development aid were traded for a floating currency, large cuts 
in public spending, taxation reform and a comprehensive privatisation pro-
gramme. The levels of official international aid from the West virtually dou-
bled between 1986 and 1987 (De Renzio et al. 2007: 4). At its peak, in 1988, 
foreign aid constituted 81.2 per cent of GDP. In Frelimo’s Fifth Congress, 
held in 1989, this recalibration of relations with the West was articulated 
as the necessary price for the pursuit of its historic mission – indeed, the 
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price of survival. By this time it was also apparent that neither side in the 
war could win in military terms, and by 1990 a ceasefire and formal peace 
talks had begun in Rome under the auspices of a Catholic lay organisation. 
Mozambique’s socialist experiment appeared to be over.
INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN 
MOZAMBIQUE AFTER THE WAR
In the early 1990s, alongside the peace deal (1992), the UN- supervised 
electoral process (1992– 4), the disarmament, demobilisation and rehabilita-
tion (DDR) programmes and the integration of some Renamo fighters into 
the national army, there was a massive influx of emergency relief aid as 
well as development aid. As people went back to their homes, development 
aid became the major vector of international intervention in the state. After 
substantial complaints that organisations were functioning in parallel with 
the state, this development aid emphasised explicitly its orientation towards 
national capacity- building. Within government, ministries began to function 
more fully and sought to co- ordinate aid flows, projects and programmes 
alongside their own activities more clearly. Despite serious and prolonged 
contestation over the 1999 elections by Renamo, there was no attempt by 
the donors to encourage a recount even in light of a recognition of electoral 
irregularities.
The presence of international organisations was highly visible throughout 
the country and in government in this period, with a very mixed influence 
in different areas. However, a specific and widely publicised episode was 
influential in shaping attitudes towards the Western donors in Mozambique 
and beyond. This was the World Bank’s intervention into the cashew indus-
try in the 1990s. Mozambique had been the world’s leading cashew exporter 
at independence and by 1980 had developed fourteen processing plants, 
supported by an export tariff which prevented the export of raw cashew 
nuts. The World Bank, on the advice of external consultants, insisted on 
the removal of this tariff through the withholding of earlier- promised state 
loans, which resulted in the collapse of the cashew- processing industries 
and the loss of thousands of jobs in those zones. Following unrest, a new 
system of export tariffs was quietly reintroduced, but the episode weighed 
on relations between the government and the donors as well as public 
perceptions of it.
Co- operation with international donors on virtually all areas of public 
life, however, deepened through the end of the 1990s and into the 2000s 
and was given renewed vigour through three major and related develop-
ments. One was the Highly Indebted Poor Country initiative (HIPC), 
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which provided a major tranche of debt relief to Mozambique co- 
 ordinated by the international financial institutions (IFIs). This required 
the production of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP),2 which 
created softer liberalisation targets and planning processes in various 
sectors and a process for overseeing their achievement. The second was 
the institutionalisation of the Millennium Development Goals and the 
commitment from wealthy countries to increase aid flows to 0.7 per cent 
of GDP in order to help meet those goals. The third was the aid harmo-
nisation and effectiveness agenda, embodied in the Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness in 2005, which underscored the principles of ‘national 
ownership’ of spending priorities and delivery through general budget 
support, sector- wide planning and ‘mutual accountability’ between donors 
and recipients (now both referred to as ‘partners’). Within Mozambique 
all three of these developments impacted the size, nature and governance 
of international aid, particularly in sectors seen as driving human develop-
ment such as health and education. From 2003 to 2008 official aid from 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) coun-
tries increased by about US$500 million, an increase of around 40 per cent 
(Cunguara and Hanlon 2010).
Yet, the relationship was also underpinned by a more vocal concern with 
corruption on the part of the donors, instigated by the murders in 2000 of a 
journalist and bank director who were investigating corruption in the privat-
isation of the Bank of Mozambique. Pressure in the form of threats of with-
holding aid was put on the government, which was perceived as acting slowly 
to find and catch the killers. The president’s own son, Nyimpine Chissano, 
was accused of having ordered the killing of the journalist but, surprisingly, 
died shortly after his indictment. Since then, various public projects have 
been marked by allegations of corruption or malfeasance.
The combination of increased attention to anti- corruption measures and the 
national ownership agenda led to a large public sector reform programme, 
supported by international co- operation, focusing mostly on the production of 
a new financial management system to be used across government. This was 
intended to support the channelling of international funds through the state 
budget. Yet, since 2010, donors have been increasingly retreating from direct 
contributions to the state budget and financing alternative providers of public 
services. The discovery of oil and gas prospects in Mozambique has changed 
the nature of state finances, as has a recent decision to incur non- concessional 
public debt for the purchase of fishing industrial equipment and other state 
expenses (Wirz et al. 2016). Whilst the donor footprint continues to be sub-
stantial in Mozambique, particularly in specific areas of public service deliv-
ery, increasingly the state is seen to be taking the lead on policy issues and 
donors are feeling rather less influential.
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WHAT KIND OF STATE HAS BEEN BUILT?
Intervention constantly positions itself in relation to its imagined future, but 
not its lived past or present. In its future, there is greater capacity, greater 
service delivery, greater ownership and greater legitimacy. Reports and 
strategies for the next donor programme rarely refer to – let alone evaluate – 
the programme that preceded it or those running alongside it. Each is born 
innocently into a future- oriented conversation where its primary reference 
points are itself, contemporary global targets, and the new people whom it 
will uplift. Scholars, too, evaluate interventions in relation to this promised 
future and ideal- typical co- ordinates, thinking constantly about how it could 
be improved next time and, in innovating, thus transcend its present limits.
Accordingly, to even talk about the histories of intervention is to interrupt 
a narrative which wants to focus on a promised future. To think about these 
pasts and presents from the experiences of those targeted by interventions is 
a further interruption. The following sections are narratives about the pre-
sent and recent past of the state in Mozambique as constituted in a time of 
 international intervention and statebuilding. They show that the effects of 
intervention – designed to build the state – have contributed to its fragmen-
tation. As argued in  chapter 6, this problematises the view of intervention as 
promoting ‘good governance’ in the global South.
Fragmentation of State Infrastructure
One of the principal effects of intervention in the institutions of the state has 
been a fragmentation and dissipation of efforts in specific sectors despite 
concerted attempts to control these effects. The experiences of the health 
sector – one of the largest recipients of international assistance in Mozambique 
and central to the historic project of postcolonial and post- war statebuilding – 
are illustrative of such dynamics. Whilst other sectors will have their own 
experiences, one would expect a sector perceived as an urgent priority and 
which was well funded to be amongst the leading beneficiaries of assistance. 
However, in contrast to the expectations generated by statebuilding discourse, 
Mozambique’s health sector has seen a contested but now effectively institu-
tionalised incoherence in how it functions at the level of government and on 
the ground. This is in spite of the widely held understanding that uncoordinated 
aid presents specific problems for its intended beneficiaries. A former senior 
ministry of health official evaluated the historic relationship as follows:
The relationships between Mozambicans and their foreign counterparts has var-
ied a lot. In pharmaceuticals, drugs, we can distinguish over different periods. 
Just after Independence, we had enough money, and didn’t need any foreign 
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help – the health sector was narrow. As the system increased, the need increased 
and the health sector became broader. This coincided with the civil war, around 
81– 82, when we couldn’t afford to import drugs. In 83– 84, we started to get 
some health aid in kind. Even the socialist countries used to pledge things on a 
list defined by us [emphasis added], and donations were on this basis. It was also 
typical for larger INGOs to decide the needs of Mozambique. They sent huge 
shipments, but no one knew what they were, what was coming and the manage-
ment of the system was not easy.
In 85/ 86, limitations were found with the system, it could be seen that aid 
was hurting not helping [emphasis added]. The tentative co- ordination started 
then, because of drugs. In 86/ 87, there were also signs of a changing relation-
ship with the Bretton Woods institutions. They were discussing the possibility of 
financial aid, which helped pave the way. This started with the establishment of 
a co- ordination mission; this was twice a year – we met with the major partners, 
the government, the banks etc. There was a meeting to discuss the mechanisms 
for moving from in- kind to financial aid. This was way before SWAp [Sector 
Wide Action plans]. The decision- making process moved from bilateral, in- kind 
aid to multilateral and financial aid. The relationships changed from one- one 
to one- many, to discuss activities. The results of this were impressive – it was 
making the best possible use of the money.3
The 1980s, in this reading, represent a time when there was some government 
control over health services, somewhat undercut by INGO activities but later 
better co- ordinated. Despite a seemingly progressive movement towards co- 
ordination, however, the last fifteen years has seen the emergence of huge 
internationally controlled, disease- specific – what are called ‘vertical’ – funds 
at the global level that has specifically worked against such attempts. The 
same official tracked the activity since the 2000s:
With AIDS, the move to support grew especially from 2000, 2002 – funds grew 
a lot in 2004, 2006 – the tendency to support has increased. The picture changed 
a lot, because the initial support came from the World Bank. Let me go back. 
Along with this process, MISAU [the ministry of health] had project support 
from the World Bank, but in terms of management, they attempted to integrate 
them, even though they were separate. With the attempt to grow the Ministry 
of Health and CNCS [National AIDS Council], there was the same project 
approach. Also, PEPFAR [US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief] 
appeared, and the Global Fund [for AIDS, TB and malaria]; which also adopt 
a project approach. These couldn’t be integrated into PROSAUDE [Common 
Funding and Planning for the Health Sector] because of the reporting back 
requirements. Now it is a parallel mechanism. Also, in theory it is aligned, but 
in practice it is separate. PEPFAR had the major impact: Firstly, because USG 
money does not flow to other governments, and second, because the imple-
mentation of government plans goes through NGOs, usually US NGOs, if you 
look at the COPs [Codes of Practice]. In the Common Fund, you are looking 
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at how decisions are made. With PEPFAR, the declaration is made, that it is to 
support the ministry’s plan, but by mandate they cannot transfer money: they 
are using money through NGOs. There are several tiers of decision- making: at 
the diplomatic level, these are usually unilateral decisions [emphasis added], 
although they are supposed to be based on the relationship between NGOs and 
the government.4
By the mid- 2000s, the minister of health had taken to referring to himself as 
the ‘minister of projects’.5 Most of all, the layered and fragmented planning 
system absorbed large amounts of time and energy for those concerned, mani-
festing itself often in back- to- back meetings with different partners in the 
ministry. In one extreme case in a different sector, it was reported that a sin-
gle NGO had sent six different delegations from different programmes to the 
same ministry on the same day.6 Another former public health official reports:
When I was there, we did a National Plan. Then the World Bank came with a 
map, and wanted a plan for the map. Three months later, Clinton [the Clinton 
Foundation] arrived, and asked for another plan. In the next three months, the 
Global Fund came, and they needed another plan – I said, ‘No, sorry’, and then 
PEPFAR – I refused. I said, ‘Sorry, we cannot’. We need to do a big national 
plan and then use it to develop some things.7
The scale of fragmentation is also pronounced. The Mozambican Ministry of 
Planning and Development has undertaken a series of evaluations of the Paris 
Declaration in recent years in an effort to record levels of national ownership 
and mutual accountability in international co- operation. Its data on the health 
sector reflects the rollback from the use of national systems in recent years 
towards project finance and vertical funds. The latter not only have their own 
time frames, reporting requirements and budgeting arrangements, but also 
require input in terms of time and resources from the government in terms of 
approving and monitoring the activity.
Figure 4.1 shows the respective proportions of the health budget spent 
through different channels. Contra the aspirations of the Paris Declaration, in 
which national systems are presented as the best channels for aid effective-
ness and ownership, the trend in the Mozambican health sector has been in 
the opposite direction for some years, mostly due to the effects of the large 
vertical funds (PEPFAR, Global Fund, Clinton Foundation). These now 
account for well over 60 per cent of the money spent in the health sector in 
Mozambique. By contrast, the proportion directed by the government by its 
own funds or common funds is less than 40 per cent. There was an attempt to 
bring the Global Fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria into the common funding 
system, but this had to be abandoned, as the finance flows were too unpredict-
able and untimely, producing serious problems (Government of Mozambique 
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2010: 55). Perhaps ironically, even the attempt to co- ordinate such fragmenta-
tion has itself produced three different co- ordination mechanisms (54).
In addition, many bilateral donors, including the United Kingdom, Norway 
and Finland, have abandoned the common fund arrangements and are con-
tracting directly with subcontractors for health provision in Mozambique. 
In the case of the United Kingdom, previously one of the central donors to 
the common fund, one of the factors cited has been the progressive decrease 
in influence it has been able to have on policy through common funding 
arrangements.8 Instead, the post- 2010 approach to aid in the United Kingdom 
has emphasised upward accountability to itself and is testing ‘payment- by- 
results’.9 Rather than the progressive institutionalisation of a functioning 
state- led system in the sector delivering public goods, the effect of interven-
tion over the last ten years appears to be working in the opposite direction, 
despite the creation of the relevant financial and planning systems at the state 
level, and despite widespread recognition that lack of co- ordination is a key 
contributor to aid ineffectiveness.
Disappearance of Human Resources
The Minister of Health says, ‘I was walking in the hospital, and one of my 
doctors says to me, “do you have a secretary’s position?” I ask “Do you 
need one?”, and the doctor says “I would like to apply” ’.10
— Former minister, Government of Mozambique
Figure 4.1. Percentage of Mozambique’s Health Sector Budget by Aid Modality, 2001– 2009. 
Source: Government of Mozambique (2010: 53).
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This is an old joke told in the health sector in Mozambique. Unsurprisingly, 
one of the major consequences of the fragmentation of the state is the con-
stant loss of qualified staff – the ‘brain drain’ to international organisations 
and/ or the private sector, and often other professions altogether. This is either 
through full absorption or through public sector staff taking unpaid leave 
to work for these organisations, at all levels from the ministry downwards. 
Intervention has generated both ‘push’ and ‘pull’ dynamics for staff to leave 
the public sector, despite the critical importance of staff retention to capacity- 
building, institution- building and service delivery.
The motivation that drives people to go to work in NGO? Are the conditions 
themselves. When I say working conditions I mean the salary. For example, 
we have a doctor in NGO who has there 100,000 meticais or 85,000 meticais, 
receives it in dollars, and converting gives 85,000 meticais or 100 000 meticals. 
And there is an employee in the system, the same course, the same category, 
who is receiving only 8,000 meticais, with the various costs that the person 
has. These are reasons that make people not think twice or three times to leave 
the health sector. Unfortunately. It is our reality and we don’t have the means 
to fix this.11
— Pharmacist- turned- hired- driver, Nampula Province
This reading is corroborated by Pavignani and Durão (1999), both former 
senior health sector workers in Mozambique, who argue that the inability to 
pay salaries is one of the most critical weaknesses of the Mozambican health 
system. In terms of the ‘push’ factors, the structural adjustment policies 
adopted in Mozambique have substantially depressed public sector wages 
in both absolute and relative terms (Marshall 1990; Pfeiffer 2003; Pfeiffer 
and Chapman 2015). Indeed, large numbers of publicly trained doctors have 
also left the country altogether in search of better salaries, with one estimate 
putting this rate at 75 per cent of all doctors for Mozambique in the years 
1999– 2001.12
Another less well- understood ‘push’ factor is the political effects of 
attempts by politicians to clamp down on time wasted on international initia-
tives inside the ministry, which had also provided financial and professional 
opportunities for those working there. Former civil servants and doctors who 
had walked away from their government jobs to jobs in European develop-
ment agencies and donor programmes argued, implicitly in their defence, that 
they were ultimately doing the same jobs but with another organisation, with 
better conditions.13 Yet, it was also clear that the dynamics of international 
co- operation produced alienation in multiple directions inside the government.
Such dynamics of alienation, opportunities and fragmentation are 
also highlighted in Pfeiffer’s study (2003) of the impact of international 
co- operation in the health sector in central Mozambique. He argues that due 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The State Under Intervention 69
   
to the tightening of state health budgets, and the willingness of external 
projects to set up broad systems of incentives, including per diem payments 
and other benefits for participation well in excess of standard salaries, the 
provincial health system had become significantly fragmented and incoher-
ent, whilst remaining understaffed. This fragmentation led to public servants 
spending a high volume of their time managing co- operation programmes and 
projects or being at workshops, rather than managing the affairs of the health 
service (for those who stayed within it). For health professionals who man-
aged to leave and join an NGO, however, Pfeiffer calculates that the value 
of the salary and benefits could be up to twenty times what could be earned 
within the state, meaning that even this short-term work could easily become 
more attractive than long- term work with job security in the state.
The critical problems in human resources within the health system are 
well understood and have been highlighted for a long period of time. In light 
of the crisis provoked by the loss of staff, the Government of Mozambique 
initiated agreement on the ‘Kaya Kwanga’ commitments in 2000. These 
promised to align donor remuneration in the sector with the state, and par-
ticularly not hire qualified people out of the ministry, in which the retention 
of capacity was critical. However, these commitments were not observed 
and the practice continues to be widespread. At the time of one of my visits 
in 2009, eight senior people were hired simultaneously out of the Ministry 
of Health by a single donor to run a new health programme.14 Indeed, the 
former Mozambican national director of human resources for the Ministry 
of Health, who has over twenty- five years’ experience and has published 
precisely on the problems of the ‘brain drain’, now works as country director 
for ICAP (International Center for AIDS Care and Treatment Program), an 
international NGO and research organisation, which is a large and generously 
funded vertical provider of HIV/ AIDS services. As explained by a senior civil 
servant, the persistent turnover of staff and the loss of experience was a seri-
ous problem for the government:
This is very negative – you have to explain things again. Those who know the 
reality, the instruments – lots is not written. When a new person comes, it is 
difficult. They think there has been no change [emphasis added] ... There is a 
tendency for much change – even new secretaries. The know- how disappears ... 
This is an illness – a cancer.15
Capacity- Building?
Almost every concept of international statebuilding is oriented around the 
idea that a key part of the challenge for the fragile state is to increase and 
strengthen the institutional capacity to administer and deliver public services, 
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by having internationals train nationals. A recent World Bank Institute report 
noted that US$20 billion is spent by donors annually on ‘capacity building’ 
in ‘developing countries’ (Otoo et al. 2009: 1). Yet the same report argues 
that ‘the results of efforts to develop capacity have persistently fallen short 
of expectations’ and cites previous findings from the institution, which say:
Most efforts at capacity development remain fragmented, making it difficult 
to capture cross- sectoral influences and to draw general conclusions. Many 
capacity development activities are not founded on rigorous needs assessments 
and do not include appropriate sequencing of measures aimed at institutional or 
organizational change and individual skill building. (Otoo et al. 2009: 1)
Within Mozambique, amongst the targets of capacity- building, these prob-
lems are very well understood, and they produced scepticism both within the 
government and outside it towards these activities. In particular, concerns are 
articulated over the large imbalances between ‘training’ and actually carrying 
out any work. A recent minister of health tapped into this scepticism when he 
effectively banned ministry officials from participating in various donor sem-
inars and workshops (capacitação: workshop) as part of a broader crackdown 
on corruption in the sector. The student who told me this argued that these 
workshops did not have any benefit but ‘they were just happening to pay the 
teachers, to pay the organisers, to buy some water, but they didn’t add any-
thing’.16 More broadly, they have been understood to be time- and resource- 
intensive, poorly implemented and often inappropriate. This is complemented 
by scepticism towards much of the ‘technical assistance’ in  ministries – inter-
national advisers seconded by development agencies – which has, with noted 
exceptions, not been experienced as particularly helpful.
This sensibility resonated with my own interpretation of the five- day health 
leadership training workshop in Maputo funded by the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) described in the Introduction to this 
book. In discussing the impact of aid, the leader of a governance- focused 
NGO also problematised the value of capacity- building workshops more 
generally, arguing:
So of course, when they do the evaluations of these projects and programmes, 
everyone is satisfied … Everyone talks about doing ‘capacitação’ – but what 
have they done in the last 20– 30 years? People that come to deliver this are not 
appropriate – can you imagine taking a Mozambican to the UK to teach them? 
This is not capacity … And still people lack the resources to implement the 
programmes [emphasis added].17
‘Capacity- building’ had become not just focused on the government min-
istries, but has been adopted more widely as a model for how to spread 
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development knowledge in civil society organisations and communities. 
Here it was also understood as not simply ineffective but resource- absorbing. 
A former civil servant and state enterprise manager argued:
A lot of money goes to training. I know it’s important but it depends on how you 
do it, and I found that most of the training is not effective, and you go around 
and you see and it’s not working. I think that could be analysed why, ’cause very 
often people, they want to do training, but either you do it well, and it may cost 
a lot of money, or you do it small, something small, but donors want numbers – 
they want to reach millions of people.
So you train a full province? You haven’t trained anybody … I was asking 
people, ‘You are asking two people from the community? They don’t read or 
write, they badly speak Portuguese, and you train them for a week on a subject, 
and you want them to go back and train other people? You are mad! It can’t 
happen, you can’t ask that from people. It’s not what they have to do, they 
can’t do it. You [the consultant] studied that, I don’t know how many years, you 
receive a lot of dollars for that, but in the community they didn’t study, they 
don’t anything, and they don’t receive for doing that. So you give them their 
work; your work you give to them [emphasis added], and they are not paid so 
you can’t do that’.
… So these numbers, these things of the numbers, and I think a lot of money 
was thrown out unfortunately. Because you have this programme, for three 
years you have to train 1,000 people on I don’t know what. Okay, you bring 
all of them to the classes and what, what, what in three years? Most of these 
trainings have to change your mentality … you don’t change in three years. You 
finish that training, it’s finished, and no one will look at that again. You don’t 
go back to work and look at it again, so all the money went in what? Salaries 
for trainers.18
The Ministry of Agriculture in particular channelled much of its statebuilding 
funds (PROAGRI I and PROAGRI II) into ‘capacity- building’ in the ministry 
at the central level. Whether or not the specific training was useful, by the end 
of the process, most of the staff had been hired outside the ministry, meaning 
that for the most part any positive effects of capacity- building were not left 
within the state.
***
The faulty assumptions at the root of most capacity- building practices have 
been well understood by academic approaches to public administration since 
the 1990s (see Grindle and Hilderbrand 1995) and acknowledged by inter-
national policy centres in the years thereafter (OECD 2006; Otoo et al. 2009). 
These studies suggest that skills transfer via training – the primary modality 
of conducting capacity- building in practice – may not actually better enable 
individuals and organisations to accomplish their objectives. The experience 
of those subject to such programmes repeatedly and from many different 
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providers corroborates and extends this sensibility. This leads to the suspicion 
not only that they may not be helpful, but that their primary objective may 
be the work- making character of the training itself. Yet, this is the main form 
in which ‘international statebuilding’ exists – through the provision of cap-
acity- building exercises, the limitations of which both recipients and funders 
are quite aware.
Citizen Experiences of Public Services under Intervention
To the extent that the state is conceived as an organisation whose role is to 
deliver public goods, the effects of intervention culminate in a deeply mixed 
set of experiences. On the one hand, using the end of the war as a baseline, 
public services, particularly in terms of education and health, are much more 
visible and functional in Mozambique than previously, and it is widely under-
stood that this would not have been possible without international assistance. 
In particular, the physical infrastructure for these services – schools, hospi-
tals and clinics – is much more visible and donors who have contributed to 
such are gratefully acknowledged within this physical infrastructure through 
badges and plaques. Indicators such as pupil enrolment and maternal mortal-
ity19 demonstrate the expansion that has taken place over the last thirty years 
from a very low level, particular for primary services. Amongst my interlocu-
tors across Mozambique there was also general agreement that health and 
education services had certainly improved.
On the other hand, in interrogating the experience at ground level in 
healthcare, it became clear that service delivery is itself also strongly con-
ditioned by different dynamics that speak to the presence of intervention. 
As discussed, one is the absence of qualified health workers, particularly in 
rural areas but also in urban ones. In response, the government has trained 
a large number of technicians to carry out a range of basic to medium- 
level functions that ideally fully trained doctors or nurses would conduct. 
Yet, these workers are also subject to the unstable conditions produced by 
depressed wages and the system of incentives to work for other employ-
ers. As a result, health services are very irregularly staffed, meaning that 
patients also are reluctant to waste their own time and resources attending 
clinics.20 These can be particularly high investments for each patient given 
the difficulties of transport and infrastructure. Moreover, and less frequently 
admitted in donor/ policy studies, there are widespread reports of problems 
of health workers soliciting bribes to supplement their wages for appropriate 
levels of care or medication.21
In addition, the frequent rigidity of project- and disease- specific healthcare 
interventions – whilst important – also strongly skews services and their 
provision in certain ways. A former civil servant noted that the weight of 
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AIDS- specific funding was seriously out of proportion with that in the rest of 
the sector, meaning that the wider systems needed to support patients did not 
function. As a result, the patients still died from preventable causes:
The AIDS clinics were very good, but the rest of the health, no. But you go to 
the AIDS clinic when you’re not sick, when you are still not sick. When you are 
very sick you go to the hospital, but your hospital doesn’t receive all that money 
so people die in the hospital, but they die of AIDS. Because of AIDS they die of 
pneumonia or whatever, but it’s because of AIDS, but there they are not looked 
after conveniently because the hospital did not receive the money but the AIDS 
structure did.22
Health workers and activists working with HIV/ AIDS patients, who were 
enabled by international intervention through vertical funds, also discussed 
the rigidity of the support given, which, for example, proscribed the giving 
of a small food basket as an incentive to come to the clinic, which would 
also allow patients to eat better to allow the medication to work.23 Clearly, 
the vertical funding was central to their work but not flexible enough for 
people working in the health centres to maximise the effectiveness of the 
resource. Depending on the channel, others were more successful in appro-
priating funds for diverse purposes not linked to the provision of care itself. 
International HIV/ AIDS money ended up supporting theatre groups and lei-
sure facilities that advertised themselves as raising awareness of the disease, 
even when this link was admittedly oblique. This money is all recorded as 
having been spent on health services.
Yet, for citizens not integrated into the public health system, and perhaps 
some who are, there is evidence of significant distrust in terms of how it func-
tions. In Nampula Province, for example, from 1998 to 2001 it was widely 
believed in some of the coastal areas that the state and NGOs were trying to 
introduce cholera into the water supply, in order to poison the population. 
This led to vigorous uprisings, including the burning of houses and public 
protests, which subsequently led to many arrests and one death. Although the 
confusion may have stemmed from the similarity in words for ‘cholera’ and 
‘chlorine’, the extent to which it ignited public anger suggested a serious and 
wide set of grievances and mistrust towards the state and the international 
NGOs working in the area. Indeed, there were widespread fears and rumours 
that public health workers, such as those vaccinating children, had come to 
kill them (Serra 2002: 27– 28).
Serra (2002) argues that various forms of structural disconnection had 
emerged, leaving the public feeling both disempowered and distrustful of 
the seemingly arrogant and distant parties who claimed to be working for 
their benefit but often did little of value or solicited kickbacks in exchange 
for attendance. Rather than long- standing superstition being the cause of 
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this, there was no history of such uprisings in Nampula. Serra argues that 
that the more immediate causes were the context of local elections which 
had increased political tensions in the district, plus new intervention pro-
grammes by an NGO. Whilst such open conflagrations are relatively rare 
responses to public service failures within Mozambique, they seem inexplic-
able without postulating that there is a broader suspicion towards the state 
and the seemingly eccentric priorities of public health staff – both national 
and international – in terms of how they operate. Indeed, such suspicion can 
be understood as a fully rational response to the experiences of the state by 
the citizens.
***
Whilst there is no single account of the many different facets of the state 
over the last twenty years, international intervention in statebuilding in 
Mozambique has clearly been a dynamic and visible presence. However, 
these dynamics have to a large extent been a force for fragmentation and 
instability rather than consolidation and coherence. As can be seen, these 
kinds of fragmentation and instability characterise its uppermost levels as 
well as delivery on the ground. In the next section, I explore how these 
dynamics are interpreted and reflected upon by its targets.
THINKING LIKE A TARGET OF 
INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION
The dynamics of fragmentation and the disappearance of capacity described 
in the previous section are drawn largely from a close study, specifi-
cally of the health sector, but resonate with experiences in other sectors in 
Mozambique. In an open letter to Hu Jintao in 2007, Mozambican journalist 
Marcelo Mosse argued:
We are poor but we are not blind, and we like ourselves! Because of this, over 
the years, we have criticized the Western donors for the negative aspects that 
their ‘cooperation’ implied; we criticized the destruction of the cashew industry; 
the re- indebtedness of ‘technical assistance’; the excessively rigorous controls 
on public spending; the (disastrous) imposed privatisations; inappropriate tech-
nologies; the so- called ‘tied aid’ (which China promotes today); the project 
implementation units; the disempowerment of the state, the inefficient and 
unending capacity building etc. …
A lot of money, credit and donations have been spent on these processes. 
We could be better, of course. We’re not. However, the country has changed its 
face, we have more schools, hospitals, better communications, roads, maturing 
institutions, etc. In short, despite the negative aspects of such cooperation, there 
are many visible gains. Yet despite this, we remain dependent.24
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Indeed, there is good reason to believe that these dynamics are more broadly 
recognisable to the targets of intervention across a wide range of contexts 
over the last thirty years or so, where many of them have become clichés.25 
In the global policy- directed literature, they are glossed as problems of the 
‘effectiveness’ of intervention, which might be remedied through the sharing 
of best practices, the establishment of better relations and the propagation of 
new concepts such as ‘capacity development’.
The targets of aid in Mozambique, however, articulate these primarily 
as political questions located in the materially unequal and asymmetric 
relations between interveners and target societies, within which struggles 
for coherence, sovereignty and presence take place, alongside a quest 
for resources. This sense of the reality of intervention is a widespread 
and common sensibility that both describes and interprets its dynamics. 
Significantly, this consciousness is widespread and came up repeatedly 
throughout the research:
We on the ground are making noise – we shout, we shout – but, well, we have 
to conform because we are a poor African country and we have to live like 
this. And we will continue living like this. In this way, some will continue to 
get poorer, and others will be much richer, and in reality what can you do? The 
only secret is to study, isn’t it, to see if you can escape, work in the NGO and 
have more money.26
— Former health worker
Of course, they [the partners] have a big influence. We are a very poor country, 
where 50– 60% of the budget is paid for by them. It’s indisputable.27
— Newspaper editor
The partners at the moment have a heavy weight in Mozambique. This derives 
from the financial aid to the budget of the state – I don’t know exactly how much 
it is. But it gives them a great power, from those that give a small amount, to a 
big amount – it gives them disproportionate weight. But Mozambique, during 
many years Mozambique has lived off this. It has created a certain dependency – 
like a drug addict, it does not think whether it can live without the drug or with 
less of the drug.28
— Director of national NGO
The differences are very old – this is an old story, that the NGO has all the 
money and the government has nothing.29
— Former agricultural technician- turned- social  
enterprise worker
The collective understanding of this inequality that emerges is of the reality of 
aid dependency: a permanent, weighty, debilitating impoverishment in which 
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individuals, groups and the government must function and do what they can. 
In more measured language, this sensibility of deep asymmetry has even 
made it into government documents:
The relationship between donor and aid recipient is unequal by nature, and 
ignoring this fact runs the risk of threatening the creation of structures that are 
not used to their fullest potential or as understood by the Paris Declaration [on 
aid harmonisation]. Ultimately, the issues of ownership and responsibility, and 
even other seemingly more technical aspects of the Paris Declaration, depend 
on real change in mentality and a real change in the nature of the relationship 
[emphasis added]. (Government of Mozambique 2010: 36)
This structural and material asymmetry between donor and recipient – the new 
language of ‘partnership’ notwithstanding – is fundamental to explaining how 
and why interventions work as they do, and how the targets of intervention 
deal with it. When Mozambique accepted a large programme of aid restructur-
ing from the IFIs in the late 1980s, many were acutely conscious of the loss of 
its control over economic policy and key sectors.30 Yusuf Adam, a prominent 
intellectual within Frelimo, noted that the combination of war, destabilisa-
tion, emergency and the debt crisis were all contributing factors in forcing the 
decision to seek more external aid (Adam 1990). The national elite and wider 
public clearly understood themselves to be in a position of dire emergency. 
International aid, together with its trappings, was seen to be the only way to 
alleviate the problems in the short term (Ratilal 1990). Yet, it is now viewed as 
a time when much had to be accepted, sometimes humiliatingly:
We were in a situation where a partner would come, want to help, but didn’t trust 
us – they said we had many ‘attributes’. So it was difficult – we had to learn 
to swallow frogs – we had to accept this humiliation. We needed to weigh the 
results of this position. If you are very weak, if you stick to a point, it’s difficult 
to move. They used to say ‘it’s up to you, we can always go next door’. But our 
schools were destroyed, the infrastructure was destroyed, so people would be 
in a lower situation, or we had to accept it. Some of the partners did this to put 
us under their control. But we accepted to change and internally reform in a lot 
of cases. But where we could, we managed to get some ownership, even having 
the resources from elsewhere. Our cohesion and sense of dignity was always 
in place – we needed to balance the gains. But with our own ideas. Instead of 
trying to find justification for why things were like this, we said, let’s just con-
centrate on our own problems. If the problem is coming from the US or Europe, 
it’s their problem. It is a waste of time to work on something we can’t influence. 
Let’s concentrate on what we have to do.
— Former government minister31
Since this time, the government and other actors have been engaged in a 
careful and demanding negotiation of the asymmetric relationship with the 
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donors, both trading compliance for aid flows and attempting to take control 
where possible of the policy agenda.32 This has involved, on the one hand, 
engaging with the fragmented co- operation infrastructure in ways which 
retain lower levels of control over sectoral planning. For example, sources 
within government and donors are of the view that although the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers were elaborated and worked on extensively with 
the multilateral donors, and were important to win debt relief and funding, 
they may actually have a relatively limited impact on the public policy finally 
enacted.33
On the other hand, it has involved a fairly serious attempt by the govern-
ment to mobilise the aid harmonisation agenda to establish forms of co- 
 ordination and mutual accountability that underscore its prerogative to shape 
policy and action:
Paris [i.e. the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness] says that they have to 
follow our plan.... Some partners want to influence what is going to be there in 
2010, but we said we’ll wait until after the election [in 2009]. If it happens that 
we want one indicator, and they others … we know that some will be problem-
atic to comply. The Government is sometimes constrained. But there is always 
a strong dialogue, discussing this. At times they force the Government to imple-
ment something.34
— Senior civil servant
Mozambican economist Carlos Castel- Branco describes Mozambique as 
existing under conditions of multidimensional aid dependency (2008), which 
is structural and historical in nature, and which heavily constrains an attempt 
to establish meaningful ‘ownership’ over policy as well as the range of 
choices available, particularly over the meaning of ‘development’. He notes 
that some analyses present this as a rational- choice issue, where external 
donors are paid more attention than parliament, because it is they who pay. 
This would be consistent, for example, with the model developed by Barnett 
and Zürcher (2009) regarding intervention. They argue that peacebuilding 
creates weak statehood because of the different goals and strategies of the 
different actors. Specifically, national elites are said to ‘covet the resources 
offered by peacebuilders because they can be useful for maintaining their 
power’ (2009: 24).
Understood from below, however, Barnett and Zürcher’s highly reduc-
tive and perniciously caricatured way of approaching the dynamics fails to 
capture the long and frustrated history of efforts to build a functioning state 
and deliver public services that has underpinned much of the activity over 
the last thirty years. These efforts have, however, been riven with the frag-
mentation of policies, institutions, efforts and resources repeatedly and over 
time. Certainly, the weight of the donors comes with the resources that they 
bring, but resources are not sought by the government only out of greed or 
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covetousness. If one looks closely at the dynamics over time from the point of 
view of the target, one sees aid approached in a more cautious and reflexive 
manner, and in light of a political project, albeit one which is increasingly 
in question. In this light, the relations are often rather more self- consciously 
transactional, their effects limited and their institutionalisation more fragile. 
In Castel- Branco’s characterisation, multidimensional aid dependency is first 
and foremost a historical situation which conditions the imperatives of gov-
ernments in a very particular way.
Other developments have lessened perceived dependence on the Western 
or ‘traditional’ donors, which demonstrate the fragility of the intervention 
relationship and the significance of financial dependency as its basis. One 
is the emergence of ‘new’ donors from the global South who are willing, for 
various reasons, to do business differently. Whilst this is not perceived as 
having uniformly good effects – particularly where natural resource govern-
ance is concerned – it is understood to proceed on a much more respectful 
and egalitarian set of political co- ordinates. For example, the Government of 
Mozambique’s evaluation of aid effectiveness has this to say about Brazil:
Brazil does not impose conditions on its support to the Government of 
Mozambique over and above the basic reporting requirements. In particular, 
Brazil does not impose political constraints, and suggests that political develop-
ment and the development of citizenship should be a goal to achieve and not a 
precondition for help, as these evolve once a certain social and economic devel-
opment is achieved, arising as a result of historical and social process and not 
due to pressure from a donor [emphasis added]. (Government of Mozambique 
2010: 29).
In practice, the experience of working with ‘new’ donors has itself been more 
contested (Alden et al. 2014), and various public protests have been launched 
against the agricultural and extractive projects proposed. That said, the percep-
tion is still that they are prepared to co- operate in a much less rigid way than the 
Western donors, who looked, by contrast, outdated. As a former minister argued:
One of the reasons is the rise of other sources of finance, for example, India – 
access is much easier … We will go for that with or without World Bank permis-
sion. The Bank has to reform itself – that will give some fresh air.35
This ease and flexibility is directly contrasted with the practices of the Global 
Fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria. The Global Fund is a private, independent 
Swiss foundation which channels large amounts of official and multilateral 
aid, and which is understood as having had a significant short- term impact 
but at very significant transaction costs for the government and the nature of 
the health system (Government of Mozambique 2010: 29).
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The government has also engaged for many years in ‘donor shopping’. 
This involves looking around for a donor willing to support projects or pol-
icies that others will not, or to step in when others pull out. The director of 
a national civil society fund also noted that this tended to make attempts at 
co- ordinated conditionality much weaker: ‘anyway, if one goes, there will be 
another to fill their place – Swiss, American, Dutch – there is no common 
agenda. It is all an industry of competition’.36
Amongst numerous examples of this over recent years is the launching 
of a national development bank for private sector credit, which the govern-
ment were unable to persuade the large multilateral donors to underwrite.37 
However, in the following years, they signed accords with the Portuguese 
government38 to do precisely this for US$500 million. This move impor-
tantly undercut an apparent plank of neoliberal economic orthodoxy which 
sought to liberalise the financial industry and allow the market to set interest 
rates and repayment schedules. Instead, it offers subsidised interest rates for 
longer- term investments.39
Breaking and/ or subverting relations of dependency has been a clear objec-
tive in the ways in which co- operation has been conducted in recent years 
in Mozambique. Increasing its sources of international aid, leveraging its 
natural resources and trying to create a fiscal base have been all responses to 
the dysfunctional dynamics of statebuilding under conditions of pronounced 
structural aid dependence.
Within the international aid industry, however, the dynamics described 
throughout the chapter are extremely well known and well understood. They 
are also well understood by the targets of aid. The question is not then, ‘why 
does this happen?’ The question must be, in part, ‘why does this still hap-
pen?’, given what is known, and indeed what is spent on both intervention 
and the contemplation of its modes of functioning.
The way in which it was explained to me by various respondents was in 
terms of a constant desire for protagonismo on the part of the Western donors, 
which would always undercut attempts at co- ordination and control on the 
part of Mozambique, and indeed other attempts to make aid more ‘effective’. 
There is no suitable English translation for this word; it is a dramatic meta-
phor relating to who is the central character of a storyline (i.e. the protago-
nist). On one occasion a specific organisation was characterised as gringa, 
and sometimes ‘having a big ego’.40 But the word used more than any others 
was protagonismo. This pervaded the way in which agreements were made, 
the demands for innovation and claims to be innovative, an insistence on con-
ducting their own new studies in a field despite the existence of the same or 
very similar ones from other organisations or from the government itself, the 
desire for meetings to happen always at the ministerial level rather than with 
lower- level officials, the detailed and time- consuming reporting and sign- off 
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requirements, even for small organisations and small amounts of resource, 
and the demand for results to be immediately reported and available.
As a heuristic, I suggest, the sense of donor protagonismo is central to 
explaining and understanding the realities of intervention, in a way which 
goes beyond the existing literatures, beyond an account of bureaucratic 
imperatives and institutional frameworks, inefficiencies and hybridisation. At 
its root it is an idea which theorises the relations of subjects within a system 
as political entities, and in terms of their human, flawed, desires for recogni-
tion, a performance of mastery, a need for attention. The interveners are seen 
to exert protagonismo not because it fulfils a functional need necessarily, but 
in some sense – at least to the recipients – it represents a statement about the 
presence and the importance of the intervener.
Such a concept helps to make sense of the backlash against the traditional 
donors. As argued by a civil society worker in Nampula:
For its part, the government says, ‘If you influenced the way we got here, it is 
because you paid. You made a contribution to our budget. And we didn’t have 
the capacity or the voice. Today we have the capacity to finance it, because we 
can gather more funds and taxes. We want to speak for ourselves, we want to 
think for ourselves, we want to have our own ideas’.41
In this reading, to think about protagonismo is to think about how relations 
are conducted – whose ideas and demands are on the table, who gets to call 
the meetings, whose priorities are listened to and by whom. It is distinct from 
dependency, particularly insofar as some donors, particularly the Nordic ones, 
were often commended for being better able to cede the political agenda to the 
targets of aid despite high levels of funding. Protagonismo is instead about a 
political relation in which intervention is understood as a kind of space for 
actualising the identities of specific interveners and their world views, rather 
than working towards a common agenda set by the government or community. 
In the final chapter of this book, we will reflect further on the significance of 
protagonismo and more broadly what it means to think with and see with the 
targets of intervention and what it means to ‘decolonise’ our thinking.
***
The realities of statebuilding under international intervention in Mozambique 
are complex, but the story may be a familiar one to those acquainted with 
aid environments. Through applying our decolonising approach to reading 
the state, however, we can see an interpretation of failure as not grounded 
simply in bad policy or bad implementation, but structurally embedded into 
political relations of aid dependency and of protagonismo. In order to see 
these dynamics, the analytic perspective needs to be embedded in a sense of 
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the historical presence, political consciousness and material realities of those 
targeted by intervention. This is crucial for an understanding of intervention 
as a phenomenon and a contemplation of its political significance.
As this chapter has shown, not only is there a significant gap between its 
stated intentions and realities, but the targets of intervention also have clear 
ways of making sense of this gap which speaks acutely to its dynamics. In 
the next chapter, we will extend this discussion by looking at how target com-
munities amongst the rural poor have experienced and navigated intervention. 
By working with the decolonising strategies set out in  chapter 3, a reading of 
intervention in the agricultural sector reveals not only similar dynamics of state 
fragmentation to those in the health sector but also wider historical structures 
of political indifference towards the conditions of the peasantry on the part of 
both interveners and the state.
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Chapter Five
Intervention and the Peasantry
We’re only asking for help. That you help us, because each time they call a 
meeting, they ask us the same things and don’t help us with anything, they 
don’t do anything we ask – they only know how to call us for meetings. 
What’s more, because people are in the field, and they say, ‘Mama, run, 
you have to go there’ … It’s just for them to meet with us and when we tell 
our problems they are not attended to … You’re the third group this year 
… people just talk and go away and don’t do anything. They just come to 
watch us make noise.1
— Women farmers, Anchilo
The women farmers who had been gathered to speak at our request were the 
immediate targets of a US- funded local development project which ticked 
many boxes in terms of current trends in international aid. The project 
focused on the creation of a private sector entity which would become sus-
tainable by starting businesses to supply grain milling services to households 
as well as offering some public outreach services. The women themselves 
said that they benefited greatly from the mill and that having to perform this 
task manually previously took a long time. Yet, they were also palpably frus-
trated with the wider context in which NGOs came and went, opportunities 
were given to some and not others, projects which had started had stopped 
suddenly, their own communities lacked some of the promised infrastructure 
and they ‘continued sitting there’. Why could they not come to Maputo, or to 
London, to talk about their problems? Why were there no resources to do the 
things that had been promised?
In this chapter I open up the political space occupied by these women, who 
are the disappointed ‘beneficiaries’ of international intervention. In doing so, 
I apply the decolonising strategies articulated in  chapter 3 to the sphere of 
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agricultural development. Its argument is that when looking at intervention 
in the agricultural sector through an embeddedness in the historical presence, 
political consciousness and material realities of the peasantry, such interventions 
come into view as largely indifferent, irresponsible or fragile. This is in contrast 
to the narrative of intervention as innovative and transformative – a narrative 
which animates both interveners’ own optimistic accounts and those which are 
more critical of intervention models. By thinking about intervention through and 
with the perspectives of the peasantry, including the accounts of farmers them-
selves, their representatives and allies, we can better understand what it means 
for intervention to be ‘non- transformational’ in terms of its presence and put this 
in the context of historical patterns of both ‘development’ and ‘de- development’ 
within rural production. We can also better understand what alternatives have 
been put forward by peasant movements and why.
The chapter begins by summarising the political context in which interven-
tion in the agricultural sector takes place, through underlining the symbolic 
importance of the peasantry to both the state and donors. It then contrasts this 
with the experiences of intervention from the point of view of peasant farm-
ers, who underline the ways in which it has been largely non- transformative 
and fragile in terms of improving conditions of production. The character 
of intervention on the ground is then contextualised in terms of the political 
activity at the level of the state and donors in agricultural co- operation, which 
is rooted in contested policies and processes for developing agricultural pro-
duction, with some shared commitment to an export- oriented strategy rooted 
in international and domestic large- scale investments. These visions for 
agricultural production are contrasted with those of the peasant movements 
in Mozambique, which have, with the material help of interveners and the 
global peasant movement, created some political force around laws to protect 
peasant land tenure and emphasise food production for domestic consump-
tion. The political logic of these campaigns is situated in a long view of the 
peasantry and the historical attempts to govern them and their production 
strategies, which have been both externally oriented and subject to forms of 
external sabotage. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how frustra-
tions amongst the peasantry are rooted in the presently visible possibilities for 
uplift around them, to which they are perpetually refused access.
***
It is worth clarifying the use of the term ‘peasant’ in the analysis below. 
The majority of people in Mozambique – around 70 per cent – are defined 
 academically and administratively as belonging to the ‘rural’ population, 
99 per cent of whom are defined as being agricultural ‘smallholders’ in state 
surveys.2 The term ‘peasants’ [camponeses] is used here as an emic term, which 
many of those who largely live and work for themselves off the land use to 
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describe themselves. This is not to suggest, however, a single type of lifestyle, 
pattern of production or political positionality. Indeed, rural social orders in 
Mozambique, as everywhere, contain their own heterogeneous hierarchies of 
status, respect, wealth, class and access to public goods. Moreover, many of 
those who live within them have, through both choice and necessity, had to 
diversify their forms of income and production to make ends meet, result-
ing in a large amount of labour migration both near and far for ‘non- farm’ 
activities.
The identity of the camponés is, however, one which has endured and been 
reproduced in the contemporary era, albeit in changing ways. Although any 
substantive account of social and political life in Mozambique must account 
for the fate of the camponeses/ peasantry, for a decolonising interpretation of 
the political significance of intervention, the camponés must figure centrally 
in the analysis. The research for this chapter largely focuses on Nampula 
Province, 2,000 km from the capital and the most populous province in the 
country, in which 85 per cent of the population live to some degree off the 
land (Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security 2014).
THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PEASANTRY
The state of the peasantry is of considerable political importance to many 
parties within Mozambique. For the ruling party, Frelimo, it is part of what 
ideologically stitches together the struggle for independence from colonial-
ism and the former liberators’ ongoing dominance of the political arena. The 
country’s 1975 constitution says that Frelimo freed ‘the land’ as well as ‘the 
man’ from colonialism, and the country’s post- independence flag contains, 
deliberately, a hoe, a Kalashnikov and a book. Certainly at the level of the 
symbolic order, Mozambique has understood itself to be a land of liberated 
peasants. Even during the liberalisation reforms of the late 1980s and early 
1990s, Mozambique’s 1990 constitution declared that ‘agriculture is the basis 
of national development’ and, against some external pressure at the time and 
afterwards, that all land is the property of the state and all Mozambicans are 
free to make use of the land as their fundamental right.
For international interveners, ostensible efforts to help the peasantry 
helped rehabilitate their image as supportive and developmental after the 
crises precipitated by economic liberalisation in the 1990s. The major politi-
cal ‘success’ of international co- operation was the ubiquitously cited statistic 
showing a fall in absolute poverty in Mozambique from 69 per cent to 54 
per cent from 1996– 7 to 2003– 4 (INE 1999, 2004). This was revealed to be 
the result of increased consumption and production in rural areas – that is, 
amongst the peasants (Fox et al. 2005). This number became emblematic 
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of the potential of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) as a ‘post- 
Washington consensus’ policy instrument to a much wider global audience. 
This played a part in re- legitimising the role of the IFIs, UN organisations 
and European/ North American donors both within sub- Saharan Africa and 
further afield after criticisms were levelled at the impact of development 
policy.3 Poverty reduction figured strongly as an orienting objective of inter-
national aid in the articulation of the Millennium Development Goals and 
the ‘Make Poverty History’ campaign of the 2000s. The successes in abso-
lute poverty reduction in Mozambique allowed the government to enjoy the 
status of a ‘donor darling’, receiving funds from across the international aid 
infrastructure.
Consequently, the moves towards providing aid as direct budget sup-
port to the government and away from project aid were closely tied to 
the perceptions of a successful implementation of the PRSP (PARPA 
in Portuguese), summarised by the statistical drop in absolute poverty. 
Furthermore, the statistics on absolute poverty reduction have been an 
increasingly important part of the government’s own electoral manifesto in 
recent years as its post- independence and post- war popularity has started 
to wane.4 Constituting the majority of the ‘absolutely poor’, the fate of the 
peasantry in Mozambique is thus intimately tied to the political standing 
of the post- war aid architecture and government ‘performance’ as a whole. 
Given the significance of the rural poor to conceptions and symbols of 
state legitimacy, international development and economic progress, it is 
unsurprising that since the end of the war, both the state and international 
interveners have developed a large array of programmes, projects and 
plans for the uplift of the peasant and for rural development costing hun-
dreds of millions of dollars.
However, these headlines have not always lent themselves to a wider 
appreciation of how Mozambican peasants over time have experienced and 
understood their realities, which is fundamental to decolonising the analysis, 
as argued in chapter 3. As the following section shows, in contrast with the 
outward celebration of rural poverty reduction in Mozambique, the expe-
rience of supposed beneficiaries is one of limited assistance, repeatedly 
deflated expectations, unrewarded efforts and a sense of being blocked from 
more meaningful transformative activity by the systems in place. And yet, 
due to the dearth of other options and the need for resources, many peasant 
farmers have sought to glean what they can from international co- operation 
projects which continue to promise better incomes and better futures, and 
which even occasionally deliver a more concrete opportunity in terms of 
direct employment. Such opportunities are, however, both rare and unpredict-
able, and auxiliary to the objectives of the interventions themselves.
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PEASANT EXPERIENCES OF INTERVENTION IN  
THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
There is a lot of effort [by us] – peace always brings this. The peasant 
tries to increase his areas of production thanks to the peace and freedom 
that he has. But, for example, at the level of agriculture, we do not have 
technical assistance. We don’t have the seeds to sow on time – for exam-
ple we’re now in August, and we will begin the campaign [of sowing] in 
September, October. The peasant doesn’t know what to expect from the 
government. He’ll make the effort and we try to produce our own seeds, 
conserve our own seeds. We plant them, what we can. He’s doing it, but 
we’ve been waiting for twenty years [emphasis added]. To improve rural 
extension, more help for the peasants, more seeds – there’s a lot of good 
things that could help increase production. But today very few of these 
things – except for what we can fight for in organised groups – are there. 
But a peasant on his own doesn’t have them or wait for them … These are 
the things that worry us.5
— Peasant farmer provincial representatives
The war in Mozambique between the government and Renamo forces from 
the late 1970s to 1990 for the most part took its worst toll in rural areas. 
Whilst cities were better fortified, poorly supplied forces swept through the 
countryside and villages looting for food, mining fields, destroying infrastruc-
ture, killing and raping villagers and forcibly enlisting fighters (Magaia 1988; 
Nordstrom 1998). Apart from the direct deaths and displacements caused by 
the war, the early 1980s became known also as the tempo de fome or time of 
hunger because of the disruption of basic food production, with many dying 
of starvation. Farmers often could not sow, plant or cultivate new areas of 
land because movement was both difficult and dangerous. Sometimes people 
would venture back to their fields and homes in the daytime, having slept in 
the bush to avoid night attacks, to see what could be retrieved. Without other 
means of subsistence, this was the only way to avoid starvation, even though 
it entailed a high risk of death. As schools, hospitals and other government 
buildings were subject to targeting by the rebels, many were abandoned or 
shut. Roads were also occupied by military forces, meaning that they were 
avoided by civilians and subject to much damage.
The advent of a ceasefire in 1990 and a peace deal in 1992 paved the way 
home for many of the rural populations who had been displaced internally 
or across the border as refugees. In discussing to what extent their lives had 
been transformed since the end of the war, many simply contrasted war with 
peace; peace meant freedom to sleep in their own houses, cultivate land, that 
their children could go to school and study, that they could go to the market 
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without fear of being attacked.6 Others noted that the roads were better and 
that there were more health centres around. More broadly, it meant something 
like a future: ‘People can dream, work towards their dreams, even if they can-
not realise them. But they are now dreaming, “we can do this” ’.7 Whereas the 
war had meant ‘not knowing if you were going to wake up in the morning’,8 
peace had allowed something like a normal life to emerge.
Although many thousands of fighters were offered relatively generous 
demobilisation packages by interveners (Alden 2002), much of the repatria-
tion after the war was ‘spontaneous’ in the sense of being undirected and to 
some extent unsupported although overseen by the UN. Much emergency 
food aid was present in the immediate aftermath of the war but phased out 
within a few years as farming resumed and emergency funds were withdrawn. 
However, alongside the food aid, an ‘explosion’ of international NGOs 
(Mosca 2011: 370) arrived and began working directly with the population 
on various aspects of rural development, often as the implementing arm 
for Western governments (Duffield 2007:  chapter 4). Projects included the 
rehabilitation of rural roads, the provision of seeds and hoes for farming, the 
creation of water posts and support for land title registrations. Interventions 
also emphasised the creation of associations for various purposes – crop mar-
keting, savings and credit networks, public awareness about health and so on. 
Evaluations of projects claim their impact through the large membership of 
these associations, numbering in the hundreds and thousands.
Promoting Productivity
Specifically within the agricultural sector, a large proportion of international 
NGO interventions have had the objective of improving production and 
productivity. Many of these interventions have involved delivering training 
packages in conservation agriculture, linear sowing and intercropping, which 
are techniques designed to increase yield in small plots. After the immedi-
ate post- war period and the demobilisation packages, the trend has been for 
interventions not to supply seeds or equipment. Instead, a few people are 
selected from different groups to be trained, and they are then encouraged to 
train people in their own communities to spread the knowledge. They are also 
encouraged to form associations in order to self- organise and receive training 
and other interventions, as well as to sell collectively. Most of the camponeses 
with whom I spoke, all of whom were members of associations, had received 
several training sessions, and some reported that they had managed to increase 
their yield as a result. Others spoke of the range of things that they had learned:
NGOs helped here by showing us how to sow, how to sell, how to conserve 
when we have some left over, how it is when we are hungry; we didn’t know 
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that cashew trees should be sprayed but now we know that when they are 
sprayed they are very fine. These are the things they taught us – how to form 
associations was also the work of NGOs.
— Farmers’ forum, Ituculo- Nicane
Indeed, these packages are significant for the fact that their implementation 
does not require any new equipment or ongoing support to peasant farmers to 
implement them. In this sense, according to interveners, they are understood 
to be ‘sustainable’ because they do not create ‘dependency’.
Yet, as was repeatedly pointed out by respondents, this also means that 
actual productivity gains and income growth made as a result of NGO inter-
ventions are also very limited. Instead, there was a sense that these interven-
tions had reached their limit, because they did not improve the technologies 
available to farmers:
This here is the issue. It’s true that the technicians of the district show us how to 
weed, how to sow, how to thin … but we can’t prepare the earth, this is difficult; 
we can only do manual work with our hands. This is why we say that agricul-
ture is not developing, because you need machinery to develop agriculture, and 
me and my wife alone can only manage two or three hectares alone. They’ve 
already shown me how to sow, how to weed, how to sow in a line – I’ve learnt 
all this. How to keep seeds – we’ve learnt this. But how to plough the field? 
This is the difficulty, and this is why we don’t go forward – because we cannot 
farm much land.9
— Farmers’ forum, Nacololo
What we are missing – now we are doing manual farming, but we need help to 
at least have a tractor to plough the land, and then we can sow in a line, because 
the land would be in a condition to keep us going forward – because we have 
been cultivating this land for many years and the soil is tired. We are asking for 
them to give us a tractor so we can sow well and have a better income – not that 
we don’t have a good income now but we can do even better … We also don’t 
have better seeds, or even a little manure or anything.10
— Farmers’ forum, Netia
An agronomist responsible for training communities agreed:
Logically, when you ask why these producers have so little, even after so many 
years of training, I don’t know. That is to say, there have been many trainings 
but there is no technology, none [emphasis in original]. So unfortunately most 
of our producers are still using the same technology they used in ancient Egypt. 
It might seem like a caricature but that is the reality.11
This lack of technology is compounded by the absence of any consistent agri-
cultural extension services, which has for many years been seen as a central 
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problem in improving productivity by a wide range of parties. One peasant 
representative noted that in 1984 Mozambique had around 1,200 agricultural 
technicians employed by the state, compared to 1,259 in 2014; a recently 
completed eighteen- month scheme to increase the number had not resulted 
in any notable increase in extensionists employed, much of the funds hav-
ing been spent on workshops and seminars.12 Another senior NGO worker 
commented:
Nampula – the whole province, with 4,7 million inhabitants, the majority – 80 
per cent or 90 per cent live from agriculture. And we have just 138 – one three 
eight – public extensionistas [technicians]. Badly paid, badly equipped – they 
probably don’t even go out to the field. And like this you think that people have 
to open their doors to globalisation?13
Many of the peasant farmers interviewed had not received any public exten-
sion visits at all. Indeed, agricultural census figures reveal a significant 
national fall in numbers of farmers receiving extension visits from 13.5 per 
cent in 2002 to 7.7 per cent in 2008 (Cunguara and Kelly 2009: 7). Given that 
extension services in agriculture are central to promoting and facilitating the 
use of agricultural inputs, it is also then unsurprising that the numbers of farm-
ers using improved seeds, fertilisers and pesticides is extremely low; chemical 
pesticide use also declined from 6.7 per cent in 2002 to 2.6 per cent in 2008 
(Cunguara and Kelly 2009: 7). These inputs are, however, critical to increasing 
the productivity for farmers and increasing their income, which for the govern-
ment and donors should be central to poverty reduction. Farmers are, however, 
currently in a situation where they have maximised what can be done without 
them. Instead, they seek ways and means of procuring such inputs themselves. 
One touted solution to this problem was through mechanisms for rural finance, 
which would provide ‘market solutions’ to these issues.
Rural Financing
However, a similar pattern of limited impact has been achieved with respect 
to microfinance – a seeming success story, in which many international NGOs 
and donors have been interested as a key component of poverty reduction 
amongst the rural poor. Whilst this vision initially aimed to increase credit 
to the poor in terms of loans to support expanded production, this approach 
initially ended up serving less poor urban clients, and with a high rate of 
default. Amongst the rural poor, microfinance subsequently morphed into the 
promotion of rotational savings and credit associations, which required no 
seed capital from donors but instead involved training associations in ways to 
generate communal savings pots from which loans could be made (de Vletter 
2006). Of these, at least some have continued to function in the intended way 
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and some members were outwardly positive about the impact on their lives. 
A member of a rotational savings and credit association exclaimed:
Oh, they [the NGO] gave us a big advantage! We didn’t have any vision, any 
idea, we were just ordinary people, walking around [gestures comically with his 
head down] with our heads down, not knowing anything. Then we were receiv-
ing trainers, and things became easily better. We are very thankful. We didn’t 
know leadership. But now, thanks to God, we know how to do associativismo 
[creating associations], we have a strategic plan, an agenda.14
De Vletter reports that the progress of rotational savings and credit adoption 
has been in excess of government expectations, which had initially targeted 
one hundred thousand savers (2006: 2).
Yet, in terms of the effect on productivity, rotational savings and credit 
methods do not appear to have had a wide impact, for the most part because 
the funds available are insufficient to meet investment needs – that is, for 
extra labour or inputs (De Vletter 2006: 54). This is reflected in the national 
agricultural census figures recording the low use of improved inputs already 
discussed. Even in Nampula Province, where this initiative is considered 
broadly successful by many donors, the most prolific of these providers 
reaches just 2 per cent of the province’s population on a generous count.15
For those reached, however, even the largest of the loans that a typical 
savings association might provide to a member – about US$50 – would 
not be enough to borrow a tractor for even one hectare of land, reported by 
one association at US$60.16 There is thus a large gap between the promise 
of microfinance as an auto- generative source of investment and the real-
ities of what investments can be made and by whom. Although they have 
promoted a more formal and more visible account of mutual help within a 
small number of rural communities, their capacity to transform production 
is limited. At best, they provide a way of reorganising the small amounts of 
capital that rural communities have managed to generate to better manage 
household needs.
A further prospective source of finance for rural communities was launched 
by the government in 2005 as part of a decentralisation initiative, which is 
commonly called the sete milhões (seven million) by the amount of initial 
investment in meticais per district (c. US$300,000). This fund was intended 
to stimulate local investment initiatives, based on the consultative and par-
ticipatory planning mechanisms located at different levels. Whilst initially 
wary of the initiative, international partners became heavily involved in the 
provision of technical support and assistance for the project, training various 
people in questions of governance, planning and budgeting. The govern-
ment passed further laws stipulating levels of participation and consultation 
that were in principle highly democratic – these were celebrated widely as 
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evidence of a commitment to good governance and development at the local 
level and supported by a range of partners.
The purposes of the funds were somewhat unclear at the outset, but became 
understood as a larger rotational credit source for the district; the district gov-
ernment would provide loans to people to generate development and these 
loans were to be repaid (Orre et al. 2012). In the eyes of the protagonists of 
the policy, developed during the Guebuza administration, this was a radical 
departure from ‘top- down’ developmental models proposed by outsiders.
Yet, despite this promise of resource flow to the local level, these funds 
have been perceived by many of the intended beneficiaries and those inter-
viewed for this project as inaccessible – for the most part they have been 
perceived as benefiting those connected to the district administrator (a post 
appointed by the president) or their families, or politically connected people. 
That they were investment funds has also been in doubt – many reported 
that funds were used to improve administrators’ dwellings or facilities rather 
than for economic activity. Interviewees noted that they were not invited and 
excluded from decision- making regarding the funds, and others that they 
were not given any information about them.17 Whilst hundreds of projects 
were approved, a perception is that they strengthened the hand of local gov-
ernment officials within the community as a source of patronage (Orre et al. 
2012). In particular, some farmers reported that officials and chiefs demanded 
large cuts of the project money offered, thus meaning that those who sought 
to borrow ended up with large debts not of their making, of which they did 
not have the means to finance. For those telling this story, it was barely worth-
while getting all the documentation and investment plans together, which 
involved a huge bureaucratic struggle on their part.18 Overall, then, efforts to 
provide financial aid at the level of the peasant smallholders have failed for 
similar reasons to efforts to increase production – they are too small, too con-
strained and in this case also too controlled by an unreliable state machinery.
Producing for the Market
There is a subset of interventions in rural communities, which have provided 
proportionately more support in terms of extension visits, inputs and tech-
nology, which have been those specifically directed at encouraging them to 
grow cash crops for international markets. These have been widely promoted 
by NGOs and social enterprises, as well as directly by the private sector. The 
shared vision underpinning these activities is that peasants can lift themselves 
out of poverty by producing more valuable crops, which will generate a mon-
etised income stream that will stimulate rural development.
Typically, starter packages provided by these interventions will include a 
supply of certified seeds in the relevant crop, training in how to sow and plant, 
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plus support for creation of an association to facilitate sales and storage. These 
programmes, usually three years in length, will include multiple visits during 
the project cycle plus monitoring and evaluation activity. More ambitious pro-
grammes in Nampula have involved creating a co- operative social enterprise to 
buy from farmers’ associations and sell to the international market, cutting out 
private middlemen (intervenientes). These interventions are explicitly directed at 
improving the supply chain as a means of raising farmer incomes.
However, understood from the point of view of the beneficiaries, these inter-
ventions have still left them in highly precarious situations, mostly because 
there are no consistent or predictable purchasing arrangements for the crops, 
despite the promises of higher incomes by the NGOs, social enterprises and 
companies promoting it. Every farmer group interviewed raised this issue – that 
they tried to follow the schemes but were mostly let down when it came to sell:
This year, we tried to do cotton – we were being told by everyone that this is 
‘white gold’, so we were all making, planting, harvesting … but for this ‘white 
gold’, we were getting 6 MT [$0.28 USD] per kilo! We couldn’t buy anything.19
— Farmers’ savings and credit association, Monapo
It didn’t get better, because roaming vendors bring their own scales and just say 
the price at which they want to buy. ‘I’m going to buy this at this price’. So, as 
a peasant with my own concerns I am forced to sell, because I have difficul-
ties, because I have to send my child to school. This is an issue, the lack of the 
market, because if you had a market this wouldn’t happen.20
— Peasant farmer provincial representatives
If you show up there with an association, you have to look at the environment of 
the community. If it’s a peasant association, you have to understand why it was 
formed. I can’t just show up there and create an association because I’m bringing 
seeds tomorrow. This is what has created some distortions. If you say ‘Antonio, 
what are you planting? Tomatoes? Why don’t you also plant some soya?’ Because 
this soya is like this, and does this, and they try to understand beforehand. And 
they understand that one day they will ask, ‘Is it true that if I produce, there will 
be buyers? Who will buy it? Are you sure of this? And this year, if not, what will 
I do with this soya?’ These are discussions which we have not had carefully.21
— Peasant farmer provincial representatives
Hasn’t anyone tried to bring these things [tractors, improved seeds] here?
No! There’s a cotton company called SAN but they only give you cotton 
seeds … and they said they would not plough any fields unless we planted only 
cotton.
Would you like to plant cotton?
No! We stopped because it gave us a lot of hassle … you have to weed it six 
times and it doesn’t give much profit – it just brings hunger.22
— Farmers’ forum, Netia
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This difficulty takes place so much at the level of producers with middlemen 
and buyers – there is no signing of a contract. Because before, they used to say 
they would buy and they had to bring a contract with the producers in the period 
of production. He can then plan, knowing that I’m going to do X hectares of 
crop X, because I’m going to sell to that guy, but this isn’t happening.23
— Farmers’ forum, Nacololo
Many of the groups interviewed had been encouraged to cultivate sesame by 
a well- regarded social enterprise co- founded by international organisations, 
and many had reported successes in the early years of production. As noted 
by the interveners’ documentation, per kilo, sesame attracts a relatively high 
price on the international market (US$2.50/ kg), and the established enter-
prise successfully purchased and resold the crop in the mid- 2000s. It can be 
intercropped with food, meaning the risk of food shortage is less than with 
monocultures such as cotton. International agencies invested heavily in pro-
jects to engage and improve the ‘supply value chain’ for this crop and have 
spent millions of dollars training for this.
Yet, farmer experiences of production suggest that the promise of 
improving their conditions through such a crop may be short- lived. Sesame 
is a crop which is highly labour- intensive in terms of harvesting, predict-
ably introduces disease within a year or two without the use of pesticides, 
loses moisture and mass if not sold on time, and is vulnerable to storage 
infestation when not stored securely. One agronomist interviewed said that 
it could be grown only for four years from the starting conditions, and 
then one had to do something else.24 For various reasons, the interventions 
established were not geared up or able to deal with these issues, leaving 
many of those interviewed frustrated. Some had stopped producing it, 
some had stopped selling it to the social enterprise due to conflicts over 
timing and predictability, and others continued to produce and to sell in 
reduced quantities but with ongoing concerns both on this front and regard-
ing the market. One farmer noted a drop from 800 kg per hectare to 300 kg 
due to lack of irrigation and production means, and others complained 
that facilities that had been promised, such as for storage, had never been 
delivered.
Overall, the picture from the experience of producing for the market at the 
encouragement of intervention is thus deeply mixed, with interventions often 
acting somewhat irresponsibly. For peasant farmers, when prices are good, 
the harvest is good and the crop sells on time and predictably, there is clearly 
satisfaction and happiness derived from that. However, it is also clear that 
there are a wide range of potential and predictable pitfalls which interveners 
have either been unwilling or unable to address, and peasants have borne the 
costs of having either unsold or unsellable crops, diseased or infested crops, 
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monopolistic and unfair purchase arrangements, lack of transport, storage and 
the other stresses of uncertainty.
***
Whilst Mozambique did appear to be a major success story for developmental 
intervention on the part of donors in the first years following the end of the 
war, since then rural development has slowed down seriously and is on some 
indicators going ‘backwards’ in terms of productivity. Recent studies suggest 
that absolute poverty has in fact increased (Cunguara et al. 2012) despite its 
macroeconomic growth, and this is due to the collapse in rural productivity per 
head. From the perspectives of peasant farmers – without formal education in 
agronomy or development economics, or overviews of agricultural statistics 
and censuses – this is obvious given the lack of investment in agricultural ser-
vices, supplies and technology, and lack of stable markets. It is also obvious 
to some of those delivering the interventions as subcontractors to the donors:
The type of help given by most of the donors – I think it doesn’t work ... To con-
tinue using a flip chart and marker all the time, that is to say that the producers 
have been seeing this for ten, fifteen years. They see a new technician coming 
on a motorbike but it’s the same old thing. So imagine – I am feeling this and 
the producers are also feeling the same thing. The same technologies. Since the 
war ended in Mozambique in 1992, 1993, the teaching techniques are the same. 
So our producers who are fifty years old – they who are seeing, they who have 
been hearing the same thing for twenty years, the same story until now when 
they are 50. So something is not going well with how we are doing things. This 
is not right.25
— Agricultural enterprise manager
There are organisations that only came and formed associations. For me the 
concern was that they formed a thousand and such associations, legalised them 
and then said we have already done the work. You leave, the names remain, but 
these associations you are looking for cannot be found. So that’s the point, at 
least me, that’s how I see it … That money, if you evaluate the investment, is 
millions of dollars. But when we are going to evaluate who was left, at least one 
person doing such an activity does not exist.26
— Peasant farmer provincial representatives
On the ground, the limitations of policy and interventions in the agricultural 
sector indeed seem obvious. The question then becomes, what has been 
going on politically over the last twenty years, such that this is what has 
resulted? And where has the money gone? The following section outlines 
the development of agricultural policy in the post- war period, as negotiated 
between the Government of Mozambique and its assorted partners. As with 
health, there has been a significant and systematic fragmentation of efforts 
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and resources, which have followed around areas of fashionable interest and 
political significance – international, regional and national – rather than the 
cumulative development of mass provision in areas of ongoing basic need. 
This has resulted in erratic provision, sudden changes in policy direction and 
a deterioration of co- ordination mechanisms.
AGRICULTURAL POLICIES, THE STATE AND 
INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION
I feel that donors don’t really want to reduce poverty. We started with 
PROAGRI in 1995 [sic]. There were millions spent on consultant stud-
ies – four studies, but if you see how much is going to the farmer, it’s just 
25% – I say why? Each donor wants to do the study, and to use the money 
of PROAGRI. And the amount of money they pay for the study is unac-
ceptable. They always want the evaluation, and they contract out – and 
how much do they support? But the support for the farmers itself, they are 
not getting a lot. With one study, you can buy ten tractors, you can really 
solve some problems.27
— Former agricultural technician working for  
European donor agency
The structural adjustment plan that Mozambique signed up to in 1987, in 
order to qualify for Western financial assistance, affected the agricultural sec-
tor as it did many others. The budget for salaries to public sector technicians 
was dramatically cut, and took a while to recover (Mosca 2011: 109). Prices 
were liberalised, the currency was devalued, meaning more competitive 
exports but more expensive imports, credit to state- owned enterprises was 
drastically lowered and many large agricultural enterprises were privatised 
through sales to politically connected figures and international investors. 
Agricultural production increased as a result of population return after the 
war and the broader expectation on the part of the donors was that market 
activity would stimulate and drive economic development. As already noted, 
many NGOs entered the country with the stated objectives of helping peas-
ants link better to the markets.
In terms of international statebuilding efforts, the push by donors to reform 
and build the capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
(MADER) became a major focus of activity. A common fund (PROAGRI) 
was established in 1999, under the principles of direct budget support, to 
help consolidate funding for the ministry. The stated emphasis within this 
first phase (1999– 2005) was capacity- building, improving production and 
supporting natural resources. Of this, as is widely understood, the vast major-
ity of funds was spent on institution- building within the ministry and (often 
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outsourced) research, with relatively little going to the provision of services 
to farmers (Evans et al. 2007: 26). Moreover, a high proportion of these funds 
was also spent at the central level instead of at the provincial or district level. 
What is less widely reported is that the majority of the state officials who 
were supposed to be trained under PROAGRI did not complete the training 
(Government of Mozambique 2007: ix), and, as with the health sector, a large 
number left to work for donors and NGOs on their own agricultural strate-
gies and programmes. The result is a state apparatus for agriculture that is 
fragmented and poorly staffed despite the investment of millions of dollars, 
particularly at the provincial and district levels but also at the centre.
A further emphasis of donors and government – driven more on a project 
basis – was in encouraging the growth of large- scale agribusinesses, although 
these have not produced any transformation in the conditions for the majority 
of peasants. Many of these sought to revive colonial- era enterprises and planta-
tions, such as in coconuts, sugar and sisal. Others sought to establish large areas 
for new crops, such as jatropha, eucalyptus and soya, through either a plantation 
or an outgrower model. Many of these were supported by the government unit 
Centre for the Promotion of Agriculture (CEPAGRI), which housed a number 
of international economists as well as government officials and was engaged 
in promoting strategic crops. There are research institutes for cotton, sugar and 
cashew, which were also connected to these efforts. However, whilst these 
units and forms of co- operation conducted much research and established many 
strategies, the impact on the ground was highly variable.
On the one hand, they managed to attract a series of prospective investors, 
and some enterprises were rehabilitated successfully. For example, the colo-
nial- era Sena Sugar Estates at Marromeu was taken over by a consortium 
of Mauritian and South African investors, but, crucially, the investment was 
underwritten by the World Bank. In total, the sugar industry has seen US$300 
million invested in the last twenty years and has succeeded in exporting to 
the EU, which has been tariff-free for African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
producers, although the future is unclear given the recent change in the tariff 
regime. On the other hand, a more disastrous intervention took place in coco-
nut plantations, where in Zambezia the US Government– funded Millennium 
Challenge Account and its private and NGO subcontractors ignored warnings 
of producers and local experts about disease and pests and pressed on with 
the project they had designed. These then destroyed the entire plantation and 
affected the nearby family sector (Valoi 2013). The government’s rapid pro-
motion of jatropha as a crop for biodiesel export also is seen to have failed, 
with peasants complaining that no one had bought it despite tons being pro-
duced at the behest of the then president (Macauhub 2010). Over the longer 
term, little attention has been paid to the creation of rural jobs, despite this 
being highlighted early on as significant (Cramer and Pontara 1998).
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By the end of the first PROAGRI programme in 2005, the government was 
under pressure from rising food prices and disappointments about production 
and support to the family sector. Moreover, many investments in agribusiness 
which had had international support through the CEPAGRI unit of govern-
ment did not pan out successfully or produce sufficient jobs. One of the early 
decisions of the Guebuza administration in 2005 was to convert MADER 
into the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG) and put rural development in the 
Ministry of Planning and Development. The second PROAGRI programme 
(2007– 12) emphasised good governance, transparency and decentralisation, 
and it also received initial support from many of the donors who had sup-
ported the first programme. With the declaration that the district level was to 
be the ‘pole of development’, the sete milhões (seven million meticais) local 
investment initiative proceeded as an exemplar of many international priori-
ties in planning and participation.
At a political level, there was understood to be a ‘change of paradigm’ on 
agricultural policy (Eurosis 2010: 86) within the government in favour of 
‘food security’. This was ostensibly aimed at being more ‘pro- poor’ and ‘pro- 
peasant’. The administration aligned itself with initiatives such as the Green 
Revolution for Africa (2007) and the African Union Comprehensive Africa 
Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) initiative. These committed 
it to an expansion of public funding for agriculture, an investment in tech-
nologies for production as well as infrastructures. In planning terms, a Food 
Production Action Plan (PAPA) was launched in 2007 for 2008– 11, followed 
by a Strategic Plan for Agricultural Development (PEDSA) to last from 2010 
to 2019. This was accompanied by a CAADP Strategy known as the National 
Plan for Strategic Investment in Agriculture 2014– 18 (PNISA).
However, many donors, including the World Bank and USAID, pulled 
out of direct support for the agricultural sector with this change of direction, 
unhappy with the prospect of direct subsidy for or provision of inputs to the 
farming sector, as well as the proliferation of different strategies (Government 
of Mozambique 2010: 56– 57). The donors redoubled efforts within the pri-
vate sector following this fallout, emphasising agribusiness, supply chain 
linkages and cash crops as primary paths to agricultural development. The 
amount of assistance channelled through PROAGRI has fallen dramatic-
ally – from a peak of 64 per cent in 2005 to 32 per cent in 2009 (Government 
of Mozambique 2010: 58), directly as a result of the struggle over these pol-
icies and priorities. The dynamics of protagonismo identified in the previous 
chapter then emerged strongly with regard to the agricultural sector, with each 
donor seeking to make its own impact and headway in an area of its choosing.
The Government of Mozambique’s own published assessment is that inter-
national co- operation in agriculture was, in comparative terms, less successful 
than that in the health sector. It can be seen that there are similar dynamics 
 
 Intervention and the Peasantry 99
   
in terms of the effect of intervention on the state sector to those described 
in the previous  chapter – the fragmentation of resource and capacities, the 
lack of delivery on the ground, the focus on specific activities with political 
importance (e.g. HIV/ AIDS and some cash crops) and tensions between the 
donors and government over priorities. Evidence that policies were not hav-
ing a transformative impact has been abundantly supplied through agricul-
tural surveys, crop- specific research and an array of reports and evaluations. 
Moreover, the basic lack of resources to accomplish even a small proportion 
of the stated objectives has been a chronic issue which has not yet shown 
improvement. It is for these reasons that leading Mozambican agronomist 
João Mosca has recently argued that ‘there has never been an agricultural 
policy’ in Mozambique (Caldeira 2016). He argues in a long- term analysis 
of agricultural policy that chronic and severe underinvestment, political 
fragmentation and instability, the lack of institutional capacity and techni-
cal knowledge have systematically undermined efforts to develop the sector 
(Mosca 2011:  chapter 7).
Yet, perhaps more fundamentally, there has been within the agricultural 
sector – more so with some donors than the government – a specific ideologi-
cal firewall against sustained and direct state support for the family sector and 
the kinds of support that peasants have said that they need, even to fulfil the 
objectives of market participation and integration. In limited situations, some 
private companies have established contracts and support agreements that act 
to mitigate risk for small farmers, such as in tobacco (Hanlon et al. 2008). 
Yet, the donors are fundamentally reluctant, even when the evidence is there, 
to allow for the state to mitigate risks to the family sector. In a recent analysis 
of the government’s CAADP investment strategy, Thurlow (2013) argues that 
input subsidies and better extension services have a much better potential for 
increasing productivity than the suggested focus on irrigation. Although the 
government’s recent ‘paradigm change’ signals that they are willing to move 
in this direction of better subsidising and resourcing peasant production, it is 
unclear that they can do so in practice without a corresponding transformative 
change in the institutional environment or political dialogue. According to 
Mozambican academic observers, the proliferation of initiatives and strate-
gies is embedded primarily in a quest to maximise the inflow of resources 
(Mosca 2011; Castel- Branco 2007) rather than being an articulation of a 
sustained policy direction.
To put these developments into the light of the findings of the previous 
section, whilst the peasants have been the object of specific but rather limited 
programmes over the last twenty years, the machinery of public policy has 
become fragmented, contested and overlaid with a range of political conflicts 
and projects from both donors and government. Underpinned by the rela-
tions of asymmetry and dependency described in the previous chapter, the 
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government has nonetheless been less willing to concede political ground in 
this sector to the donors, leaving relations and resource flows heavily stilted. 
Donors, for their part, have been unwilling to confront the often hypocritical 
and counter- productive character of their own policy prescriptions, refusing 
forms of support which are widely used elsewhere. Despite the mounting evi-
dence that there are serious and urgent problems at the level of agricultural 
production, demonstrated through the national surveys, the political deadlock 
on the issue combined with the fragmentation of the state means that it is 
unlikely to be resolved soon. Much will depend, then, on whether other part-
ners, such as producer states from the global South, will provide the space 
and resources to work around this.
That said, international assistance flowed not only to the state sector within 
agriculture but also to civil society organisations representing the rights and 
interests of peasants. These organisations have had a significant impact on 
key developments in the agricultural sector over the last twenty years, par-
ticularly with regard to land tenure. These are being seen as increasingly 
prescient given present pressures on land from both elite domestic investors 
and their foreign counterparts (UNAC/ GRAIN 2015). In the next section, 
I contemplate the significance of these forms of co- operation as part of the 
intervention landscape and note that these represent alternative departures for 
thinking about assistance. In particular, they offer an alternative vision of how 
to organise production such that it serves the needs of peasant farmers first.
THE PEASANT MOVEMENT AND ALTERNATIVE 
VISIONS OF DEVELOPMENT
Whilst the political struggles between the government and donors on agricul-
tural policy has been played out over the last two or three decades, a mobilised, 
well- connected and materially funded network of organisations representing 
peasants and their interests has created some political force in terms of rethink-
ing the political landscape. Their presence is a constant thorn in the side of 
both the government and donors, and increasingly they are at the forefront of 
resistance to the seemingly more progressive forms of co- operation between 
Southern governments (e.g. Brazil) and Mozambique. Whilst these move-
ments began life as a campaign around questions of land tenure and reform, 
they have become institutionalised as a counterpoint to the extraverted strate-
gies of rural development pursued by both donors and the government. I look 
here at the questions of land tenure and food sovereignty, which are key planks 
of its alternative thinking on rural production and development.28
In the early 1990s, the National Union of Peasant Farmers (UNAC) and 
the Organisation for Rural Mutual Assistance (ORAM) were formed and, 
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from their inception, had a particular interest in the question of land reform. 
They were materially supported by a number of the Scandinavian donors and 
have since received work from USAID and DfID, amongst others. They are 
also linked to global movements such as the Via Campesina and Movimento 
Sem Terra (MST) in Brazil. They have often been supported by academic 
organisations and think tanks – such as the Institute for Social and Economic 
Studies (IESE), Academic Action for the Development of Rural Communities 
(ADECRU) and Cruzeiro do Sul – that produce regular analyses of govern-
ment and donor policy. These organisations are also partially funded by 
international agencies – mostly small European donors. Although not widely 
visible and read by the broader population for numerous reasons, their analy-
ses and engagements frequently make it into the national press; they provide a 
source of high- quality intellectual labour for the policy world, and their mem-
bers rotate through public universities and international conferences. Whilst 
they do not officially promote any specific political platform, they have, often 
in collaboration with the peasant organisations, challenged government and 
donor thinking on questions of poverty reduction, agricultural productivity, 
land grabs and foreign investment, privatisation, aid and state ownership and 
social protection.
On the question of land, in the post- war period it was widely known and 
expected that this central plank of public policy – the allocation of land to and by 
the state – would be under pressure from the donors who would want privatisa-
tion for the purposes of foreign investment. However, a large campaign ensued, 
led by UNAC, ORAM and other organisations, resulting in the Land Law of 
1997, which established community and/ or individual rights to land they had 
been farming for ten years and specified a process of consultation on any resettle-
ment proposals and compensation for people displaced. Individuals and commu-
nities can register a Direito do Uso e Aproveitamento da Tarra (DUAT) (a right of 
usage for land) but the law underwrites their claim, even if they have not done so.
In relative terms, this is the most pro- poor land law in Africa. Whilst this 
has not stopped all processes of displacement which do not comply, in prin-
ciple there has been the capacity to do so, which seems to have been factored 
into agri business planning. On some limited occasions, peasants have also 
successfully challenged enterprises who have not complied. For example, in 
Nampula Province, Lurio Green Resources was challenged by the commu-
nity in conjunction with the local government after having conducted a very 
shallow consultation and forced to redo the process.29 At a national level, 
widespread concerns emerged about the proposals for PROSAVANA – a 
huge project with Brazilian and Japanese investors designed to cultivate soya 
in the Nacala corridor. Significant demonstrations and forms of resistance 
took place at both national and community levels, meaning the project has 
been effectively stalled for the foreseeable future. Whilst the government at a 
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central level is very clearly frustrated, and the public remains uncertain as to 
what is coming next, it is clear that vocal and organised civil resistance has 
slowed down projects like this. It has done so by capitalising on the symbolic 
and political importance of the peasantry to the wider political establishment 
in the country, and in particular that central connection to the land which was 
the promise of the liberation struggle.
The peasant movements have also been active in promoting a campaign 
around ‘food sovereignty’, which is aimed at challenging the government’s 
vision for the involvement of corporate suppliers and large- scale plantations 
in the delivery of ‘food security’. This ‘food sovereignty’ campaign endorsed 
by UNAC in Mozambique articulates more clearly the connections between 
the central endorsement of particular production strategies in agriculture and 
the exclusion of the peasantry from their formulation. In particular, UNAC 
and other coalition partners have attacked plans such as the Green Revolution 
for Africa, publicly endorsed by the president as a means of ensuring ‘food 
security’, for their failure to engage with the existing modes of production 
and needs of peasant farmers. They argue that these would be better served 
by a more supportive market for locally produced goods rather than imports, 
and more attention to land access (Nhampossa 2007).
Within this ‘food sovereignty’ campaign is an alternative vision of how 
Mozambique should engage with the world and how the state should engage with 
the peasantry. In short, it calls for a substantial reorientation of Mozambique’s 
development strategies around consumer and producer meetings, community 
co- ordination and non- intensive agriculture as ways of connecting peasant 
autonomy with economic survival.30 As UNAC argue, rising food prices in 
particular have contributed to not just rural poverty but also broader patterns of 
alienation in Mozambique’s cities. In particular, a reliance on wheat imports has 
rendered urban populations susceptible to world food price and currency fluctua-
tions, contributing, along with fuel prices, to increased social unrest and rioting 
in recent years (BBC News 2010). It is perhaps not a little ironic that some of 
the money that funds development interventions in Mozambique derives directly 
from the sale of US wheat surpluses into this market.31
Although the food sovereignty terminology has not become politically 
mainstream in Mozambique, the campaign and pressure on questions of food 
production arguably has created a context in which the post- 2010 govern-
ment policy for food production has had to respond to its criticisms. The 
food sovereignty discourse rearticulates the problems of the contemporary 
economic system through lenses which speak to the historic situation of the 
peasantry. As articulated by the farmers interviewed for this project, and also 
noted in the Chr. Michelsen Institute’s (CMI) studies of rural poverty, these 
strategies very rarely depend on the state or NGOs for income or social insur-
ance (Tvedten et al. 2006). Although the food sovereignty movement does 
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not rule out a role for state intervention, the vision speaks to the need more 
fundamentally to reconfigure the relations between people, the state and the 
market. This speaks to an ambivalent relationship with state- led development 
strategies in the territory and the tendency for these to be oriented towards 
extraverted development models. As we will see in the next section, these 
have had only limited advantages for the peasantry.
Taken together, the presence and activity of the peasant movements and 
their supporters are significant for three reasons in thinking about the debates 
on international intervention. First, it is a demonstration that public account-
ability can function even with donors in the picture and that they still have 
the ability to force climbdowns or changes of direction on specific issues. To 
this extent, ‘democracy’ needs to be understood outside the formal framework 
of parliamentary opposition and more as a set of struggles for the public nar-
rative. Second, it is clear that international assistance can, when it chooses, 
support efforts that seem to have genuinely ‘pro- poor’ or ‘pro- peasant’ conse-
quences, and ones which are critical of its own presence. Although this is not 
the norm and it is largely the Nordic countries that do this for historic reasons, 
it becomes clearer that options exist for such kinds of engagement. Third, it is 
also clear that emerging from the work that organisations such as UNAC and 
IESE do is a different vision of what ‘development’ and well- being can mean, 
especially when understood from the point of view of peasant farmers. In this 
other vision, development and well- being begins from and is grounded in the 
creation of conditions for mutual support and uplift, the valuing of people at 
the base and the orientation of systems in line with their needs.
This different vision resonates further when located in an appreciation of 
the historical dynamics of political organisation and production within rural 
Mozambique, which has been shaped by globalising forces for centuries. In 
this longer historical perspective, the need for these alternative understand-
ings of democracy and development rooted in an engagement with the base 
becomes particularly pressing in light of the ways in which the peasantry has 
been chronically marginalised from political and economic projects. Worse, it 
has been subjected to forms of destabilisation and experimentation over time 
which have destroyed and left fragile the social and economic fabric of rural 
communities. It is these to which we now turn to locate our understanding of 
intervention and its effect on the peasantry.
THE MOZAMBICAN PEASANTRY AND  
THE LONG VIEW OF INTERVENTION
The post- war interventions in Mozambique have tended to start from a 
base which understands their arrival as effectively a Year Zero in terms of 
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development. Duffield describes this orientation as interveners projecting a 
sense of ‘the cleansing fire of war’ having stripped African populations back 
to being part of a bare, natural economy which is essentially self- sustaining 
and self- reproducing (2007: 90). As argued in  chapter 1, many critical schol-
ars in the global North also leave this assumption undisturbed through their 
failure to historicise populations subject to international statebuilding. What 
happens when such histories are brought into view? One important under-
standing that emerges is that the peasantry in Mozambique are not recent 
but long- term subjects of global political and economic forces that have by 
turns integrated, dispossessed and then ignored them. It is not a lack of con-
nectedness that characterises this dynamic so much as the basic structural 
indifference of external parties to their conditions which is the continuous 
feature. To this extent, the experiences of post- war intervention amongst the 
peasantry have not showed a transformation in conditions, even if interven-
ers’ ideals and promises formally reject the policies of the not- so- distant past 
and present themselves as ‘pro- poor’.
Northern Mozambique carries both physical and political imprints of its 
long historical integration with the rest of the world. Ruined buildings, trad-
ing posts, churches and factories can be found along the coast of Nampula 
Province, for example, as can the large fortress on Mozambique Island which 
served as the route for the export of enslaved Africans until the late  nineteenth 
century. Further inland, although fewer in number and density, ruins of 
 colonial- era farm buildings, estates and equipment are also present. Other 
zones in the north were under the control – sometimes more nominal than 
profound – of colonial companies, who operated under royal charters and 
with full right to ‘develop’ the country’s potential for export markets. This 
also entailed a claimed sovereign right to raise hut taxes and/ or take forced 
labour (chibalo) as a way of payment from African populations.
As Portuguese colonialism intensified, expanded territorially and reorganised 
itself in the twentieth century, an administrative system developed in which 
district- level organisation and régulos (‘traditional’ leaders) were created. 
Combined with sipais (native policemen), this administrative structure expanded 
the capacity of a now unitary state to collect taxes, enforce the cultivation of 
crops such as cotton, and take people seen as ‘immoral’ or ‘idle’ to work on 
large infrastructure projects, sometimes very far from their homes. Others were 
encouraged to migrate to provide seasonal labour in the South African mines 
or to take industrial work in the south of the country. In all of these processes, 
the African peasantry in Mozambique were seen as a resource to exploit or 
‘develop’, either as human assets to be commodified and traded or as productive 
assets which could be targeted for labour, specific crops and products.
Significantly, the networks and needs which they served were global in 
terms of commodity chains and transnational in terms of being woven into 
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several imperial systems of production. Labour was also moved globally – 
through the trade in bonded humans to the Americas and in the rotation of 
migrant labour to South Africa. In this sense, the Mozambican peasantry has 
been intensively connected to the system of the modern global market for at 
least a hundred years, and long before the presence of the liberal post- war 
development and statebuilding projects.
Yet, this integration into global processes was also mediated through sig-
nificant forms of counter- organisation and resistance, which also enjoyed 
transnational connections and support. Isaacman and Isaacman (1976) elabo-
rate an array of forms of anti- colonial resistance from the nineteenth century 
onwards to the 1920s in the centre of the country, which included forms of 
evasion, migration, the establishment of alliances and open- armed rebellion. 
There was also significant resistance to the forced cotton regime from the 
1930s onwards (Isaacman et al. 1980; Isaacman 1995) which also involved 
forms of crop sabotage amongst other strategies. More obviously, the anti- 
colonial liberation front (Frelimo) which emerged in the 1960s in Tanzania 
spread through the north of Mozambique and advocated openly for the over-
throw of the Portuguese regime, in collaboration with a wider global anti- 
colonial movement. As did other guerrilla movements, Frelimo faced violent 
repression and sought shelter amongst the population, leading to attacks by 
the colonial powers on the same.
As far as peasant life was concerned, independence brought both changes 
and continuities. Frelimo’s anti- colonial purge dislodged many of the tra-
ditional authorities (régulos) installed by the Portuguese and put in place 
local party infrastructures and Grupos Dinamizadores to organise social and 
political life. The experience of this varied widely across the country; whilst 
many were supportive and enthusiastic, much of the ideological orthodoxy 
was either illegible or irrelevant to the people and realities of the situation 
(Marshall 1993; Harrison 2000). It also had a number of coercive elements 
in different parts of the country. Particularly when Renamo appeared (Cahen 
1987), populations were contained in collective villages to prevent infil-
tration, but these were also schemes to resettle rural populations in order 
to make them ‘develop’ and produce in different ways (Coelho 1998).32 
However, given the fragility of the postcolonial state and its dependence on 
foreign exchange, to some extent similar policies were produced – Samora 
Machel called on peasants to produce cotton as a national duty, for example, 
despite its continued unpopularity.33 The attempts to expand assistance to the 
peasants also faced severe capacity constraints, which meant that, as now, the 
survival and reproduction of rural populations was ensured for the large part 
by their own efforts.
What is interesting about the transitions from colonialism to independ-
ence, and from socialism to liberalism, is that both incorporated widespread 
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de- development and de- industrialisation, as a result of active sabotage and 
human capital flight as well as weaknesses in public decision- making.34 
When the majority of Portuguese settlers left in 1975, for example, it was 
in a hurry and people were not permitted to evacuate with many belongings. 
There are many examples of industries and enterprises having their records 
burnt, estates and equipment destroyed and sabotaged, more or less simply 
out of spite. The same goes for a number of homes. Enterprises such as sugar 
and copra manufacturing which were established and functional virtually 
ceased to function, as did much of the technological infrastructure in the 
agricultural sector, such as there was. The colonial power saw itself as having 
invested in the lands it possessed, and there was no desire amongst many of 
the settlers to see it flourish after they had left.35
The war with Renamo was, similarly, both anti- public sector and anti- 
developmental in strategy and effects, designed to precipitate the failure of 
the government. In this sense, it provides a counter- narrative to the idea that 
‘wars make states’ – in Mozambique for the peasants, this was not the case. 
In particular the extensive landmining of the rural areas and the sabotage of 
enterprises, roads and railways actively targeted the capacities of the state to 
support and rule the peasantry, as well as the peasantry to be able to put their 
own coping mechanisms such as migration and counter- mobilisations into 
effect. This strategy of sabotage was necessary, for Renamo’s white minority 
backers in Rhodesia and South Africa, to demonstrate that a black African 
socialist frontline state should not be able to succeed unchallenged. It was 
also incidental insofar as Renamo’s own capacities were not particularly well 
organised or co- ordinated – they were not particularly interested in building 
their own ‘liberated zones’ with ideas for social and political organisation 
or production. Instead, they reinstated a number of the colonial chiefs and 
demanded supplies but did little else in terms of stimulating production. It is 
significant that in this Cold War ‘proxy war’, the main objective was to pro-
duce political and economic failure through a campaign of violence.
The end of the war in 1990, peace, liberalisation, concerted efforts at 
statebuilding and the international NGO explosion, however, promised an 
improvement in this situation for the peasants. After all, here were the world’s 
wealthiest countries, most experienced technical consultants and most presti-
gious institutions to offer development resources, expertise and more amen-
able conditions in which to improve the lives of the peasantry. Surely, in the 
absence of war and colonialism – two phenomena directly counterposed to the 
peace and freedom offered by liberal intervention – such efforts should have 
been richly rewarded? As testified by farmers and studies, however, product-
ivity is lower than in colonial times despite twenty years of such efforts.
How can we make sense of this? On the one hand, there is the fragment-
ing effect that international intervention has had on the state infrastructure 
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and strategies of production. As with the health sector in the post- war period, 
there are multiple dynamics and processes which actively push resources, 
capacity and energy away from public investment in agriculture, precluding 
any accumulation thereof. This is not the same as the colonial and socialist 
orders, which at least sought to instrumentally accumulate capacity in these 
areas. West’s (2008) account of the post- 1990 reforms as an experience 
of political and economic ‘abandonment’ amongst the peasantry resonates 
strongly with this characterisation.
Another factor is the extremely short- termist nature of the interventions 
themselves and their desires for quick and visible results. In this sense, ses-
ame can be understood as the international NGO crop par excellence given 
its quick yields but predictable long- term degradation of the crop and soil. 
Higher forms of investment and inputs would be needed to maintain ‘suc-
cess’, but they are not forthcoming from any particular source. Moreover, for 
projects or programmes to succeed in the sector, investments of at least ten 
years would be desirable.36 A further factor has been the active suppression 
by international interveners of efforts to subsidise inputs and create price sta-
bilisation for farmers or state marketing arrangements that might have miti-
gated risk for the rural poor (Smart et al. 2014) – which even colonial and 
socialist production methods managed to different degrees. This is in spite 
of the fact that such donors do the opposite for their own markets – as noted, 
much US Government funding to the agricultural sector in Mozambique 
occurs through the Title II Food for Peace mechanism – that is, the sale of 
agricultural surpluses into the local market bought by the US Government 
from US producers.
Whilst not a strategy of destruction per se, international intervention over 
the last twenty to thirty years has shown a determined and structural indif-
ference to its own repeated failures, a ready propensity to consume its own 
resources as well as active antipathy towards policies that might give the state 
a central supportive role in the agricultural sector. Whilst much energy and 
money has been put towards the generation of studies, evaluations, strategies, 
capacities and plans by interveners, which in many instances require farmer 
participation to fulfil, there is very little to show at the level of the population 
beyond unsteady returns, disappointed expectations, limited amounts of tem-
porary resource and ongoing exposure to malnutrition.
And yet, the potential paths to development are clearly visible to the peas-
antry and have been so for some time. They can see across the landscape of 
the country industrial farmers with more and better machinery, individuals, 
groups and organisations with appropriate levels of financing for investment, 
individuals with the right kinds of education and so on. The things which 
would be necessary to uplift their situation clearly exist and are available for 
the right price, making it all the more frustrating that the projects which come 
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to ‘develop’ them never exactly deliver this. What is lacking is not the means 
of production per se, but the capacity to appropriate it for themselves.
It is in this context that the peasant movement emphasis described in the 
previous section on reorienting development comes into view. By articulating 
a vision of uplift rooted in those resources – particularly land – over which 
peasants have relative control, and a vision for their critical resource – that 
is, food – the alternative priorities for development seek to insure against 
the structures of external indifference to which the peasantry has been his-
torically subject. Rather, by recentring peasant production and control as the 
main elements of a development strategy, they hope to reconnect the missions 
of liberation and development to their intended subjects. To decolonise the 
gaze here is to rethink how intervention, solidarity and assistance would work 
in a world which put such issues at the forefront of its aims.
***
For the rural populations, twenty years of international assistance have had 
some successes, as discussed in the last chapter, particularly in terms of 
extending the reach of basic public services such as schools and hospitals. In 
terms of supporting a broad- based agricultural development strategy which 
transforms the poor conditions of the peasantry, however, there has been little 
movement. This is not to say that ‘development’ has only been ‘virtual’ or 
‘ineffective’, although the mismatch between its projections in reports and its 
reality is profound. Rather, we must contemplate the idea that interventional 
intervention itself has operated in a way in which its reported successes fol-
low directly from and are dependent on the suppression and ignoring of these 
realities. It is through a re- engagement of the historical presence, political 
consciousness and material realities of the peasants that such an interpreta-
tion becomes available. In this framework, the peasants are both symbolically 
necessary and materially disposable to the perceived successes of interven-
tion. Yet, it is also possible to emphasise modes of engagement that would 
begin from the realities and historical situation of the peasants themselves.
In the previous two chapters, using our decolonising strategies, we have 
seen that, viewed from the ground, intervention can be understood as frag-
menting and disorderly, hypocritical and indifferent to its ultimate effects on 
its intended beneficiaries, whom it treats as disposable. These perspectives 
are made available by an engagement with the targets of intervention, a sense 
of their historical presence, their political consciousness and their material 
realities. These deny the intellectual tendency to see interveners themselves 
and their activities as the key terrain of the political but insist upon reading 
them within a landscape populated by other people, projects and ideas. It is 
only then that questions of the costs of intervention can begin to be calculated 
in terms of its wider impact on the lives of targets.
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In the next chapter, we open up further alternative interpretations of 
intervention through an engagement with the politics of anti- corruption. 
By engaging our decolonising strategies, the politics of intervention is 
woven into public discourses on greed and corruption as part of an inter-
dependent moral economy, which challenges the claims of intervention 
to be promoting ‘good governance’. Within this wider ethical landscape, 
intervention cannot escape its own situatedness within structures of accu-
mulation and dispossession, obligation and entitlement, and labour and 
reward, which problematise the visions of statebuilding and development 
to which it is attached.
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Chapter Six
Anti- Corruption and the  
Limits of Intervention
Another thing is that local workers and international workers for an 
organisation have a big difference in contractual conditions. They treat 
people as nationals and internationals – and what is the justification? They 
say we base the pay on what is in Europe … When basic needs are met, 
it’s ok … of course I am going to do my job, but if I ask, between me and 
you, what’s the difference?
— Former agricultural technician working for  
European donor agency1
What was the difference between my interviewee and his European col-
league? Although they were doing similar jobs, she was much younger, less 
experienced, and, she admitted separately, earning much more money and 
living much better than she could have done in her own country. I was not 
exactly surprised by the question but found it disturbing for a long time after-
wards. By that point in the research, I had temporarily stopped ‘noticing’ the 
striking sight of mostly young, wealthy white international intervention staff 
in expensive cars, hotels and bars. Yet, I reflected, seeing Mozambicans in 
such places always occasioned me to wonder about the origins of their wealth. 
Primed by newspaper scandals and anti- corruption reports, I speculated about 
the nefarious ways in which they might have achieved their positions. But 
what was the difference, really? Why was it normal for interveners to live 
this way but not for anyone else? And what was the lesson about wealth and 
corruption that was being taught by intervention?
International statebuilding interventions are fundamentally – almost by 
definition – characterised by a concern with the nature of ‘governance’ in 
the global South. As seen in  chapter 4, one significant aspect of this has 
been a concern with ‘capacity- building’ at the level of state institutions. 
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However, another central pillar of ‘good governance’ activity has become 
‘anti- corruption’ efforts. This has led to a proliferation of donor intervention 
strategies based on ‘an international consensus [that] has now emerged that 
corruption and poor governance fuel state failure, deter foreign investment, 
and cripple economic growth and development’ (USAID 2005: v). Based on 
the power of this consensus, good governance qua anti- corruption has become 
one of the most prominent and well- funded aspects of international interven-
tion, spawning a wide array of strategies, forums, conferences, grants, work-
ing groups, government agencies and advisers, and increasingly integrated as 
a form of conditionality into wider transformation efforts (Doornbos 2001).
In order to ‘decolonise’ our understanding of these issues, it is necessary, 
as argued in  chapter 3, to root such an understanding outside the discourses 
of intervention, and instead within a sense of the historical presence, politi-
cal consciousness and material conditions of those people targeted by such 
programmes. As this chapter shows, international intervention efforts are a 
real but relatively limited part of anti- corruption politics within Mozambique, 
which has much deeper historical roots and addresses a broader set of politi-
cal and moral problems than those identified by good governance strategies. 
Moreover, it encompasses not only the behaviour of political elites and 
citizens but also that of interveners and the system generated by interven-
tion itself, as indicated in the opening of this chapter. The chapter traces 
three forms of discourse that contribute to the politics of anti- corruption in 
Mozambique – the promotion of ‘good governance’, the memorialisation of 
Samora Machel, and the fears of insatiable, unknowable greed. This wide and 
varied landscape locates the problem of corruption beyond the legality and 
transparency of conduct with which intervention is concerned, and within a 
broader critique of the changes in society since the end of the war.
GOOD GOVERNANCE AND THE 
PROSPECT OF RADICAL CRITIQUE
The move towards the goal of ‘good governance’ in shaping international aid 
flows and development agendas as part of a ‘liberal’ transformation agenda 
has been in the gradual process of institutionalisation for around two decades. 
As such, ‘good governance’ demands are thus viewed in much of the critical 
literature as a key site of deep Western intrusion into the social and politi-
cal orders of aid- recipient countries (Williams 2008). In particular, these are 
seen to be aligned with concerns to make countries fit for foreign investment 
through the reduction of risks and instability (Wei 2001).
Alongside many other countries, Mozambique was targeted by a number of 
intervener funds and strategies designed to fight corruption. These included 
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funds to reform the public sector financial management systems as well as 
funds to civil society organisations concerned with questions of good govern-
ance and anti- corruption. Many of these organisations have performed their 
functions in a way which appears to have satisfied their external funders – 
indeed the multiple extension of funding arrangements for these organisations 
indicates their success in this regard. Journalists within Mozambique have 
also participated within these organisations and developed expertise on ‘good 
governance’ issues.
However, to frame this engagement as simply capitulation to an external 
liberal framework or the internal ‘hand’ of interveners does not capture the 
ways in which such organisations and writers have often gone far beyond a 
generic ‘good governance’ agenda. Rather, they have used and reconfigured 
the ideas as a form of immanent critical consciousness towards the existing 
political order, as well as a challenge to the character of foreign interven-
tion and investment. In short, they have embraced the wider consequences 
of an anti- corruption platform under a ‘good governance’ regime. As Noe 
Nhantumbo, a journalist, writes in a recent book:
 the most important thing is that the political forces of civil society know how to 
take advantage of this genuine ‘external aid’, and make the ‘Good Governance’ 
question their own, taking in full and with all its consequences … To know 
how to take advantage of and use the small open windows for the evolution 
and growth of international political relations is a necessity … It is in this way 
that we must look at the issue of ‘Good Governance’. The risk that we currently 
run is to view this issue as being appropriated by politicians and leaders, to be 
later sold to the international community when they invite them. (Nhantumbo 
2007: 100– 101)
Some outlets have been attempting to use these ‘small open windows’ as 
a way to develop a critical account of power. By way of example, one of 
the currently most prominent and best- funded NGOs for ‘good govern-
ance’ in Mozambique is the Centro de Integridade Pública (CIP) run by 
Marcelo Mosse, an investigative journalist and public commentator, and 
Adriano Nuvunga, a lecturer at Eduardo Mondlane University, and funded 
by Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, 
Norway, the Ford Foundation and International Budget Partnership.2 Much 
of the work of the centre is given over to the monitoring and advocacy of 
corruption and governance issues, the provision of training and the evalua-
tion of the effectiveness of government policy. Indeed, many of the angles 
of analysis used to diagnose political problems and corruption are framed 
in ways which are compatible with a technocratic approach to governance, 
such as a focus on accountability mechanisms and the implementation of 
laws (Mosse 2006).
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Yet, in many cases, the issues discussed, the quality of investigation and 
commitment to analysis vastly exceeds efforts made by either government or 
development partners and is undertaken in an environment where, as previ-
ously discussed, lethal violence has been used against those who investigate 
corruption. In particular, recent analyses of the Extractive Industries and 
Public Private Partnerships have been extremely specific and vocal in their 
challenges to specific processes, contracts and tenders. These criticisms not 
only encompass conflicts of interests amongst the Mozambican political 
elite, but also implicate companies, international investment vehicles and the 
international policies which support these practices. In this sense it retains a 
focus on the idea of ‘public integrity’ as a moral activity as well as a multidi-
mensional political problem, rather than primarily a technical one.
This has involved a much broader critique – through the idea of good gov-
ernance – of how international intervention operates at a structural level in 
the state. Nuvunga, for example, via a discussion on governance, develops an 
account of the functioning of the state that corresponds to what was discussed 
in  chapter 4:
Aid appears to have helped build, but also fragment, the State machinery and 
institutions. It appears that dependence on aid has created an incentive structure 
that makes civil servants reluctant to get involved and commit themselves to 
public duties unless there is a prospect of direct personal benefit in the form of 
perks. (Nuvunga 2007: 49– 50)
He goes on to argue that the movement towards central budget support has in 
fact led to perverse consequences for ‘governance’:
donors not only control national policy through aid conditionality, they also con-
trol key institutions through their direct involvement. This has long- term conse-
quences for institutional sustainability in the country. (Nuvunga 2007: 49– 50)
Although using the framework of ‘good governance’, Nuvunga’s analysis 
offers a gently stated if far- reaching structural critique of the role of aid in 
the political sphere of Mozambique, and one which is directed at the donors 
as well as the government. This is supplemented by a number of political 
commentaries co- published regularly with Joe Hanlon, which interrogate 
the relationship between donors and government closely and underscore the 
problems of political legitimacy and accountability with it.3 This interpreta-
tion of ‘good governance’ thus puts emphasis on the specifically democratic 
rather than bureaucratic ways in which the term can be understood, opening 
up the political space for a different kind of critique. Indeed, donors’ own 
discourses of what constitutes ‘good governance’ in Mozambique appeared to 
have changed over the years in line with the diagnoses of activists, including 
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those regarding the dominance of Frelimo in political life. As Hanlon (2004) 
notes, for a long time there was a deep reluctance by the donors to engage 
with issues of governance in anything other than a technical fashion.
The idea that the structures of intervention promote governance failure 
through its own policies is one advocated by Marcelo Mosse, who argues 
strongly from a good governance platform that cuts in public sector salaries 
imposed by structural adjustment policies were a major cause of corruption 
that both the government and donors wanted to ignore (2006). This cor-
roborates with analysis heard elsewhere in interviews and newspaper dis-
cussions – that cuts to public sector salaries following structural adjustment 
were a primary driver of corruption in the post- war environment. Mosse also 
explains the ways in which the ideological drive for privatisation amongst 
donors in the early 1990s facilitated corruption – an analysis picked up even 
now in the state- friendly Noticias newspaper.4
In this kind of reappropriated ‘good governance’ consciousness, donors 
themselves are also accused of failing to uphold ‘good governance’ in their 
dealings with the government of Mozambique. Since the Paris Declaration and 
movement towards aid harmonisation, the government itself has launched a 
number of audits of bureaucratic delays within the aid system, as mentioned 
in  chapter 4. These have presented findings that the majority of delays in 
processes were attributable to delays at the World Bank or EU rather than the 
government, which has been since used to pressure them politically.5 Others 
have noted more ironically that despite pressing for legislative reform, donor 
agencies have undermined the ‘good governance’ they promote by not follow-
ing these procurement and employment laws themselves in their own practices 
(CanalMoz 2009).6 This is supplemented by the idea that there has also been a 
failure of governance in donor countries, as noted by another public intellectual:
The other thing that needs to happen is that European citizens need to ask their 
governments where the money is going – what are you doing? Because it is 
going from the taxpayers of Europe – the working people – to the rich of Africa 
[laughs]. I was asked to give advice to a lady from a Finnish organisation who 
was working on a poster to raise funds for her organisation. It was a poster of an 
African child who was hungry. I advised her to add a picture of the politician’s 
mansion across the road. She didn’t do it … but this is what I mean. You have 
your own internal mechanisms for monitoring … but you need to go and see.7
A political consciousness of ‘good governance’ in Mozambique can be under-
stood as not one which simply reproduces a technocratic ideology of donor- 
led development, although it may also do this, but one which also looks at 
the structure of the political and economic order more broadly and critically 
through the lenses of inequality and unaccountability. For Nhantumbo, the 
idea of ‘good governance’ is amenable to be rescued from ‘the deceptive 
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mires of the mouth’ as the basis for a much more radical critique of the 
international order through a more widespread democratisation of power and 
resources. Yet, he argues that this has implications that neither the politicians 
of Africa nor the West will embrace:
On both sides, in Africa and in the West, politicians are using or presenting 
a version of policy which is double- faced. They know that they need to keep 
‘Good Governance’ as a continued factor and condition of cooperation but they 
are aware that to take it to its logical conclusions would infallibly destroy the 
bases on which their economies sit. From here we may gather that the politi-
cians and governors will never sufficiently advance, in the implementation of 
the totality of this strategy or policy because this will contradict their interests in 
this domain. Only a change in the fundamental strategies between the partners 
is what can bring about an open and profound approach to the issue of ‘Good 
Governance’. (2007: 103)
Nhantumbo’s analysis ties together the dysfunctions of intervention with the 
interests of interveners and those of the government. He advocates, however, 
not for a rejection of international assistance and cooperation but a more 
radical reappraisal of how it is approached and whose interests it serves. His 
vision of how Africans might approach and use the idea of ‘good governance’ 
illustrates perfectly how a seemingly technocratic and politically innocuous 
discourse can itself be turned towards a more far- reaching critique of political 
leadership, the distribution of wealth and international interventions.
Whilst the language of ‘good governance’ thus has the potential to under-
pinning a critical political posture, it is not one in which more than a rela-
tively limited number of public figures habitually express themselves, and its 
own power is somewhat limited. Much more prevalent at a public level are 
those discourses with resonances with aspects of national identity and collec-
tive being. These not only provide a more compelling point of accountability 
for most Mozambicans but also allow the discussion of a wider set of issues 
than that permitted by the language of ‘good governance’. In the next two 
sections of the chapter, both the icon of Samora Machel and public discourses 
about greed are shown to underpin a richer and deeper conception of the ways 
in which corruption emerges and functions within society.
‘ISSO NÃO ACONTECIA SE SAMORA 
ESTIVESSE VIVO’ – ‘THIS WOULD NOT BE 
HAPPENING IF SAMORA WAS ALIVE’8
One of the most potent and most common responses to contemporary pub-
lic corruption scandals in Mozambique is via unfavourable and nostalgic 
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comparison to the political leadership under the first ten years of the post- 
independence government after 1975, led by President Samora Machel. 
Although the latter part of this is also commonly known as the tempo de 
fome (time of hunger), it is also memorialised in many circles as a time when 
public institutions functioned with a keen sense of purpose, transparency and 
enthusiasm. In particular, Machel was seen to attack vigorously, denounce 
and severely punish corruption in the public sphere as simultaneously coloni-
alist, immoral and counter- revolutionary (Harrison 1999). Machel’s lengthy 
political discourses, broadcast nationally via the only television and radio 
channels, elaborated passionately and in detail the distinctions between a cor-
rupt colonialism and the kind of society that Frelimo aimed to build:
That’s what colonialism means: bribery, corruption and immorality; robbery; 
nepotism, favouritism and patronage; individualism and ambition; servility 
and subservience … Destroying all this was the aim of the armed struggle for 
national liberation. (Machel, cited in Harrison 1999: 540)
Machel’s presidency is remembered for the stringent and vigilant punishment 
of transgressions and corruption in public administration. One famous tactic 
involved personal unannounced spot checks on various parts of the state 
machinery across the country, including then state enterprises and farms. 
Irregularities of any sort would result in public castigation, which would be 
often followed by summary dismissal.9 More serious criminal transgressions 
were punished much more severely, culminating in several public executions. 
One of the most high- profile of these cases was the execution by firing squad 
of the prawn merchant Gulam Nabi, who had been bribing customs officials 
(Hanlon 1984: 208). Moreover, it was made clear that Machel’s attitudes to 
corruption were widely shared – the suicide of Francisco Langa, a Frelimo 
cadre who had embezzled funds, was publicly attributed to very intense per-
sonal shame by the party, who made an example of him (195).
During the 1980s, government propaganda on the theme revolved around 
the image of ‘Xiconhoca’ – a character who was seen to collaborate with 
Portuguese secret agents in the independence struggle but pretended to sup-
port the new government, and who was lazy, drunk, corrupt and self- serving. 
Cartoons, such as that shown in  figure 6.1, showed him in a range of situa-
tions and roles grotesquely undermining the new, virtuous regime at the level 
of both practice and ideology in his selfish conduct and orientation. He is 
described, in the militant idiom of this new order, as ‘the enemy’.
‘Xiconhoca’ was seen to embody a corruption which was as much moral 
and political as it was material. In this sense, corruption was perceived as an 
active threat to the programme of radical revolutionary change which Frelimo 
aspired to bring about in this period. Much of this focused on, and indeed 
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depended on, the personal conduct of the citizens and their embrace of the 
‘New Man’ ideology elaborated by the party’s ideologues. Public education, 
which rapidly expanded in the post- independence period, was tasked with the 
ongoing formation of ‘New Men’, who would be literate, technically profi-
cient and morally dedicated to the construction of the Revolution. Those who 
were compromised by corrupt or anti- revolutionary behaviour were often dis-
patched to remote provinces to be ‘re- educated’ in drastic and violent ways.
Samora Machel was killed in a plane crash in 1986 in suspicious circum-
stances, yet his figure looms large in contemporary political consciousness. 
This is the case especially amongst younger generations, who have sought to 
Figure 6.1. Xiconhoca O Inimigo (c. 1979: Mozambique History Net, http:// www.
mozambiquehistory.net/ cartoons.html; Maputo: Frelimo, Edição do Departamento de 
Trabalho Ideológico): ‘He’s a saboteur of the national economy, he has no class con-
sciousness, he’s a dead weight in the office, to summarise, he’s a Xiconhoca’.
 
 Anti-Corruption and the Limits of Intervention 119
   
critique the recent and contemporary political environment through the recov-
ered figure of Samora (Sumich 2007). This recovery of a tradition of moral 
opposition to corruption has emerged on several different fronts, including 
within the ruling party, amongst public academic and political commenta-
tors in the press, in the political opposition, amongst the urban youth and 
middle-class, amongst the unions and within the blogosphere. At the core of 
this consciousness is a narrative of Mozambican moral rectitude, transpar-
ency and decisiveness which Samora is seen to embody.
The reclamation of Machel’s legacy as a form of political consciousness 
takes place in a political context of visible corruption and increasing inequal-
ity, for which the context is the structural reform of the economy through IMF 
conditionality, the end of the war, and the vast influx in aid money both in 
response to famine and in the period after the war. Under Joaquim Chissano’s 
leadership, Mozambique was opened up economically and politically, and aid 
money flooded in. For various reasons, including the context of emergency 
and the lack of oversight, much of this money and these resources were never 
accounted for, according to multiple interviewees. Mozambique nonethe-
less became a prominent ‘donor darling’ on the international scene, broadly 
endorsed for its wise post- war political and economic choices and strong 
growth rates, forgiven much public debt and made the recipient of one of the 
highest per capita aid flows of sub- Saharan Africa.
This coincided with a visible change in the wealth of elites, particularly 
those in and connected to the Frelimo party. This change was linked in part 
to the effect of donor money and policy on liberalisation and privatisation 
(Harrison 1999; Pitcher 2002; Hanlon 2004). During this period, various cor-
ruption scandals emerged regarding thefts and embezzlements from former 
state enterprises, which were of widespread public knowledge and disquiet. 
The most notorious of these related to the banking sector, during the course of 
which the country’s leading investigative journalist, Carlos Cardoso, and the 
interim director of banking supervision, Siba- Siba Macuacua, were murdered. 
Those implicated in the murder included a number of the Presidential Guard 
as well as Chissano’s son Nyimpine, whose testimonies in the trial were tel-
evised (Sumich 2007; Hanlon 2003). This episode accelerated what had been 
an increasing level of political dissatisfaction with the perceived deixa andar 
(let it go) attitude of Chissano regarding the widespread criminality and cor-
ruption in the state at all levels. Chissano’s decreasing public popularity could 
already be seen in the results of the 1999 presidential election, which resulted 
in only a narrow victory under rather dubious circumstances.
Within the Frelimo party this consciousness emerged from what was then 
Armando Guebuza’s faction, who claimed the inheritance of Machel’s man-
tle. They claimed this legacy in the run- up to the 2004 presidential election, 
when Chissano’s administration was criticised for its deixa andar approach 
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(Mosse 2004: 81). As Hanlon reports, after winning the election, Guebuza’s 
administration from 2005 visibly reactivated many of the political discourses, 
practices and habits of Machel, including unannounced spot checks in public 
institutions and services (2005: 2). Guebuza’s administration also took care to 
celebrate Machel publicly, including building striking new monuments to him 
around the country and declaring 2011 Samora Machel Year.
Guebuza’s narrative of his own moral, Machel- like stand on corruption was 
sold to, but not entirely bought by, a wide range of audiences, who have contin-
ued to use Samora and the socialist legacy as a political resource in critiquing 
corruption within contemporary Frelimo as well as the effects of Mozambique’s 
liberalisation. It is perhaps unremarkable to note that this has been a feature of 
internal Frelimo struggles, particularly in factions associated with Samora’s 
widow Graça Machel, who argued that honest people had been excluded from 
the government in order for corruption to continue (Mabunda 2010).
But this line of argument has also been a feature of the more independent 
press. Even as Guebuza promised to restore a sense of morality in the state, 
he was accused of doing so only in speeches but not in practice by journal-
ists such as Machado da Graça, who argued that, unlike Samora, he lacked 
the political will to do so (Mucavele 2005). Indeed, during his presidency, it 
was reported that Guebuza was also the wealthiest person in Mozambique. 
Borges Nhamirre, a commentator on CanalMoz, has also pointed out that 
under Samora the salaries of high- ranking state officials were fixed by law, 
were public knowledge and that perks of the job were not permitted, in clear 
distinction to today’s practices (Nhamirre 2011). These are commentators 
who occupy different parts of the political spectrum and speak outside the 
Frelimo party but who engage in the recovery of Samora as part of a critical 
and broadly salient form of political consciousness.
Perhaps more surprising is the resurrection of Samora by an opposition 
whose members waged open warfare against Samora’s government in the 
1980s. In a recent TV debate on the political thought of Samora Machel – 
the holding of which is perhaps in and of itself revealing – Máximo Días, a 
former Renamo deputy, argued that if Samora were alive, many of today’s 
leaders would be in jail for their failure to uphold transparency.
According to him, ‘some have the understanding that I have already liberated 
the country, and now I must liberate myself from myself’, and each takes his 
own decision to enrich himself. (Banze 2011)
At this same debate, he asked for financial contributions for a Samora Machel 
Academy, which would be dedicated to ‘the promotion of the ideas of Samora 
Machel, namely: the fight against corruption, transparency, amongst other 
virtues the remains of which are in question today’. Whilst the sincerity of 
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this resurrection by the opposition is questioned, particularly by a sceptical 
public spotting opportunism,10 it is clear that its political resonance in terms 
of public consciousness is real in terms of the critique of profiteering offered.
Yet, perhaps tellingly, the idea of Samora’s era as an uncorrupt one is par-
ticularly visible as a form of political consciousness amongst the urban youth 
who were not yet born during his rule. This group, as Sumich notes, some of 
whom have taken to wearing T- shirts bearing Samora’s image, tends to speak 
favourably of this more equal, more honest time (2007: 13). Across my own 
discussions this was a repeated theme – that under Samora these sorts of 
transgressions did not occur and that people worked for the public good.11 This 
critique is also borne out in various aspects of popular culture. As an example, 
the popular MC Azagaia, Edson da Luz, has interspersed clips of Samora’s 
speeches against corruption into his music videos, in which his own lyrics 
condemn the ‘liberators’ of Mozambique – that is, the ruling Frelimo elite – as 
mere mercenaries, enriching themselves, lacking ideology and selling images 
of hunger to make a profit. In the closing frames of the video, Samora is shown 
giving a public address, saying, ‘We cannot build happiness or well- being with 
bandits and thieves … Correct? But it must be you who dislodge the bandits 
and thieves. Denounce them. Kick them out’ (Azagaia 2009).
The icon of Samora as a symbol of political honesty and purpose thus contin-
ues to occupy a dominant role in public debates on corruption in a way which 
ties together the central co- ordinates of Mozambican nationalism as being about 
the legacies of anti- colonial liberation with the present situation of sharply 
increased inequality and enormous wealth at the level of elites. This is visible 
even where the government is pursuing the anti- corruption strategies encour-
aged by donors. We see an example of this in the recent establishment of the 
Gabinete Central de Combate a Corrupção (GCCC), which formed a key pillar 
of its ‘good governance’ strategy, which itself occasioned the release of aid mon-
ies. At the opening of its new Chinese- funded headquarters, in which its main 
meeting room was named after Samora, its director, Ana Maria Gemo, argued
that Samora Machel fought corruption vehemently and advocated an equitable 
distribution of national wealth. ‘He dedicated his life to the building of a fair and 
transparent public administration, whether through creating legal instruments, 
or otherwise in his vigorous speeches, teaching Mozambicans to be determined 
and persistent regarding obstacles to any development of our young nation … 
in following the teachings of Samora, in this room, we will develop strategies 
for crime prevention, civic education, which are aimed at promoting citizenship, 
a culture of transparency, integrity and good governance. Strategies will be 
aligned to the establishment of trust in institutions of public administration and 
justice, because, after all, corruption is a challenge within our grasp’. (O País 
2011; emphasis added)
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The multiple ways in which the legacy of Samora has been appropriated in 
the recent past speaks to its power and significance within Mozambican soci-
ety, particularly at the level of popular discourse. Within these debates, we 
already see ways in which such a legacy serves as a rich point of reference 
for an anti- corruption politics which is expansive, resonates with a founding 
political identity and articulates a particular ethic of public service which is 
sensed to have been lost. Although the complaint – that things would not be 
like this if Samora was alive – is also occasionally mocked as saudadista (a 
kind of wistful nostalgic orientation), it is nonetheless one which pierces his 
would- be successors at the heart of one of their claims to political legitimacy.
The icon of Samora speaks to the question of corruption as emerging out 
of selfishness, a lack of collective loyalty, a lack of personal integrity and a 
lack of sense of public service. In this discourse, to talk about corruption is 
to talk about the ways in which members of society and the government are 
motivated in their conduct, as well as the subsequent distribution of national 
wealth that results from their decisions. This already greatly transcends the 
ideas of good governance as transparency by requiring a form of moral judge-
ment or accountability to the collective – and much enrichment by political 
elites for example happens very transparently at any rate. By resurrecting 
Samora, Mozambicans challenge the kinds of changes to society that have 
been happening since the end of the war and particularly the production of 
inequalities since the turn to a more liberal market capitalism.
However, saudades for Samora are not the only form of political conscious-
ness responding to the issues of corruption and governance. In articulating a 
deeper politics of anti- corruption, many Mozambicans attack the question 
of greed directly as a function of uncontrolled and unseemly appetites, and 
sometimes worked through occult means. These ideas again build towards an 
explanation and critique of the root causes of corruption as being moral and 
political rather than technical.
BLOODSUCKING, GREED AND POWER
A satirical play was put on in Maputo, Mozambique’s capital, in July 2009. 
Entitled The Politics of the Belly and written by the youth theatre group who 
staged it, the narrative followed the adventures of a teenager as he sought to 
tell the difference between lies and truth within contemporary Mozambican 
society. In a series of hilarious encounters with his father, the school, the 
police, some drunken army veterans, a nightclub owner and the national par-
liament, the young man’s naïve questions expose the hypocrisies, cruelties 
and absurdities at the heart of various claims to authority in his life.12 The 
actors, many of whom were university students, were well acquainted with 
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Jean- François Bayart’s (1993 [1989]) opus of the same name on the nature 
of the African state. Yet, within the plot and narrative, they were also trading 
on a wider public sensibility of the politics of corruption as a social crisis of 
appetite, greed and dishonesty.
Within public discourse, the figure of the cabrito or goat is emblematic 
of this idea. The cabrito is a widely recognised representation of a corrupt 
public official – one who is greedy, mindless and seeks to profit from his/ 
her immediate surroundings. Like the Xiconhoca character, the cabrito has 
also appeared in many public anti- corruption campaigns and cartoons, taking 
bribes in public offices and services and undermining efforts for develop-
ment. The term cabritismo is used liberally in media discussions of corrup-
tion, capturing a level of disgust and derision towards these practices, as well 
as an understanding of how pervasive they have become. Such complaints 
are in part tied to a sense of government failures to tackle corruption – more 
than one interviewee recalled former president Chissano’s deixa andar (i.e. 
laissez- faire) attitude and reported his dismissive response to complaints 
with considerable indignation – ‘goats eat where they are tied’. Mozambican 
writer Mia Couto popularised the term cabritalismo as a way of capturing 
the relationship of the turn to capitalism and the emergence of widespread 
cabritismo, which enabled officials to eat according to the length of their rope 
(i.e. their seniority/ responsibility) (Harrison 1999: 548).
However, the idea of corruption as wanton, greedy consumption also draws 
connections back to wider understandings of the uses of sorcery and black 
magic to enable certain individuals – almost always outsiders to a commu-
nity – to drain power/ life from others and advance their status or projects. In 
particular, fears of the chupa- sangue (bloodsucker or vampire) are relatively 
common in different parts of the country – for example, in 2015 a number 
of urban bairros in Nampula experienced the terror of a chupa- sangue attack 
that led to nocturnal vigils and some families choosing to sleep in the bush 
at night (Savana 2015). This was explained by one resident as directly a fear 
that the ‘procuring of blood was to guarantee that the government had money, 
since when Nyusi took charge the coffers were empty’ (Savana 2015).
Mozambican sociologist Carlos Serra traces the emergence of the chupa- 
sangue rumours in the postcolonial era as being first associated with Frelimo’s 
Grupos Dinamizadores (GDs) in 1975 in Zambezia. GDs were detachments 
of party activists sent to modernise communities and ensure their loyalty, but 
rumours spread that they were vampires who had come to suck the blood of 
the communities in order to manufacture money for the new country and to 
support its hospitals (Serra 2015). The rumours were reattached to the Red 
Cross in the late 1980s when they advertised for blood donors, and with the 
presence of outsiders during outbreaks of cholera, malaria and meningitis. 
In each of these cases, the weakness and illness within the community is 
 
 
 
124 Chapter Six
   
associated with predatory outsiders who have come to deplete their strength 
and resources.
Elsewhere, there are contexts in which this broader fear of predation also 
manifests as a questioning of the accumulation of power and wealth. In 
extended studies of peoples on the Muedan plateau in northern Mozambique, 
West (2005, 2008a, 2008b) presents sorcery as one such hermeneutic of 
governance. In Mueda, it is believed amongst the Makonde that sorcerers are 
highly powerful and accumulate this power through the means of uwavi – a 
knowledge and mastery over the invisible realm, often but not always used 
for malevolent ends. Practitioners of uwavi are said to maintain their power 
through feasting on human flesh, through deploying invisible helicopters 
and planes to bomb their enemies, through turning themselves into lions and 
through holding zombified slaves. In order to counteract the power of sor-
cerers, ordinary Muedans practice different forms of kupilikula – protective 
counter- sorcery rites – many of which rely on using natural and man- made 
objects invested with spiritual power (mitela). However, few profess knowl-
edge of uwavi itself – rather, it is held to be broadly mysterious except to its 
alleged practitioners (West 2005).
Discourses of uwavi and kupilikula interact in multiple ways with the 
structures of political power on the plateau. ‘Big chiefs’ in the villages, in the 
Frelimo government, and their associates have been long believed to exercise 
forms of sorcery in the conduct of their affairs, both for the means of protect-
ing the population and, increasingly, for self- enrichment. As such, the com-
mon representation of leaders as ‘eating everything’, ‘eating alone’ or having 
large appetites can be understood to refer simultaneously to their control over 
material goods and their appetite to consume flesh to make them more power-
ful (West 2005: 180– 189). West further argues that the advent of privatisation 
and the sudden and mysterious accumulation of wealth by various parties has 
been interpreted in Mueda as likely involving practices of uwavi, particularly 
the use of zombie- slaves (186).
Examining West’s descriptions of the ways in which uwavi is discussed, 
it is uncontrolled greed itself, and the fear and envy it generates, that is seen 
as potentially damaging, ‘anti- social’ and in need of policing (2005: 35– 37). 
We can contrast this sensibility with the notion of ‘corruption’ expressed in 
‘good governance’ discourse, which differentiates only between ‘legal’ and 
‘illegal’ forms of enrichment. Whilst this seems to resonate more closely with 
the nostalgic discourses about socialist purity in endorsing a collectivist ethos 
towards the distribution of social goods, consciousness of uwavi also captures 
a sensibility about the double- edged nature of protection/ predation, as well as 
the temptations that draw people towards uwavi.
Moreover, West argues that the framing of uwavi draws attention to the spe-
cifically unpredictable and non- transparent ways in which power is harnessed 
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and deployed, meaning that many ordinary Muedans feel subject to its force 
but unable to intervene in the effects it produces. This is particularly pertinent 
to the ways in which the advent of democracy on the plateau was received – in 
which the wielding of power was meant to have been rendered transparent and 
accountable (2005: 265– 266). Instead, the period of democratic decentralisa-
tion and associated privatisation in Mueda has been interpreted as effective 
abandonment by the state, leading to increased reports of uwavi and attacks on 
its alleged practitioners (West and Kloeck- Jenson 1999; West 2008a).
Fears and rumours of the chupa- sangue and practices of kupilikula are also 
connected to understandings of colonialism in Mozambique. Specifically, 
these include the beliefs in parts of Mozambique that the Portuguese colonis-
ers were themselves vampires/ bloodsuckers who had come to feast on the 
flesh of Africans (Pimentel Teixeira 2003). In discussing kupilikula practices 
in colonial times, West reports a social dynamic intended to contain the 
effects of a greedy and voracious colonial power: ‘The régulo ate the peo-
ple. And the Portuguese ate the régulo’ (2008: 99). And yet, in the Muedan 
accounts, this is always bound up with the consumption and appetites of those 
amongst themselves – those who encouraged and profited from the presence 
of outsiders, leaving them to abandon their people.
In anti- corruption politics in Mozambique, the invocation of ideas of 
greedy bloodsucking by powerful figures in the public eye is thus not a meta-
phorical whimsy or one derived from exposure to popular Western represen-
tations of vampires. Rather, it is steeped in a public hermeneutic of what it 
means to consume and control, particularly through a targeting of those who 
work hardest. When challenged during his 2009 electoral campaign about the 
problems of corruption, the then president Guebuza exclaimed, to a standing 
ovation, that
‘to promote corruption, in the State or in the private sector, is the same as 
“drinking or even sucking” the blood of a brother’. Speaking today, in a grand 
public rally taking place in the municipality of Manica, Guebuza said that even 
now promoters of corruption spend a lot of time coveting the few means of those 
who sweat night and day to earn a living. (O País 2009)
Yet, and as seen with other forms of anti- corruption consciousness earlier, 
this discourse is also turned back on those that wield it. In attacking the 
reported decision of the government to authorise the purchase of luxury 
cars despite a recent public financial crisis, Machado de Graça enters full 
declamatory mode:
At a time when we are expecting from the Government a proposal to cut costs 
and measures to curb inflation, the apes – pardon, the rulers of this country – do 
the opposite: they are worried about going to the tailor to increase the size of 
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their trousers and jackets, due to the huge growth of their bellies at the expense 
of our taxes … In fact, the leaders we have today are a real public danger, that 
is, they are political vampires who suffer at the expense of the suffering and 
widespread underdevelopment of Mozambicans. Drowned in massive lunches 
and dinners, washed down with wine and whiskey, tightened in Italian suits and 
accommodated in luxury cars paid for with the blood, sweat and tears of the 
people, they contribute, in the Government, to take the country to the abyss.  
(@Verdade 2016)
For many within Mozambique, then, understandings of corruption are 
inseparable from a moral and political discourse about consumption, greed 
and voracity, which is entangled with a relational sensibility about who gets 
rich at the expense of whom. The cabrito and the chupa- sangue are inhuman 
public menaces who will eat everything up, drain you of your own life force, 
grow fat at your expense and put you to work for them. In a recent context 
where politics and intervention have been supposedly oriented around the 
alleviation of poverty through economic liberalisation – and in colonial 
and socialist times around the civilisation or development of society – the 
ongoing presence of such figures is a testament to the predatory dynamics 
embedded within such projects. Such dynamics of self- enrichment are also 
understood as internal to the intervention project itself. In the next section, 
reflections on corruption which also incorporated critiques of intervention are 
discussed, showing that it too forms part of the moral and political universe 
under scrutiny.
ANTI- CORRUPTION AND INTERVENTION
In an interview with a Mozambican agronomist who had worked for a 
long time in the international aid industry, our conversation turned to the 
meaning of corruption. As an example, he spoke about the costs spent on 
international assistance projects in keeping workers in cars and houses. He 
says he knew a Norwegian project, which was something like 3.5 million 
euros, which had ten expensive cars. As another example, he says that he 
knows a couple, who run an HIV/ AIDS organisation in Maputo, whose 
place is worth US$7,000 per month. ‘So what is corruption? Who are the 
criminals?’13
It is of course widely known that expatriate staff costs and salaries are – in 
relative terms to the public – extremely high in Mozambique. Indeed, the 
luxurious conditions of aid workers are now a highly visible and universal 
cultural cliché of the contemporary aid environment (Smirl 2015). Pfeiffer 
summarises conditions in the post- war health sector in Mozambique for many 
expatriates:
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With the exception of two agencies, expatriates were paid from US$1000 to 
US$6000 per month, usually tax- free. Most agencies provided housing, private 
access to project cars, and funding for personal vacations. One engineer work-
ing for a European agency calculated that at the end of his four- year contract he 
would have saved nearly US$300,000. (Pfeiffer 2003: 730)14
In project- based assistance, costs associated with supporting expatriates 
through salaries, housing and transport can consume up to 50 per cent of the 
budget, although in programme aid it is likely to be less. In other cases, it can 
be more, which was the cause of some consternation to interviewees:
we thought of discussing the budget: where does the budget go to? You can’t! 
You don’t know. The way it’s written, it’s written in such a way that you can’t 
see where things go, and this has been a struggle to make it more clear so that it 
can be analysed by people … If I tell you that I had a project in Zambezia where 
we were giving $150,000 of social security funds to communities, and we spent 
$1 million to do that … these were the things that I couldn’t agree in the NGO.15
This spending has a knock- on effect in terms of the conditions in the public 
sector, where cabritismo is understood to be rife. Rentals in the neighbour-
hoods in Maputo where expatriate workers generally live are high, pushed up 
by the large numbers of aid workers and their respective housing allowances 
(Hanlon 1996; interviews), which have pushed up demand elsewhere. As 
an example, the US State Department’s published 2011 housing allowance 
for each worker based in Maputo was between US$28,700 and US$39,500 
per year (US State Department 2011b).16 For temporary visiting staff in 
Mozambique, there was a per diem allowance of up to US$238 for hotels 
and accommodation in Maputo and US$220 elsewhere (US State Department 
2011c). Salaries, beginning at US$27,431, rising to US$129,517, were also 
subject to a 25 per cent hardship boost and a 35 per cent cost of living allow-
ance (US State Department 2011a). Published data on UN pay scales indicates 
similar levels of pay and benefits (International Civil Service Commission 
2011). This compares to a 2010 national average annual income of US$410 in 
Mozambique, or US$34 per month (World Bank 2011). The average annual 
income in Maputo City in this period could, however, have been over ten 
times higher (US$1,109) than in the poorest provinces (US$96), where the 
majority are well below the international poverty line (UNDP Mozambique 
2008). A doctor working for the government in this period could expect to 
receive US$330 per month, which works out as US$3,960 per year (Ferrinho 
et al. 2011: 9). In this light, the ‘brain drain’ detailed in  chapter 4 can itself be 
understood as in part a direct consequence of the high status in which expatri-
ates expect to live. These raise the costs of even a moderate standard of living 
at a reasonable proximity to a workplace, for which many turn to cabritismo 
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if they have not left the public sector altogether. As the respondent quoted at 
the beginning of this chapter asks, ‘between you and me, what’s the differ-
ence’? Why is it that expatriates are seen as intrinsically entitled to a better 
standard of living than Mozambicans?
Other linkages were made between international intervention and corrup-
tion of which two are notable. The first is the uncontrolled way in which aid 
was practised in the immediate aftermath of war, which generated conditions 
in which self- interest could flourish:
So, the staff were relaxed, receiving money, receiving meals, but not preparing 
the state to manage things. They were managing the donations, and not the state, 
and not working in the interests of the people. This is where the question of 
corruption emerged – because people came in, no one was controlling anything, 
and even the donors were not controlling anything, and people began to think of 
themselves first and how to guarantee their lives.17
The sensibility that the flood of donations and donors in the post- war envi-
ronment had enabled a loss of control and virtue was shared across multi-
ple interviewees, including many who had been directly involved in their 
disbursement.
The other linkage speaks more directly to how particular contracting prac-
tices such as non- transparent tenders were themselves normalised by inter-
veners in ways which are now criticised as corrupt amongst the ruling elites:
One thing that happened at the time was all these regulations from World Bank, 
procurements, things like that. When you read, it’s very nice; in practice they 
really taught people how to rob. I said this in a meeting and someone told me 
‘You won’t be allowed to go to the States anymore’ [laughter]. I said okay. But 
I believe the first ones to teach our institutions to rob in procurement and things 
like that, the World Bank were the first ones to teach this, and they brought all 
their consultants to organise the procurement units here, and then we discover that 
these procurement units are all … are fake! They managed their way around …  
we were not used to it, so before the ’80s, probably until very late ’80s, 
Mozambique was a country where you wouldn’t think of bribery, of things like 
that, and so it was a surprise for everybody to see Mozambicans acting like that. 
It was a shock.18
In summary, international interveners, rather than exemplars of public vir-
tue and transparency who can lead anti- corruption efforts, are thus them-
selves also heavily implicated in the wider project of self- interest and 
enrichment that underpins anti- corruption politics across Mozambique. 
Scandal, rumour and unrest attaches to each site of accumulation, and each 
is suspected of occlusion, manipulation and immorality. Interveners also 
take care to provide for themselves richly in terms of salaries and conditions 
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of living and working, in a way which underscores a hierarchical binary of 
entitlement to the fruits of aid. Understood in the light of historic projects 
of rule and the startling wealth differentials that have accompanied it, 
international intervention has demonstrated an inability to transcend such 
dynamics – rather, the perception is that it has accelerated and facilitated 
unseemly accumulation and greed. Why, then, should it be positioned to 
lead a fight against it?
***
Decolonising our understanding of corruption – through rooting it in his-
torical forms of political consciousness and material realities – is genera-
tive of a wide and rich comprehension of the dynamics which facilitate 
and sustain it, as well as its moral and political implications. Such a 
comprehension clearly demonstrates the limits of the liberal- technocratic 
approach of the interveners, which only manages to distinguish between 
legal and illegal means of self- enrichment amongst Mozambican public 
officials. For many Mozambicans, corruption cannot be separated from 
greed, consumption and capitalist strategies of accumulation, for which 
international intervention has played an enabling role, and in which almost 
everyone is implicated. Yet, these hermeneutics also contain other pos-
sibilities for society, rooted in better pasts, presents and futures in which 
such dynamics are not dominant. Can such a decolonising approach help 
us rethink the politics of intervention from the ground up? Drawing on 
the experiences of Mozambique, it is to this question that the concluding 
chapter turns.
NOTES
 1. Interview with former agricultural technician working for European donor 
agency, Sofala, 16 July 2009.
 2. Centro de Integridade Pública website: http:// www.cip.org.mz. Accessed 27 
May 2011. It is of note, though, that as a guerrilla group Frelimo itself also started 
with a grant from the Ford Foundation in the 1960s, solicited by Eduardo Mondlane.
 3. See Mozambique Political Process Bulletin, also published at http:// www.cip.
org.mz.
 4. See Maússe and Mabunda (2015, 26 June).
 5. Interview with vice- minister of Planning and Development, Maputo, 19 
August 2009.
 6. Interview with senior civil servant, Ministry of Planning and Development, 
Maputo, 24 August 2009.
 7. Interview with director of good governance NGO, Maputo, 17 August 2009.
 8. Popular saying in Maputo. Heard in my own research, also discussed in 
Sumich (2007: 13).
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 9. Diary notes of conversation with young hostel worker, 10 June 2009; also 
Hanlon (2005).
 10. Which the below- the- line comments to this particular article clearly show.
 11. Diary notes of conversation with hostel worker, Maputo, 10 June 2009; diary 
notes of conversation with musician, Maputo, 7 July 2008.
 12. Teatro Luarte (2009), The Politics of the Belly. Performed at Teatro Avenida, 
Maputo, August 2009.
 13. Interview with NGO employee, Nampula, 10 August 2009.
 14. Of course, there are variations in this package between permanent, consultant 
and volunteer staff (McWha 2011), the ability of various organisations to pay salaries, 
and there is increasing awareness within the aid community about the use of project 
or programme funds as personal subsidies. Nonetheless, there is a relatively common 
standard of remuneration, and of living, which is often in excess of what these work-
ers would be able to achieve in their countries of origin.
 15. Interview with former public official, Maputo, 12 August 2014.
 16. It is not insignificant that the landlords of these properties are often themselves 
high- ranking members of the ruling party.
 17. Interview with NGO worker, Nampula, 1 August 2014.
 18. Interview with former public official, Maputo, 12 August 2014.
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Chapter Seven
Conclusions
Decolonising Intervention,  
Decolonising International Relations
We cannot adequately study any kind of politics by only thinking with or 
about the powerful parties. For a standpoint theory tradition this is a form of 
‘pseudo- objectivity’ which ultimately naturalises the subordinate status of the 
disempowered. In this study, I have sought to cultivate a sense of how inter-
national statebuilding is understood by its intended targets, precisely in order 
to contribute to a better, more holistic understanding of how world politics 
works. This has implications for how practices are themselves organised.
The wager of the book has been that a ‘decolonising’ approach (as outlined 
in  chapter 3) would help to combat the Eurocentric tendencies of the schol-
arly literature (identified in  chapter 2), by delivering a fuller account of the 
political dynamics and significance of intervention (elaborated in  chapters 4, 
5 and 6). This decolonising approach roots itself in the historical presence, 
political consciousness and material realities of the targets of intervention, 
which works to counteract their erasure or reductive representations in more 
Eurocentric accounts. We have seen through the later chapters of the book that 
this opens up different aspects of intervention to a deep critical interrogation 
rooted in the experiences, ideas and histories of the targets of intervention.
In this concluding discussion, I recap the findings from Mozambique and 
argue that the hermeneutics derived from the decolonising approach support 
an alternative structural explanation of international intervention as consti-
tuted by a global politics of coloniality and relations of colonial difference. 
Such an explanation renders the dynamics of protagonismo, disposability, 
entitlement and dependency experienced by its targets intelligible. I argue 
that this framing represents an important analytic departure from the primary 
existing interpretations of intervention. I go on to discuss ways in which a 
decolonising approach to the political ethics of intervention suggests the need 
to fundamentally reframe its political stakes along the lines of responsibility, 
 
 
 
 
 
132 Chapter Seven
   
justice and reparation, whilst suggesting some interim measures for more 
solidaristic political action in the present.
WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED ABOUT INTERNATIONAL 
STATEBUILDING? PROTAGONISMO, DISPOSABILITY, 
ENTITLEMENT AND DEPENDENCY
When viewed in a long- term perspective from the site of intervention, the 
research question ‘why does intervention fail?’ becomes ‘why does inter-
vention keep failing?’ In our examination of the dynamics of intervention 
in Mozambique from the perspectives of the targets, the following patterns 
emerge as worthy of explanation:
First, as shown in  chapter 4, international intervention systematically frag-
ments statebuilding efforts – that is, the attempt to consolidate a political and 
bureaucratic infrastructure that can deliver, with authority and legitimacy, 
an organised range of public services to its citizens. It does this through a 
persistent drain on the human and financial resources to the state, even as it 
aims to supply them, a frequent switching of priorities depending on external 
trends and initiatives and a lack of flexibility in its forms of assistance. These 
dynamics of fragmentation have the effect of alienating many state employees 
from their work and incentivising them to abandon the state, with the knock- 
on effects of the loss of expertise, institutional memory and accumulated 
experience. It consumes the resources and energies of those who remain, in 
the name of a supposed ‘capacity- building’ that rarely improves state cap-
acities. It also negatively impacts the interactions of citizens and the state, 
because public services themselves become erratic, unpredictable and unreli-
able. Significantly, conscious efforts by both the host state and donors to pro-
mote ‘local ownership’ to arrest or reverse these tendencies –  exemplified by 
the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness or the Kaya Kwanga Agreement –  
have not resulted in broad success. Rather, these dynamics of fragmentation 
have continued in spite of widespread knowledge and understanding of their 
detrimental effects.
Second, as shown in  chapter 5, international interventions have not had 
strong effects in terms of raising the well- being of the rural poor, despite this 
being a major source of its claims to legitimacy. Although life is better since 
the end of the war, and some target groups have managed to realise short- 
term benefits from participating in development programmes, in other cases, 
they have been ignored, made unfulfilled promises to and exposed to serious 
risks, especially the poorer people. Moreover, some of these programmes and 
policies have detracted from the state’s ability or willingness to consolidate a 
broad supportive national infrastructure for agricultural production and rural 
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economic development. This is despite substantive investment in an intel-
lectual infrastructure that points to the need to do so and resources intended 
to consolidate state capacity. The state, itself increasingly fragmented on this 
point, has instead been ‘punished’ by donors for pursuing alternative policies 
through the withdrawal of major sources of prospective funding for the sec-
tor. In this sense, some of the larger interveners are clearly more committed to 
having things done their way than they are to supporting the state in general 
as a vehicle of public service delivery or economic uplift.
Third, as shown in  chapter 6, interveners are not themselves necessarily 
understood to be harbingers of a less corrupt politics, although they have 
provided some important support in this regard for some actors. Nonetheless, 
the technocratic ‘good governance’ approach to corruption promoted by 
intervention is itself inadequate for grasping its political and distributive sig-
nificance, specifically in the context of the ‘savage capitalism’ (Mosca 2011: 
444) that has emerged since the end of the war. A wider and richer public 
consciousness on the issue of corruption locates these in the coarticulations of 
greed, power, entitlement and the capacity to hide one’s actions. This critique 
is primarily directed at the country’s political elites and public servants for 
enriching themselves through their access to power; yet it is also one in which 
international intervention is itself co- implicated as historical cause, ongoing 
enabler and exemplar.
Viewed in the light of these dynamics drawn from the interpretations and 
experiences of the targets, international intervention appears lumbering, 
demanding, hypocritical, narcissistic, limited and irresponsible. How can we 
make sense of this as a political phenomenon? Thinking with the standpoint 
of its targets, four structural features come into view.
First, the dynamic of protagonismo, identified by respondents, attributes 
to donors a kind of political need to insert oneself into the narrative and feel 
one’s influence in any particular policy sector to feel it is worthwhile. Indeed, 
this corresponds to reports that donors have pulled out of sectors where they 
feel their influence is diminishing, leading to a reduction in the proportion 
of aid in that sector directed through the target state. It may be one way of 
explaining why donors retain bilateral aid programmes despite also contrib-
uting to multiple regional and multilateral funds. This need for protagonismo 
is not reducible to ‘vested interests’, nor does it correspond to a consistent 
attachment to specific liberal ideological prerogatives; rather, it appears to be 
a structural political need for presence, effect and significance over and above 
this. Colloquially, it might be glossed as the ‘ego’ of intervention, although 
this does not quite capture its relational and dynamic qualities in the context 
of co- operation. It should be noted that this is not a criticism of individual 
attitudes of ‘superiority’ but a structural dynamic which consistently con-
strains attempts to cede any real ‘ownership’ to the targets of intervention. 
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As an explanatory concept, protagonismo captures a key dynamic in the 
aid relationship hitherto not discussed as a cause of structural failure in the 
literature.
Second, and relatedly, there is a strong sense of the relative disposability 
of the target state and society compared to the interveners.1 Specifically, the 
repeated failures and experiments within intervention are not understood by 
the donors to have any opportunity costs in terms of time or engagement 
for the counterpart or beneficiaries, so – apart from the financial cost borne 
by the donor – the failures of intervention are treated as relatively costless. 
This is because for the most part the targets of intervention – elite and other – 
are treated as people without histories or ideas, or ongoing other activities – in 
other words, as blank slates. Yet, rather obviously once one thinks from the 
bottom up, intervention has very clear costs for its targets in terms of time and 
lost energies within activities which most likely have no long- term impact 
because they are inadequately designed, resourced, scheduled or followed  up.
The practice of incentivising people to show up with generous per diems or 
other benefits means that attention is diverted from the wider costs and value 
of the programme itself when trying to engage the targets of intervention. 
Indeed, the demand for a per diem payment can be understood as resistance 
to the wider politics of disposability in which ‘beneficiaries’ are otherwise 
interpellated. Even if donor employees do not believe that there is no cost to 
failure privately, publicly there is no accounting for or acceptance of respon-
sibility or cost for failed action, particularly outside the immediate life cycle 
of a project or programme. This is despite an extensive and expensive ‘moni-
toring and evaluation’ infrastructure within international co- operation, which 
is constantly trying to measure the ‘impact’ of aid.
This politics of disposability for the beneficiaries is married to the third 
feature, a relative politics of entitlement amongst the interveners, as dem-
onstrated through the dynamics of how interveners themselves are rewarded 
and looked after. Entitlement is a political relation of which inequality is the 
descriptive outcome – it is a set of presumptions endowing certain parties 
with the right to a particular set of privileges. A system of valuing, insur-
ing and rewarding interveners very far over and above people in the target 
country not only has the clear political implication that they are particularly 
special human beings compared to everyone else, but it even suggests the 
interpretation that the primary purpose of intervention is to provide for their 
political presence, comfort and luxurious lifestyles. Their collective pres-
ence in turn reorients the structural conditions of living for those working 
within the state, who must negotiate this politics of entitlement in order to 
attempt to live in comparable levels of comfort and safety and provide for 
their families. No matter how many attempts there are to prevent this from 
happening, unless interveners themselves can restrain their costs and sense of 
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material entitlement, it is extremely difficult to produce conditions in which 
those working for the public sector can be retained and rewarded, allowing 
the state to be strengthened. The significance of this is that we must consider 
intervention as itself integrally part of, and not separate from, the dynamics of 
‘development’ and accumulation in the spaces in which it unfolds.
Finally, the structural dynamics of what Castel- Branco calls multidi-
mensional aid dependency need to be examined. Although it seems utterly 
obvious as the foundation of intervention in this context, its political sig-
nificance as a vector of IR is not always well elaborated – indeed, it is not 
uncommon for literatures on intervention to ignore it completely. On the 
one hand, the absolute and relative lack of resources for the host state means 
that they feel pressure to accept resources from donors, even when accom-
panied by dubious arrangements, not wholly aligned with what they really 
want to do, or even obviously potentially damaging. To refuse one source 
may mean refusing future potential resources, and so in terms of the long 
game, dependency creates a situation in which the targets of aid have to be 
much more permissive than they might otherwise be. This means that the 
seemingly grey zone of political sovereignty – what Harrison and others call 
the ‘sovereign  frontier’ – is itself fundamentally predicated on dependency – 
that is, the material need for funds. The flipside of this is that it is much more 
politically fragile in the longer term than many believe, meaning that the 
influence of donors also diminishes where other resources become available, 
either internally or internationally. The rapid diminishing of the power of 
Western donors once oil and gas revenues were prospected in Mozambique 
is testament to this fragility.
These structural features that emerge from accounts from below – 
 protagonismo, disposability, entitlement and dependency – contribute to 
widespread and persistent patterns of alienation amongst the targets of inter-
vention, who have now understood very well the gap between what interven-
tions promise and what they deliver. In particular, although ‘statebuilding’, 
‘capacity- building’ and ‘development’ are what is intended, the ability to 
accumulate efforts in any particular direction is heavily limited. It is this which 
leads to a perception that interventions are not particularly directed at the insti-
tutional and human development of the target society, as they profess to be.
COLONIALITY OF POWER AS STRUCTURAL 
ACCOUNT OF INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION
Why are these relations so persistent? It is here that the concepts of the ‘colo-
niality of power’ and ‘colonial difference’ help articulate a historical- structural 
account of global order, in a way which can help us make sense of the 
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persistence of structures of protagonismo, disposability, entitlement and 
dependency within the relationship. Reading from the bottom up, these are 
not trivial dimensions of the relationship, but constitutive features that are 
resistant to reform and which consistently undo the purported aims of state-
building. They should therefore be of significant interest to those who study 
global relations of power in the present.
The concept of the coloniality of power was developed by Quijano (1992, 
2000) to explain the persistence of hierarchical and Western- centric relations 
in an ostensibly ‘postcolonial’ world, but has been developed further by 
others (Mignolo 2002, 2007; Grosfoguel 2002). It ties together the historical 
emergence of hierarchical concepts of race and culture with the emergence of 
a capitalist world system centred around Europe, locating both phenomena in 
the conquest of America. Specifically, it is the argument that ‘modernity’ in its 
historic and epistemic co- ordinates cannot be separated from  ‘coloniality’ – 
that it always carries within it a racist, dualistic hierarchy of the human which 
enables forms of conquest, appropriation, violence and domination. This 
has been central to the production of a global division of labour and a nat-
uralisation of the entitlements of the West to the products of the non- West –  
in short, to a global colonial matrix of power. In this sense, formal ‘coloni-
alism’ is itself only one specific historical instantiation of ‘coloniality’. As 
Anghie and others have shown, modern international institutions such as 
international law and regimes of sovereignty themselves can be read as con-
stitutively concerned with the reproduction of colonial and imperial power 
over the Third World (Anghie 2007; Abrahamsen 2005).
Supposedly ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘universalist’ in its form, modernity is 
thus produced not through moral and scientific relations of equivalence but 
geocultural relations of colonial difference. Relations of colonial differ-
ence attribute primary historical significance and political consciousness to 
Western subjects and apparently West- centred historical processes, which 
others are then encouraged to reproduce or into which they are encouraged to 
integrate themselves. They are partially hegemonic, insofar as they are pro-
ductive of a series of identities and ways of being in the world. However, they 
are also incomplete which means that border spaces of thinking and being- 
otherwise continue to be produced at the margins of colonial order, replete 
with potentials for recasting colonial modernity (Anzaldúa 2012 [1999]; 
Mignolo et al. 2006). Border spaces represent a space for different identities, 
values, connectivities and ways of thinking and being.
Existing accounts of the coloniality of power and colonial difference tend 
to operate in a grand historical and rather abstract register, sketching broad 
connections between accumulations of wealth and the production of know-
ledge at a global level. Their contribution is to articulate the situation, often 
identified with Latin American states and societies, of ongoing structural 
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inequalities and subordination despite a century and a half of political inde-
pendence and attempted economic development.
The account of international intervention presented in this book, how-
ever, shows how this hierarchical, structured bifurcation of Western and 
non- Western subjects central to modernity (Shilliam 2008) animates the 
foundational dynamics of intervention in a more detailed, concrete political 
sense, through the dynamics of protagonismo, disposability, entitlement and 
dependency. Each of these dynamics turns on the political and practical pri-
macy of the interveners and systematically obtains even in a setting in which 
individuals and institutions try quite hard to avoid or deny racist or colonialist 
resonances of any kind. Despite this, the organisation of protocols and prac-
tices reinscribes colonial difference – that is, a bifurcated humanity – through 
its framing of who is and who is not important. Thinking about racism in this 
way, as a feature of the global coloniality of power – a hierarchical division 
of subjects and entitlements – however, can move the conversation beyond 
the defensive denials with which discussions of race and racism are often 
greeted. Rather, we need to think about ways in which the global political 
order generates, formalises and naturalises forms of political indifference 
towards non- Western subjects. These structures are arguably prior to debates 
and issues around ‘sovereignty’, ‘global governance’ and ‘hybridity’, insofar 
as the latter are questions of world order which in practice presuppose the 
reality of the coloniality of power.2 A thought experiment suggested by one 
of my interlocutors – of a Mozambican going to the United Kingdom to teach 
its civil servants how to operate – illustrates perfectly the foundational colo-
nial asymmetry that underpins the political dynamics here. Even in a world 
of blurred boundaries, sovereign frontiers and transnational governance, it 
remains fundamentally absurd for us to think of multiple African delegations 
sitting in European countries offering three- year rotating assistance pro-
grammes in different sectors, living at much higher standards than the poor 
communities they intend to help.3
When we think about international statebuilding interventions as structured 
by and through a contemporary global colonial matrix of power – which for 
many operates as a kind of background common sense even if it is not articu-
lated in the language of coloniality – it becomes relatively obvious why, as a 
project, it would not work in producing or contributing to the production of 
autonomous and coherent self- governing political entities. These are condi-
tions where the accumulations of organised authority, resources and expertise 
in a particular space are challenged by centrifugal dynamics of fragmentation 
and disposability. This is not to say that individuals in those spaces are not per-
sonally powerful or wealthy – indeed, many, including in Mozambique, have 
carved out spaces for the generation of personal wealth through business oppor-
tunities or through servicing the infrastructure of intervention. However, the 
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accumulation of wealth amongst individuals and networks enables the con-
solidation of regimes who inhabit the state rather than effecting the kinds of 
cumulative forms of statebuilding and development which they promise.
***
In thinking back to the existing literatures on intervention, this account, 
rooted in the experiences of its targets and a contemplation of the coloniality 
of power, helps flesh out a number of lacunae or blind spots within the exist-
ing literature. An obvious place to start is with Autesserre’s recent award- 
winning Peaceland (2014) – an otherwise empirically excellent account of 
the everyday dynamics of peacebuilding which broadly correspond to many 
of those identified here within longer- term statebuilding. Descriptively, 
Autesserre shows a clear awareness of the primacy of interveners’ own well- 
being, protocols and knowledges over what she terms the ‘local’ and dem-
onstrates multiple ways in which these produce systematic dysfunctionalities 
and resentments. However, Autesserre’s analysis is seriously hamstrung by 
the inability or refusal to articulate or investigate the colonial and racialised 
dimensions of this relationship. Rather euphemistically referring to what we 
would recognise as ‘relations of colonial difference’ as non- specific ‘struc-
tures of inequality’ between the international and local, she is dismissive of 
the idea that these could be colonial in form, suggesting that such suggestions 
are ‘conspiracy theories’ (204) and citing the presence of African nationals 
within peacebuilding contingents as evidence that they are not racist. And 
yet, the characteristic dynamics that she identifies – such as the disregard for 
‘local knowledge’ – are not analysed as being part of any wider political pat-
tern of colonial epistemologies. When we do such analysis, it seems that one 
reason that ‘local knowledge’ cannot be seriously incorporated into the logics 
of intervention is that it can fundamentally challenge the authority of ‘the-
matic experts’. For example, in  chapter 6 I demonstrated that ‘local knowl-
edge’ and understandings of corruption in Mozambique put the ruling elite 
and the interveners under a moral spotlight which highlighted their hypocrisy, 
greed and sense of personal entitlement to supposedly public resources. Such 
forms of consciousness and historical memory could even overturn interven-
ers’ implicit claims to epistemic supremacy on matters of anti- corruption.
Even more strangely, Autesserre also analytically disregards accusations 
of racism and colonial behaviour made by her own respondents, even though 
they make it into the text. It turns out that the ‘listening project’, of which 
ethnography like this should be a key part, is not much of a ‘hearing project’. 
These issues are instead all glossed as problems of practice, which are only 
institutional problems, and thus de-tethered from any other form of historical 
knowledge or political relationship. This obtuseness is recurrent but at its most 
jarring where a respondent has referred to peacebuilders as acting as if they 
were ‘a different species’ (2014: 177), calling into explicit and direct focus the 
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bifurcated conception of the human within peacebuilding. For Autesserre, the 
specificity of this issue is ignored, in favour of more palatable conclusions 
about the ‘daily work routines’ of peacebuilders and their social habits, and 
the need to have ‘more positive narratives of local people’ (214).
There is much to say here about the reasons why this may be the case, but 
two points may suffice. The first is that, intellectually, Autesserre’s invoca-
tion of the ‘practice turn’ (Bueger et al. 2015) may be incompatible with 
any form of structural analysis that would explain patterns of practice in 
terms outside itself. Indeed, she (rightly) calls into question the framing of 
peacebuilding as ‘liberal’ given its many non- liberal or un- liberal elements. 
Yet, this is not a necessary consequence of attention to practice; indeed, 
insofar as patterns are not idiosyncratic or trivial, they can be understood as 
structural in character without being deterministic (Wight 2006:  chapter 4). 
The second related point is to do with understandings of both colonial-
ism and racism in Autesserre’s epistemological framework. Colonialism is 
understood to be definitively historical (in a past versus present sense) and 
therefore not part of the present, as is repeatedly made clear – any attempt 
to suggest a connection is simply dismissed. More interestingly, although 
Autesserre does – with some courage – address racist attitudes amongst 
interveners, racism is understood as a function of an individual’s own stated 
misplaced prejudices but not a structural, institutional or collective condition 
with wider implications. Yet, married with Autesserre’s empirical material, 
the framing of the coloniality of power and relations of colonial difference 
are analytically powerful – they demonstrate the non- accidental, political 
and structural character of the problems she identifies, and which are identi-
fied in the findings of this book.
At the other end of the spectrum are writers whose conceptual attention 
to the structural production of intervention frame it as an explicitly ideologi-
cally driven political project – of global neoliberal governance and biopoliti-
cal containment of ‘uninsured’ populations (Duffield 2007), of ‘riot control’ 
(Duffield 2001; Pugh 2005), of regimes of ‘multi- level governance’ in the 
context of the internationalisation of the state (Hameiri 2010) or a hollowed-
out ‘post- liberalism’ (Chandler 2010). These accounts are structural in 
their orientation, locating international interventions and the ‘development-  
security merger’ in terms of a set of wider (neo)liberal global capitalist 
formations. Where they present detailed engagements with post- conflict or 
post- crisis environments (and not all do), they also present useful analyses of 
the ways in which intervention has sought to reform target societies in ways 
to make them amenable to markets, privatisation, structural adjustment pol-
icies and so on. All of these emphasise the changing nature of sovereignty 
and autonomy under conditions of globalisation and most make the argument 
that the last few decades were fundamentally about re- engineering states 
and populations to make them amenable to capital. As argued in  chapter 2, 
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Duffield in particular highlights the need to see contemporary interventions 
as a continuation of strategies of colonial rule, designed to govern the ‘surplus 
populations’ produced by capitalist realignment after the 1970s.
Whilst these accounts are valuable in drawing out what interveners may or 
may not intend, what the analysis of this book suggests is also a fundamen-
tal indifference as to whether they succeed or fail in these efforts to govern. 
In this sense, the analysis resonates with Heathershaw’s (2009) account of 
the performative character of intervention in Tajikistan and, to a smaller 
extent, Mosse’s (2005) account of the politically necessary gap between 
‘good policy’ and functioning practices. Certainly, the present array of poli-
cies and outcomes in Mozambique put forward over the last thirty years has 
not produced a coherently structured, obediently governed space, even from 
the point of view of liberal and capitalist penetration. Thinking from below, 
does this really look in any way like a governing project – even a failed one? 
And if not, what does this tell us? An explanation rooted in questions of the 
coloniality of power rather than biopolitical governance pushes more towards 
a constitutive rather than a purposive account of how and why intervention 
functions the way it does, specifically looking at the roots and features of the 
hierarchies in place.
Relations of colonial difference are clearly both ‘material’ and ‘epistemic’ 
in character and practice, and they robustly reproduce themselves despite a 
series of attempted challenges. However, the relation of the ‘surplus popu-
lations’ identified in Duffield’s account to the specific contemporary con-
figuration of capital is, on my reading, secondary in an analytic sense to the 
wider relations of disposability in which they are embedded. In a historical 
sense – perhaps even epistemically and materially – relations of colonial dif-
ference are prior to any specific project of neoliberal governance, and may 
indeed outlast it. Whilst there is, then, an affinity between this explanation 
rooted in the coloniality of power and those rooted in the expanded frontier 
of liberal governance, there are clearly also fruitful questions to debate and 
which demand further research.
Finally, it is worth saying something about a third literature which sug-
gests that the politics of intervention is characterised by compatibility prob-
lems between interveners with their programmes of liberal engineering and 
‘locals’ of various kinds. Although the writers do not use the term, the ques-
tion of compatibility between interveners and intervened- in societies sub-
stantively underpins writings on the ‘hybrid peace’ (Mac Ginty 2010), the 
‘post- liberal’ peace (Richmond 2012), the ‘local turn’ (Mac Ginty et al. 2013) 
and the ‘friction’ literature (Björkdahl et al. 2013). Perhaps unsurprisingly 
given the authors’ roots in the conflict management and peacebuilding tradi-
tions, the emphasis is on societal groupings, values and forms of contestation, 
rather than between the interveners and the state as a political actor. Thus a wide 
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range of local actors, of whom some are state- based, by turns adapt, resist, 
are co- opted or coerced by intervention towards the goals of the liberal peace, 
although it is sometimes recognised that the relationship is asymmetric. This 
produces various forms of ‘hybrid peace’ in which the ‘liberal’ and ‘local’ are 
brought together, in either ‘negative’ or ‘positive’ forms.
In terms of the findings of this study, the fundamental problems of 
intervention – and indeed the causes of the alienation and dispossession 
produced amongst its targets – are not ‘compatibility’ problems caused 
by a lack of familiarity, cultural fit, understanding or empathy, or tensions 
between ‘liberal’ and ‘local’ ways of doing things, but ‘coloniality’ problems 
caused by the well- understood underlying political dynamics of intervention 
and its bifurcated understanding of who matters.4 Whilst the ‘compatibility’ 
literature acknowledges these issues, and sometimes attempts to run differ-
ent accounts and explanations together5 as if they were the same, it does not 
clarify the political parameters of this problem. Rather, by characterising 
the actors as ‘liberal’ and ‘local’, respectively, the compatibility explanation 
tends to ontologically depoliticise and de- historicise relations of colonial dif-
ference as being about a ‘clash of values’.
In sum, whilst there are many accounts of international peacebuilding and 
statebuilding interventions in circulation, few have attempted to mobilise the 
ideas of the targets of intervention in building up an analytic framework for 
explaining the phenomena. Autesserre’s approach has been welcomed for 
its detailed ethnography, but she translates her very striking findings into an 
oddly blunted, analytically flat set of conclusions. Duffield’s comprehensive 
account is also rich and convincing, but does not embrace the potential of a 
standpoint form of critique as a means of reinterpreting the political dynam-
ics of intervention. The coloniality of power framework developed here, 
however, brings together the lived experiences of intervention with a way 
of making sense of it as a structural, productive dimension of global power. 
As such, this project also makes a contribution to debates on the coloniality 
of power by the elaboration of some of its historiographical, epistemological 
and methodological concerns through an extended illustrative case study in a 
space of global public policymaking.
(HOW) CAN WE DECOLONISE INTERVENTION?
Given the constitutive, structural account of the coloniality of power which 
shapes the terrain of intervention, what hope is there that such a relationship 
can be decolonised? Are there forms of political ethics which can usefully 
challenge the present dynamics? Is it possible for international intervention 
to function, such that it does, in a less damaging way? What would this look 
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like? In this concluding discussion, I suggest that, to decolonise intervention, 
it is necessary to contemplate abandoning its central intellectual assumptions, 
its modes of operation and its political structures, in order to remake a terrain 
for solidaristic engagement and, where appropriate, postcolonial reparation. 
Given the scale of such a transformational demand, short of this, there are 
also smaller gestures that could nonetheless make a small impact on the con-
duct of intervention and its political effects.
To recap, the dynamics of intervention identified in this study – protagonismo, 
disposability, entitlement and dependency – all have their roots in what we have 
called the ‘coloniality of power’. This coloniality of power produces a kind 
of ‘common sense’ about the modern world, in which the West emerges as an 
either fortunate or deserving historical genius, which rationalises and justifies its 
subordination of the rest of the world in political and economic terms. Racialised 
identities, theories of human development, sciences of anthropology, sociology 
and economics, concepts of sovereignty and nationhood and so on all cohere to 
produce a world in which the primacy of the West as a beacon for humanity is 
taken as given and a benchmark for others to which to aspire.
Yet, a short excursion into the historical rise of the West reveals its embed-
dedness within global dynamics of interdependence and competition, as well 
as the history of dirt and blood involved in the growth of capitalism and the 
rise of the West (Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 2015). Moreover, the emergence 
of the West as an economic and political entity was itself constitutively bound 
up with its own imperial integration with the global South; an emblematic 
example of this is the role of India in furnishing much of the raw materi-
als, labour and technology that drove the Industrial Revolution in Britain 
(Bhambra 2007). A look at the economic policies and strategies it has recently 
promoted, however, demonstrates that they are not those which led to its 
rise – instead, they are much the opposite (Chang 2002).
To recall these histories is to challenge the common sense through which 
people of the global South are rendered dependent and disposable, whereas 
their Northern partners are the protagonists of and participants in the machine 
of human progress. This alternative historiography demonstrates that modern, 
ostensibly ‘Western’ phenomena such as ‘development’ and ‘statebuild-
ing’ turned on the fundamental interconnectedness of different populations 
around the world, of which the accumulated wealth of the collective efforts 
were restricted to particular spaces and peoples due to the racialised sense 
of entitlement underpinning the wider enterprise. To reject the contemporary 
reproduction of the racialised character of that entitlement is to make a case 
for a redistributive postcolonial ethical order, which recognises forms of 
collective historic responsibility for the nature of this order. Therefore, to 
reframe North- South international intervention through a decolonising sensi-
bility means, first and foremost, that aid needs to be conceived not as a form 
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of philanthropic assistance from the rich to the poor but a political system of 
historically engaged reparations working on healing what Mignolo and others 
have called ‘the colonial wound’ (2009: 3).
Such a rethinking might lead for a reversed understanding of who deserves 
what out of intervention – in this story, it is the target of aid who is entitled to 
it materially by virtue of historical patterns of imperial dispossession. They 
are also, under this logic, entitled to create the political space for their own 
sense of protagonismo over how to generate collective well- being. As Castel- 
Branco (2007) argues in his critical account of ownership discourse, it is not 
enough to simply talk about ‘ownership’ or ‘sovereignty’ but to cultivate the 
material conditions under which chronic aid dependency can be overturned. 
As noted in the earlier chapters, where Mozambique has been able to generate 
some freedom of manoeuvre, it has done so, albeit at considerable political 
cost sometimes, and not always to the benefit of the public.
Interveners, however, need to embrace their diminishing importance and 
lost moral authority on many aspects of intervention, whilst being ready to 
assist financially where they are able. This is an unpalatable prospect for 
those accustomed to a playing field in which they are understood to be natu-
rally entitled to offer expertise, guidance and to exercise control. Specifically, 
they can look to de- escalate the tendencies for protagonismo, disposability, 
entitlement and dependency within Western intervention, which should 
reduce some of the immediately harmful impact that aid may have, even as a 
wider structural transformation is ultimately necessary. Three specific forms 
of attention to existing practice can be illustrated here briefly.
First, interveners could find ways of accounting for the opportunity costs 
of their own activities to the targets of intervention. The politics of disposabil-
ity within intervention is particularly engendered by bureaucratic accounting 
mechanisms which follow dollars around but do not generally conceive of 
the intended beneficiaries as expending any resource in order to service the 
programme. This is, as the study has shown, of course untrue, but it enables 
interveners to treat beneficiaries as effectively disposable. A more respect-
ful accounting procedure would account for the loss of time and activity 
occurring as a result of the programme. In the health sector, for example, 
how many patients would have been attended to, had the worker not been at 
the programme? How many civil servant hours have been absorbed by this 
co- operation? In the agricultural sector, what would this land have been used 
for if not this crop? What was the longer- term effect of this project (i.e. two 
or three years after the project was finished)? More broadly, have any projects 
like this been tried before and what was the long- term effect? If the target 
had the funds, what would they spend them on, and is this more important 
than what is being suggested? Integrating such considerations and calcula-
tions into the planning phase as well as the monitoring and evaluation phases 
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would force a reckoning with the ‘real’ value of the programme or project on 
terms set by the intended beneficiary. This would also reframe the conversa-
tions around the expensive and ineffective character of many international aid 
consultancy engagements. Whilst the conservative Western press and politi-
cal establishment frames these as a waste of taxpayers’ money, a decolonising 
reading of the same sees these costs as principally borne by the intended tar-
gets, who not only lose the resources that they might have had to implement a 
programme but also have to spend time servicing and supporting consultants.
Second, interveners could simply observe the international signed agree-
ments on aid harmonisation and ownership. This is a very basic request on 
one level, aimed at containing the negative effects of protagonismo on the 
part of donors, but one which Western donors in particular seem fundamen-
tally unable to stomach. Many of the issues with the effects of duplication, 
ownership and fragmentation were already addressed in the Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Busan Partnership for Effective 
Development Co- operation (2011) (although neither is an unproblematic 
document). Yet, the trend for many Western donors in Mozambique has been 
to withdraw from common funding arrangements and priorities defined by 
the government, citing a lack of influence and transparency and seeking to 
develop partnerships outside the state to realise their objectives. This study 
suggests, however, that, in many respects, the reduction in influence over the 
development agenda should be viewed as a positive outcome politically, if 
it means that the target government is able to pursue a policy it has defined 
coherently, supported by resources which are committed to those ends. In 
the longer term, to have ‘traditional donors’ seeing themselves more like 
Southern donors do will mean reckoning with the relations of colonial differ-
ence that have historically defined these relationships.
Finally, interveners could think about a deeper politics of postcolonial eth-
ical responsibility regarding global political and economic structures which 
facilitate dynamics of ongoing dispossession. Whilst certain structural hyp-
ocrisies in international development are well known – such as the long- term 
persistence of EU and US agricultural subsidies, which often disadvantage 
Southern producers and business, and the roles of the state in subsidising 
various industries – it has recently become clearer through revelations such 
as the Panama Papers that Western financial institutions and tax havens are 
key actors in facilitating elite networks of corruption in the global South 
(Cooley et al. 2017). These can also be understood as integral to facilitating 
state collapse (Hill et al. 2013). These situations have to be understood as pol-
itically untenable in the light of a stated desire to promote fair and equitable 
global development, in which power and money are made accountable and 
accessible to the many rather than the few. Western governments and publics 
need to refrain from claiming moral authority on these issues and begin with 
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a diagnostic of the multiple sites at which theft and dispossession take place, 
many of which are within their control.
***
And yet, as this book is being finished, it appears that the global political 
climate – at least in the West – is moving in another direction. The politi-
cal consensus of the last few decades offered occasional public glimpses of 
solidaristic and humanistic sensibilities about world politics, even if deeply 
embedded in relations of colonial difference, and problematic, hypocritical 
practices which worked against statebuilding. There were points at which 
a thin global accountability was promised, even if not delivered. Whilst the 
old is dying, and the new is not yet born, the morbid, populist- authoritarian- 
 racist- fascist symptoms of the present are not especially promising. It may 
well be that the ethical imperatives holding together practices of international 
intervention will simply break and the practices disappear from Western 
policy in the near future. This may seem unlikely, but, even so, a significant 
rescaling is almost certainly on the cards.
This presents both an opportunity and a problem for a de colonial political 
moment. The opportunity may be this: With a West which is less committed 
to interfering directly in the global South, there is more space for practical 
‘de- linking’, which generates space for autonomous political projects and ways 
of thinking/ being. This may anyway be the consequence of the decline of Western 
power in its twentieth- century form (Hopgood 2013). The recent rise of leftist 
governments in South America and elsewhere has partially realised some of 
these aspirations. However, in looking at the ongoing problems these countries 
have faced, it is clear that (a) the West is unlikely to seriously disengage from 
the global South, and (b) politically engaged people in different sites can-
not abandon the interconnected character of decolonial politics on issues as 
diverse as land dispossession, violence against indigenous peoples, offshore 
tax havens, environmental degradation and the facilitation of war. All of these 
require a confrontation with the relations of colonial difference that facilitate 
the globally differentiated entitlements of humans to protection, resources and 
political space.
With this in mind, the future prospects for the contribution of academic 
knowledge to a better and more just world will depend on its capacity to 
work with and through the perspectives of those disempowered by relations 
of coloniality, across the globe. IR as a discipline is beginning, slowly and 
surely, to perceive ways in which it might do this. As it develops ‘loci of 
enunciation’ beyond its North Atlantic roots, there is the potential for its 
thinking to become broader, more diverse and more insightful on such issues. 
In this sense, although the discipline may be late to the party in terms of con-
fronting its colonial thinking, there is plenty more music to come.
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NOTES
 1. See Giroux (2012), Odysseos (2016).
 2. See particularly Anghie (2007:  chapter 5).
 3. John Heathershaw has drawn my attention to the satire by Megoran (2005).
 4. Targets of intervention therefore often develop a fluency in multiple political 
registers, as demonstrated by Heathershaw (2007).
 5. See, for example, Richmond (2014: conclusion).
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